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This thesis presents the first academic analysis of key US motion picture 
production company Laurel Entertainment. Established in Pittsburgh by Night of 
the Living Dead (1968) director George A. Romero and his business partner 
Richard P. Rubinstein, Laurel’s geographical and ideological separateness from 
bicoastal filmic centres was unprecedented. Yet despite being at the forefront of 
a number of practices that came to shape non-Hollywood production, including 
synergetic crossovers and diversification, Laurel has been neglected from 
previous investigations of the independent sector. This study traces Laurel’s 
growth from grassroots subsidiary to publicly-owned enterprise, revealing the 
strategic and creative thinking that ensured survival on the margins of the 
industry. Here, an analysis of the firm’s infrastructure employs a synthesis of 
ethnographic research, empirical data and business and economic theory, 
considering the complex array of stakeholders and changing opportunity 
structures that fed into and helped dictate output. Scrutiny of Laurel and its co-
founders also provides new insight into the cinema of major genre filmmaker 
George Romero, while shedding light on the under-researched figure of the 
independent film producer. By looking towards the activities of the Laurel 
partners, this study offers a revisionist account of auteur filmmaking, cult film 
and independent cinema from a “real-world,” practitioner-level perspective, 
asking how these strands intersected within the firm and mapping out the 
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Laurel Entertainment, Inc. is a motion picture development and 
production company primarily specializing in moderate budget feature 
films. 





















1963 Dec. George A. Romero and his partners initiate the Pittsburgh-
  based motion picture production company Latent Image, Inc.   
1968 Oct. The Latent Image partners release their debut feature Night 
  of the Living Dead, made under the limited partnership Image Ten.  
1970 9 Dec. Romero applies for a certificate of incorporation for Laurel 
  Productions of Pennsylvania, a subsidiary of Latent Image. 
1972 2 Mar. Latent Image’s There’s Always Vanilla is released in limited 
  theatres across the US, distributed by Cambist Films. 
  May. Jack’s Wife (aka Season of the Witch, aka Hungry Wives) 
  screens in New York, distributed by Jack H. Harris Enterprises.  
1973 23 Mar. The Crazies is released theatrically in the US, distributed 
  by Cambist Films.  
  Freelance journalist Richard P. Rubinstein interviews Romero for 
  Filmmakers Newsletter. Rubinstein agrees to become Romero’s 
  business partner at a revived Laurel Productions. 
  Laurel begin work on the sports documentary series The Winners. 
  Production continues throughout 1974. Released by ABC.  
1975  25 Feb. The company is formally renamed Laurel Tape & Film, 
  Inc. 
1976  28 June. Romero is made general partner of J.W. Associates, a 





1977  The company begins operating under the name the Laurel Group, 
  a subsidiary of Rubinstein’s video production firm the Ultimate 
  Mirror. 
  May. Martin premieres out of competition at the 30th Cannes Film 
  Festival. 
  Nov. Production of Dawn of the Dead begins in Monroeville,  
  Pennsylvania. 
1978  May. A cut of Dawn of the Dead screens at the 31st Cannes Film 
  Festival. 
  Aug. Martin screens as part of the first Utah/US Film Festival.  
  2 Sept. The European edit of Dawn of the Dead (aka Zombi)  
  premieres in Italy. 
1979 20 Apr. Dawn of the Dead is released in US theatres, distributed 
  by UFDC. 
  14 Dec. Laurel Entertainment receives a certificate of   
  incorporation, establishing a new, legally distinct iteration of the 
  firm. 
1980 31 Mar. Laurel Entertainment begin trading as a publicly-owned 
  company, reporting the sale of 675,000 shares. 
1981 10 Apr. Knightriders receives a limited US theatrical release,  
  distributed by UFDC as the first of a three-picture deal. 
  25 Apr. Laurel enter into a two-year agreement with talent agent 
  Adams, Ray and Rosenberg, Inc. for domestic representation. 
1982 10 Nov. Warner Bros. release Creepshow across US cinemas. 
  Made in collaboration with UFDC. 





1985  Apr. Mitchell Galin joins as vice president of production. 
  19 June. George Romero exits the company. 
  July. Day of the Dead is released theatrically in the US, distributed 
  by UFDC. 
1986 9 May. Laurel acquire the assets of California-based limited  
  partnership Angeles Cinema Investors. 
1987 1 May. Creepshow 2 is released theatrically in the US, distributed 
  by New World Pictures. 
1988  24 July. Tales from the Darkside ends after four seasons. 
  22 Oct. Television series Monsters begins its own four-season 
  run. 
1989 1 Mar. Laurel merge with Spelling Productions and television 
  distributor Worldvision Enterprises to form Spelling Entertainment, 
  Inc.  
  21 Apr. Pet Sematary is released by Paramount Pictures,  
  produced by Rubinstein and Galin. 
1990  4 May. Tales from the Darkside: The Movie is released by  
  Paramount. 
1991 Apr. Monsters ends production after 72 episodes. 
  16 July. Short-order series Golden Years begins airing on CBS. 
  Written by Stephen King. 
1993  31 Mar. Blockbuster Entertainment acquires 48% of Spelling’s 
  common stock. 
  28 Sept. Movie-for-television Precious Victims airs on CBS. 
1994  Jan. Blockbuster merge with transnational media corporation 





  15 Jan. Movie-for-television The Vernon Johns Story premieres. 
  14 Feb. Viacom acquire a controlling interest in Paramount  
  Communications. 
  25 Mar. Blockbuster’s ownership of Spelling’s common stock rises 
  to 70.5%. 
  8 May. Miniseries adaptation of Stephen King’s The Stand begins 
  airing on ABC. 
  23 Nov. Viacom closes Laurel Entertainment’s offices. Laurel’s 
  final programme, Stephen King’s The Langoliers, premieres on 14 


























George A. Romero cuts a rather curious figure. He is an American 
commercial director who owns and runs his own production company. So 
far he has made six feature films but remains unwilling to join the 
industry, and admits to being constantly “amazed that anything survives 
the system at all.” 
Chris Auty. “The Haunting of Middle America.” 1979. p.28 
 
We [Laurel] tend to operate in more a ‘European style’ in terms of the 
way we produce and the way George directs in that we tend to follow 
Sarris’s auteur theory of direction . . . I see my function as a producer in 
terms of providing George Romero with a brush, palette and canvas. And 
his creative control is absolute in terms of the film itself, that he’s the 
scriptwriter, that he is the director and that he is the editor. It’s totally the 
product of one man’s vision—on a creative level. 











Established by major independent filmmaker George A. Romero and producer-
entrepreneur Richard P. Rubinstein, Laurel’s ambition to construct a profit-
maximising corporate entity around notions of auteurship was audacious. That 
the firm would do so from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a space geographically and 
ideologically apart from bicoastal filmic centres, was unprecedented. In Laurel’s 
professed determination to provide a stable, autonomous platform for Romero’s 
artistry, the firm was at the forefront of a number of practices that came to 
shape non-Hollywood production in the 1970s and beyond, including synergetic 
crossovers, multinational funding structures, manipulations of ancillary markets 
and product diversification. Despite this, the company has been entirely 
overlooked by the academy. Romero is recognised as one of the most culturally 
significant horror auteurs to emerge from the US, from his directorial debut 
Night of the Living Dead (1968) onwards demonstrating a commitment to 
politically challenging low-budget genre cinema. His status as a leading cult 
filmmaker may be assured, but the activities of the small independent 
production company that facilitated a substantial part of his output has been 
neglected. 
 In scrutinising Laurel Entertainment, this thesis offers an intricate, micro-
industrial case study of an independent production company on the margins of 
both the industry and current academic frames of analysis. Delving into the so-
called “real-world” activities of the firm provides a unique perspective from 
which to assess independent filmmaking practices and production cultures, 
enhancing our understanding of institutional behaviours and creative incentives 
in this sector. Laurel’s remarkable longevity across three decades of production 
(four when we take into account parent company the Latent Image) traversed 





the macro-industrial changes that impacted this small-sized media enterprise. 
Utilising a media industry studies framework that “perceives culture and cultural 
production as sites of struggle, contestation, and negotiation between a broad 
range of stakeholders” (Holt and Perren 5), this thesis presents new insight into 
the work of George Romero and, not least, the under-researched figure of the 
independent film producer, revealing the myriad economic, legal and 
institutional forces that feed into and dictate cultural objects away from 
Hollywood. 
 Sitting within this broader study of the firm is an intersection between 
three distinct fields of media analysis: auteur filmmaking, cult film and American 
independent cinema. These strands were crucial to Romero’s framing as an 
important regional director who “redefined the genre film” (Yakir, “Morning” 60), 
yet this study reviews issues surrounding the auteur, cult and independent 
cinema in closer relation to industrial parameters, looking at the impact on 
systems of corporate governance and marketplace strategies. This thesis 
considers how these fields interacted and were internally organised within the 
firm, charting the innovations, compromises and contradictions of this 
infrastructural convergence. Interrogating Laurel’s corporate development 
expands existing critical materials to consider these branches of academic 
study from a ground-level perspective, asking what auteurship, cult and 
independence meant to practitioners, not only artistically, but also in terms of 
economic and industrial permanence. 
 
Literature Review 
No prior scholarship exists on Laurel or its co-founder Richard P. Rubinstein. 





popular press has been almost as disinterested as the academy. Paul A. 
Gange’s The Zombies That Ate Pittsburgh: The Films of George A. Romero 
(1987) is singular in discussing Laurel with any degree of specificity, the 
attention bestowed upon the firm perhaps unsurprising given the book’s status 
as an official Laurel publication. In a chapter dedicated to Laurel’s early 
development, Gange grants the partners agency to discuss their individual 
“philosophies” concerning the company. As Romero reiterates his need for 
“creative control,” Rubinstein situates himself as a mediator between the “bad 
guys” of Hollywood and Romero’s artistry, a “decisive” business graduate who 
gets things done while “refusing to bend to the rules of the Hollywood studio 
system for financing and distribution” (58, 59). The partners stress that they 
maintain “autonomous bits of turf” within the firm’s corporate governance (57), 
divided evenly between Rubinstein’s business knowhow and Romero’s creative 
leadership. 
 Critical focus has fallen on Romero himself with more frequency, largely 
due to the success of the “zombie films” that established his reputation. In a 
career that encompassed five decades, Romero directed six feature films 
depicting the walking dead, beginning with Night of the Living Dead and 
culminating in Survival of the Dead in 2009. Scenes of explicit violence made 
Night controversial upon its original late-1960s release (Hoberman and 
Rosenbaum 110), yet the film was quickly redrawn as a “a seminal text in the 
development of modern horror” (Waller 14). The film’s apparent political subtext 
(the nihilistic ending sees the African American hero shot dead by a redneck 
posse) is perceived to have “radicalised the low-budget American horror movie, 
reinstating the marginal genre’s potential for putting forward oppositional 





Night’s influence in its immediacy, both geographically (set in a Pennsylvanian 
farmhouse rather than a Transylvanian crypt)1 and industrially. “[Romero] 
brought horror to the heartland,” writes Newman, “and encouraged a 1970s 
generation of hand-to-mouth auteurs” that included Wes Craven, David 
Cronenberg, John Carpenter and Tobe Hooper (“American Horror” 134). 
 The film’s 1978 sequel was equally impactful and the bloody display of 
cannibalism in Dawn of the Dead famously caused New York Times critic Janet 
Maslin to flee the theatre after fifteen minutes (C14). Dave Kehr regarded the 
“aggressiveness and antisocial stance” as equally shocking, writing that “as an 
independent film, Dawn of the Dead might be too independent—too fierce and 
original and threatening” (106). Such was Dawn’s notoriety that critic Tom Allen 
predicted “the biggest cult blockbuster of all time” (1), and the film went on to 
earn an impressive $55 million at the worldwide box office (“Dawn of the Dead 
(1979) - Financial”). 
 The widespread portrayal of Romero as a counterculture auteur began in 
the immediate wake of Dawn of the Dead’s US release. In 1979, Romero and 
Rubinstein were guests at Toronto’s Festival of Festivals, interviewed by 
organisers Robin Wood, Richard Lippe and Tony Williams as part of a 
retrospective on horror cinema.2 This retrospective, alongside the 
accompanying American Nightmare booklet (written with Andrew Britton), 
significantly contributed to the study of horror cinema, inaugurating a rich vein of 
analysis that was readily taken up by subsequent scholars in the field. By 
incorporating Marxist and Freudian theory, Wood conceptualised horror as a 
                                                   
1 Night stands alongside Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960) and Roman Polanski’s Rosemary’s 
Baby (1968) as one of a trio of 1960s horror movies that removed the traditional distancing 
devices of the genre, instead relocating their narratives into recognisable American locales—a 
rural farmhouse, a roadside motel and a Manhattan apartment complex respectively. 





vital, transgressive counterpoint to the dominant systems of capitalism and the 
normative sociocultural constructs validated by Hollywood (“An Introduction” 7). 
Romero’s films were placed at the heart of this enquiry and Wood concluded 
that the flesh-eating ghouls in Dawn of the Dead, driven by their sole need to 
consume, were “the logical end-result, the reductio ad absurdum and ad 
nauseum, of Capitalism” (“Neglected” 31). 
 As influential as Wood’s writings may be, his approach has limitations. 
Wood’s inability to see past a text-centred reading allowed him to punctuate 
transgressive qualities without considering the conservative role genre might 
play within an industrial framework, i.e. as a packaged commodity (Holt and 
Perren 10). In his vehemence to reframe horror as a worthy academic subject, 
Wood is also somewhat reductive, arranging films and filmmakers on opposite 
sides of a transgressive vs. regressive battle line. Those that failed to meet 
Wood’s ethical standards, as with David Cronenberg and Brian De Palma, are 
subsequently cast aside (“Neglected” 28). Such compartmentalisation also 
applied to Romero, and within Wood’s advocacy the filmmaker was limited as a 
specific cultural type—as a horror film auteur. When Romero stepped outside 
this box, upping the comedic content as he did with Creepshow (1982), or 
setting aside genre entirely as with Knightriders (1981), Wood was dismissive. 
For him, the former comprised “a series of empty anecdotes,” the latter was little 
more than an “archetypal liberal American movie, with something nice to say 
about every minority group [and] some pious platitudes” (Hollywood 168-69). 
 Wood’s American Nightmare collaborator Tony Williams has also 
returned to Romero with a degree of frequency, penning The Cinema of George 
A. Romero: Knight of the Living Dead in 2003 (updated in 2015) and editing the 





is admirable in his determination to move past the boundaries of horror and 
zombies, becoming one of the first Romero scholars to give attention to lesser 
known works such as There’s Always Vanilla (1971), Jack’s Wife (1972) and 
Monkey Shines (1988). Williams draws strong auteurist connections between 
Romero’s films and, like Wood, is single-minded in his focus on textual analysis. 
The impact of Romero’s industry collaborators on these films, such as Russell 
Streiner at Latent Image or Richard Rubinstein—collaborators who may 
complicate an auteurist reading of Romero’s films—are ignored. 
 Williams’s writing hypothesises a connectedness between Romero and 
the traditions of late-nineteenth/early-twentieth century literary naturalism, 
drawing parallels between shared displays of a “decaying inner-city 
environment” and the stylistic and narrative excesses of texts such as Dawn of 
the Dead and Émile Zola’s 1873 novel Le Ventre de Paris (Cinema 10-12). For 
his part, Romero insists that these similarities are coincidental (“An Interview” 
399), leading Williams to infer that such influences must have been 
appropriated “unconsciously” (Cinema 176). Fundamentally, Williams is striving 
to impart artistic seriousness onto Romero’s work via association. Linda 
Williams observes that genres that revel in the “gross display of the human 
body” (such as Dawn of the Dead) are the lowest in “cultural esteem,” with 
horror second only to pornography (“Film Bodies” 3). As Harmony H. Wu 
asserts, horror’s “generic imperatives are to produce exactly the kind of ‘visceral 
intolerance’ in which reviled distaste is firmly rooted,” consequently reiterating 
“lowbrow” insinuations (86). 
 Equating Romero to more reputable “high art” works like literary 
naturalism is one way of justifying the “base forms” that appear elsewhere in his 





has often fallen somewhere between “high” and “low art” value judgements. 
Rona Murray sees in Night an encapsulation of both art and exploitation “in its 
innovative and artful reinvention of the horror B-movie aesthetic” (45). Joan 
Hawkins claims that this convergence has proven problematic for those 
tastemakers who worry over the “erosion of a certain idea about art cinema.” 
Accordingly, clear distinctions have been made between “culturally superior” art 
films and debased exploitation fare (“Culture Wars”). 
 While theorists such as Tony Williams endeavour to resituate Romero 
within a more respectable critical arena, such distinctions can be seen as vital 
to the filmmaker’s cult reputation. Jeffrey Sconce’s widely cited essay 
“‘Trashing’ the Academy: Taste, Excess, and an Emerging Politics of Cinematic 
Style” (1995) defines cult, or paracinema as he calls it, as a celebration of 
“lowbrow” product, presenting “a direct challenge to the values of aesthete film 
culture and a general affront to the 'refined' sensibility of the parent taste 
culture” (376).  For Sconce, paracinema encompasses 
 
such seemingly disparate subgenres as 'badfilm,' splatterpunk, 'mondo' 
films, sword and sandal epics, Elvis flicks, government hygiene films, 
Japanese monster movies, beach-party musicals, and just about every 
other historical manifestation of exploitation cinema from juvenile 
delinquency documentaries to soft-core pornography. (372) 
 
Given the “sheer eclecticism” of these films (Jancovich, “Cult Fictions” 314), 
Pierre Bourdieu’s seminal work on cultural distinction has been repeatedly 





taste.3 As Bourdieu observes, “taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. 
Social subjects, classified by their classification, distinguished themselves by 
the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished 
and the vulgar” (390). For David Chute, cult cinema’s “crucial social function is 
to overstep the limits of established taste” (“Outlaw Cinema” 10), an 
oppositional rally cry that neatly summarises paracinema consumption. 
 Mark Jancovich’s exploration of cult and “audience-screen” relations4 
proposes that aficionados seek to affirm their identity by rejecting mainstream 
entertainment and celebrating transgressive materials (“Cult Fictions” 306). 
From the perspective of cult fandom, viewers of mainstream product become 
the “moronic victims of mass culture” (“Real Shocker” 25). Absurdly reductive 
though this definition may be, it is central to oppositional identity constructs 
(Jancovich et al. 2). Jancovich writes that cult reception rests on “the sense of 
distinction between that which is defined as the authentic subcultural self and 
that which is presented as the inauthentic mass cultural other” (“Real Shocker” 
29”), a process that subsumes industrial strictures into the broader concerns of 
fan identity-making. Writing with a “fan’s-eye view,” critics V. Vale and Andrea 
Juno assert that lowbrow/low-budget cult films are more authentic because they 
are unshackled from the restraints of mainstream production: 
 
They can be transcendent expressions of a single person’s individual 
vision and quirky originality. When a corporation decides to invest $20 
million in a film, a chain of command regulates each step, and no one 
person is allowed free rein. Meetings with lawyers, accountants and 
corporate boards are what films in Hollywood are all about. (5) 
                                                   
3 See also John Fiske. “The Cultural Economy of Fandom,” 1992. 30-49. 






Industrial parameters, however ill-defined, become little more than an additional 
means through which to signify mass cultural bankruptcy. But what this reading 
shrouds is the question of how exactly these cult films are made. What is the 
production process, and to what extent does this process permit artistic 
transcendence? 
 Looking at cult through issues of reception, Elena Gorfinkel argues that 
the field has shifted “from the ‘death of the author,’ to the (re)birth of the 
audience” (35). Yet as is apparent from Vale and Juno, the “individual vision” of 
an author has not been entirely discarded. Mathijs and Sexton have detected “a 
romanticist creed” surrounding the auteur, underpinned by “the idea of a lone, 
heroic figure battling against the odds to create works that are taken to heart by 
outsider audiences” (68). In 100 Cult Films (2011), Mathijs and Mendik pay their 
own tribute, championing directors they perceive to be “the core of the cult 
auteur canon”—a list that includes George Romero (Introduction 3).5 As a cult 
figure, Romero’s identity rests on transgression (politically and in taboo displays 
of violence), his use of debased genres, his auteurist propensities and, not 
least, his geographical distance “far away from Hollywood” (Spainhower 183). In 
other words, his independence. 
 Despite being crowned “king of the independents” by some excitable 
critics (Keyser 198), Romero’s close association with genre has seen him 
ignored in academic and critical studies of American independent cinema (see 
Levy 12; Insdorf 58). This thesis, however, resituates Romero’s work within a 
                                                   
5 The other filmmakers joining Romero on this pedestal are Dario Argento, David Cronenberg, 
Peter Jackson, Terry Gilliam and Alejandro Jodorowsky. To date, Gilliam is the only filmmaker 
on this list not to try his hand at horror. Indeed, Mathijs and Mendik note the “authority of genre” 
when it comes to cult cinema and, at least in terms of their own hand-picked selection, confess 





broader study of independent cinema, exploring (in contradiction to issues of 
cult film reception) the economic and industrial value of cult horror to 
practitioners and media entities on the margins of the mainstream industry. 
Indeed, numerous parallels and overlaps between cult and independent cinema 
will quickly become apparent, yet these strands have developed separately, 
displaying their own distinct taxonomies based on ideological, industrial and 
temporal paradigms. 
 In the introduction to American Independent Cinema: A Sight & Sound 
Reader (2001), Jim Hillier says that “historically, ‘independent’ has always 
implied work different from the dominant or mainstream, whether this 
relationship is defined primarily in economic terms (production and distribution) 
or in aesthetic or stylistic terms” (ix). More than just “different,” in American 
Independent Cinema (2005) Geoff King situates the independent as a 
“challenge to Hollywood” (1), customarily (though not definitively) laid down 
through a combination of “ultra-low-budget” filmmaking, a disruptive or 
unconventional visual style and a direct address to social issues usually 
avoided by “mainstream Hollywood” (2). King asserts that a “degree of distance, 
industrially, from the Hollywood studio system often appears to be a necessary 
condition for substantial formal or sociopolitical departure from the dominant 
norms” (2). Chris Holmlund writes that the independent label suggests “social 
engagement and/or aesthetic experimentation—a distinctive visual look, an 
unusual narrative pattern, a self-reflexive style” (2). 
 If this already sounds like cult film, writings on the American independent 
also centre the director-auteur, extolling a medium that fortifies “the personal 
vision of the filmmakers, who retain complete control over their projects” (Rosen 





is exceedingly rare in major studio productions, while it is altogether common—
if not taken for granted—in independent filmmaking. In this sense the indie 
realm is the province of the auteur” (“Film Industry” 50). Emanuel Levy’s 
Cinema of Outsiders: The Rise of American Independent Film (1999) also 
highlights a link between independent cinema and “personal expression,” where 
“the expectation is for an idiosyncratic mindset, the stamp of truly independent 
filmmakers like Steven Soderberg, John Sayles, Hal Hartley and Todd Hayes, 
who stubbornly stick to their eccentric sensibilities. The independent label 
evokes audacious movies” (2-3). 
 Analysis of the sector has galvanised around films from the 1980s 
onward. Independent cinema during this period was habitually identified as a 
“new phenomenon” (Hillier xv; “The Independent Feature” 57), with 
Soderbergh’s sex, lies, and videotape (1989) considered a climactic moment. 
Jennifer Holt reports that sex, lies, and videotape’s substantial returns6 altered 
the industrial perception of independent cinema, now viewed as “something that 
was profitable, viable and appealing to mainstream audiences” (303). sex’s 
reputation was elevated by its inclusion at several high-profile award 
ceremonies, notably the 1990 Academy Awards (nominated for Best Original 
Screenplay) and the 42nd Cannes Film Festival, where it won the prestigious 
Palme d’Or. 
 By 1989, however, independent cinema was far from the “new 
phenomenon” advertised. In Celluloid Mavericks (2000), Greg Merritt 
acknowledges a diverse independent sector almost a century old, 
encompassing everything from silent-era exploitation to 1990s “mini-major” 
production-distribution houses such as Miramax. Even before sex, increasingly 
                                                   






available funding opportunities created space for differentiated, low-cost 
product. In September 1979, New York’s Festival of American Independent 
Feature Films drew sponsorship from the Lincoln Centre and the Film Fund to 
shed light on non-Hollywood productions. In 1981, American Film magazine 
produced a special report on the independent feature, now expansive enough 
to be labelled a “movement” (57). Annette Insdorf’s article “Ordinary People, 
European-Style” lauded the “social and moral” vision of “these politically 
sensitive and geographically rooted directors [who] resist Hollywood’s priorities 
and potential absorption . . . [following a] European tradition that values a 
leisurely narrative over breakneck, television commercial-style pacing, reflection 
over action, and a depiction of political realities over sex and violence” (58). 
 Defining independent cinema was then as much about what it was not as 
what it was. Insdorf sought to distance “quality” films such as Gal Young ’Un 
(Dir. Nuñez, 1979) and Barbara Kopple’s documentary Harlan County U.S.A 
(1976) “from filmmakers like George Romero, Tobe Hooper, John Carpenter, 
and David Cronenberg, who to one degree or another exist outside the industry 
orbit, but whose affection for Grand Guignol, violence, and sex has attracted 
commercial money” (58). Chuck Kleinhans adds that the term “independent” 
“has to be understood as a relational term—independent in relation to the 
dominant system—rather than taken as indicating a practice that is totally free-
standing and autonomous” (“Independent Features” 308). As Jamie Sexton 
writes, many independent cinema scholars (and, not least, consumers) have 
positioned horror as an “abject entity . . . it must be excluded from most 
definitions and accounts of independent cinema because it contains values 
which independent cinema denies, yet it must also exist and be tolerated to an 





as a particular generic construct” (81). 
 The critical aggrandisement of certain independents began as a sincere 
attempt to support emergent filmmakers, pointing to the limited distribution 
networks, exhibition spaces and pots of money available to the first-timer 
(Cornwell 63-64, 80, 84). Undoubtedly commendable, this focus downplayed a 
historical context, reinforcing a narrative that American independent cinema 
began in the late 1970s/1980s. Additionally, so-called horror or cult filmmakers 
like Romero were only valued as a counterpoint, overlooking: 1) the fact that 
genre was far from the financial guarantor proposed; 2) that the use of genre 
might not preclude artistry and/or a “social and moral” vision; and 3) that these 
filmmakers might have interests beyond the production of genre films. By 
considering these factors, this thesis challenges the above narratives on 
American independent cinema, integrating the rich and diverse production 
history of Romero and Laurel to present a more holistic overview of 
developments in this sector from the 1960s to the mid-1990s. 
 In an academic analysis, attempts to recognise a diverse independent 
sector have sometimes been seen as disruptive to a wider critical organisation. 
For King et al., “if the term independent is taken to mean any non-studio 
production in the history of American cinema, it runs the danger of becoming so 
inclusive as to be of little value as a specific analytical tool” (2).7 In his own 
determination to add specificity, Levy identifies two distinct ways of classifying 
independent cinema, in either economic terms or as a “spirit or vision.” In the 
first, “any film financed outside Hollywood is independent. But the second 
suggests that it is the fresh perspective, innovative spirit, and personal vision 
that are the determining factor” (3). Favouring the latter, Levy discounts “B-
                                                   
7 This said, King concedes that the inclusion of genre-producing firms in an examination of 





movies, straight-to-video and genre films, such as broad comedies (Dumb and 
Dumber) and horror flicks, even if they are made by such masters as George 
Romero” (12). 
 Indeed, in a critical organisation of independent cinema, economic 
conditions have often been discarded (Carson 129), or else, as with cult, 
positioned as another counterpoint. Discussing the so-called “Sundance-
Miramax era” (1980s to 2010s), Michael Z. Newman writes, “the autonomy of 
indie culture is a function of artistic expressivity unconstrained by commercial or 
institutional pressures and demands.” (“Indie Film” 28). Perceiving mainstream 
production to be diminished by its overtly commercial agenda, the “indie” 
cineastes identified by Newman seem to be in alignment with the cult and 
paracinema audiences of Sconce and Jancovich et al. Yet as with Sexton 
above, Newman highlights the discordance of such oppositional taste cultures. 
Just as independent cinema offers subcultural capital through a rejection of 
“hegemonic mass culture,” it “also serves as a taste culture perpetuating the 
privilege of a social elite of upscale consumers” (“Indie Culture” 17). Returning 
to Bourdieu, this independent filmgoer denies the “lower, coarse, vulgar, venal, 
servile” pleasure of low-culture to affirm their superior or refined taste palette” 
(391). Of course, elitist, high-cultural pleasures are exactly what cult film fans 
purport to reject.8 In connection with reception and fan consumption then, cult 
and independent cinema appear to be fundamentally incompatible. 
 Also drawing upon taste cultures, Janet Staiger has offered her own 
distinctions between so-called “authentic” independents and the type of 
                                                   
8 Fiske argues that cult films typically appeal to “subordinated formations of people, particularly 
with those disempowered by any combination of gender, age, class and race” (30). James 
Monaco, however, strongly refutes such assertions, maintaining that the trash aesthetic of films 
like Pink Flamingos (Dir. Waters, 1972) and El Topo (Dir. Jodorowsky, 1970) indulge an 
educated, self-aware and emotionally distant viewing model. For Monaco, cult, like independent 





expensive, large-scale independent productions that emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s, such as Carolco’s $102 million Terminator 2: Judgement Day (Dir. 
Cameron, 1991). Her assertion that independent features “without an 
intellectual engagement might better be relegated to the traditional classical 
Hollywood cinema film practice” (“Independent” 24) is problematic, not only in 
its reinforcement of elitist notions of taste based on class, ethnicity and 
education, but also in its neglect of those independent producers who have 
used this “aura of quality” as a marketing tool, deemed particularly useful when 
selling films without a bankable star or attention-getting visual effects (Merritt 
276). A study of Laurel’s dual nature, “somewhere between the art house and 
the mall” (Merritt 268),9 moves away from value-laden polemics, harmonising 
cult and independent cinema through a consideration of the pragmatic, 
everyday realities (and compromises) of non-Hollywood film production. 
 For his part, Merritt has also drawn upon independent films and 
filmmakers typically rejected by Staiger’s “conception of quality” (“Independent” 
22). Nor is his study “limited to merely ‘spirited’ arthouse fare. Such genres as 
ethnic, horror, and pornography are given their fair due” (xiii). Yet despite the 
industrial framing of his work, Merritt remains in the thrall of the director-auteur 
and the apparent “freedom to tell one’s own story one’s own way” available in 
the independent sector (xv). In his conclusion, Merritt imagines a future where 
“the next great director—with a small budget and a big dream—calls action!” 
(411), a statement dislocated from the complex interplay of industrial personnel 
that facilitates calling “action” in the first place. Chuck Kleinhans is 
contemptuous of what he calls “the authorship myth” (“Independent Features” 
                                                   
9 Although this description was not used in direct reference to Laurel, Merritt was describing 
similar practitioners who strove to blend “thought-provoking” content with a broader 
accessibility. He cites L.Q. Jones’s post-apocalyptic satire A Boy and His Dog (1975) as a 





310), upholding that “independence is not just a state of mind; it is a set of 
potentials that can only be realized in a real world situation with real economic 
institutions and constraints” (326). 
 The scholarship on independent and cult cinema identified above has 
been of extreme value to the academy, not least in serving to overcome 
potentially “slippery” definitions (Hillier ix; King, American 9) to organise these 
strands as specific analytical tools. Textual qualities and issues of taste and 
reception have risen to the fore, countering the “sheer eclecticism” of these 
sectors. An auteurist interpretation of George Romero (alongside other horror 
filmmakers such as Wes Craven and Tobe Hooper), meanwhile, has been 
crucial to a serious-minded evaluation of horror cinema, with theorists in this 
field determined to look past the splatter to see the sociocultural, sociopolitical 
impact of these films and filmmakers. But to gain insight into how these fields 
were recognised and/or appropriated by individual practitioners and institutions, 
and, in turn, to ask what a “ground-level” viewpoint can contribute to a broader 
comprehension of auteur filmmaking, cult film and independent cinema, this 
enquiry must step outside this theoretical range. Accordingly, I will appropriate a 
media industry studies framework to explore the real-world practices, belief 
systems and identity of a single media entity (McDonald 2). 
 Spicer et al. comment that “the financial side of art has always proved 
problematic for academics and critics alike, as if fetish objects are somehow 
sullied by the profit motif” (Introduction 1). Such perceptions are becoming 
outdated and media industry studies has grown exponentially. Schatz 
emphasises the way media industry studies “gauges the complex interplay 
between media production (and media products) and the myriad forces that 





Hollywood” 19). Spicer et al. continue that a focus on economic, technical and 
political forces can enrich debates surrounding creativity, media historiography, 
national and transnational media cultures and authorship (Introduction 1, 7). 
John Hartley writes that industry studies can exploit “the fuzziness of the 
boundaries between ‘creative arts’ and ‘cultural industries,’ freedom and 
comfort, public and private, state-owned and commercial, citizen and consumer, 
the political and the personal” (18). 
 Such boundaries are further complicated by the range of stakeholders 
involved in the production of media goods. Rather than simply the vision of an 
auteur, media industry studies posits that all media is a negotiation between a 
number of participants. Michele Hilmes observes that the very “concept of 
‘industry’ implies the coming together of a host of interests and efforts around 
the production of goods or services” (22). From this perspective, John Thornton 
Caldwell points out that “negotiated and collective authorship is an almost 
unavoidable and determining reality in contemporary film/television” (199). In 
terms of production, additional ‘authors” might include producers, screenwriters, 
cinematographers, editors, production designers, composers, etc. At the 
financial level, this could be investors, shareholders, a board of directors, 
distributors, exhibitors, promoters or the marketplace itself. Even if, as Schatz 
maintains, the significance of the director-auteur in shaping a film cannot be 
overlooked (“Film Industry” 49), a media industry evaluation places this figure 
into a wider municipal,10 calling “into question some of the dominant analytical 
                                                   
10 James Lyons has applied a “value chain” model to film production, charting the fluctuating 
importance of key personnel as they traverse various stages of production. This work raises 
important questions about “creativity and creative power” (197). The “value chain” sees 
filmmaking as a “process of assembly” (202), situating the director as a function (one of many) 
whose value diffuses or concentrates depending on the demands of specific stages of 
production. Lyons writes that “concentrating on directing as a function, rather than director as an 
entity, can be helpful in correcting the auteurist supposition that, on an independent film, the 





frameworks that have shaped not only media scholarship but notions central to 
humanistic study generally” (Hilmes 30). 
 A media industries enquiry does not necessitate a total abandonment of 
textual components. In the introduction to their important edited collection 
Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method (2009), Holt and Perren stress 
that this is a holistic methodology, one that probes the interrelationship between 
industry, audience, society and text. As they write, “the textually orientated 
concerns of film and media studies could be enhanced and enlivened by a 
broadened base of analysis without threatening the larger commitment to the 
qualitative, critical work associated with humanist paradigms” (2). Indeed, 
addressing issues of economy, politics and policy can bring us back to the 
construction of texts and images, offering additional insight into artistic 
decisions and meaning-making (2). Hilmes positions the text as the starting 
point, a “preserved” artefact that remains central and present, the question that 
sparks the investigation (An Interview with Professor Michele Hilmes). Media 
industries can consequently be of vital use to an enquiry into American 
independent and cult cinema, extending the scope, while remaining inclusive of 
the academic work that has come before. 
 When considering media infrastructures and the products they construct, 
Holt and Perren insist that political economy is essential to the analysis (8). 
Gamble et al. outline political economy, at its simplest, as “an understanding of 
the different political and legal contexts which have shaped the development of 
the company and of the considerations that should determine its future” 
(Introduction 20). More precisely, Douglas Kellner says political economy “calls 
attention to the fact that the production, distribution and reception of culture 





relations between the state, the economy, social institutions and practices, 
culture, and organizations such as the media” (“Media Industries” 101). 
Economist R.H. Inglis Palgrave emphasised that political economy is about 
more than the relationship between “the government and governed,” also 
looking to the activities and interactions of individual practitioners (qtd. in Mosco 
23). Such relationships, particularly the interactions (both legal and personal) 
between the Laurel co-founders, will be crucial to this investigation. 
 A media industry and political economy framework has already been of 
value to a study of cult and independent cinema. Cult cinema scholars including 
Matt Hills and Bruce Kawin are alert to the fact that, even in the low-budget 
sector, commercial considerations are significant (Hills, “The Question” 443; 
Kawin 21). Kate Egan and Sarah Thomas’s work on “cult film stardom” also 
presses this case, perceiving the diametric figure of the so-called cult film star 
as “a negotiation between industry, management and economic values and 
notions of the subcultural and offbeat” (7). Mathijs and Mendik in The Cult Film 
Reader (2007)11 recognise that cult exists as “part of an economic premise” as 
cultural goods produced for profit (“Editorial Introduction” 7) yet insist that 
“something always goes wrong with cult films—there is always something 
unplanned intervening in one of the levels of production, promotion or 
reception” (“Editorial Introduction” 7). The industrial frame of my investigation 
puts such notions to the test, asking how cult sits within the self-conscious 
economic activities of a single company. 
 The business undertakings of horror and exploitation practitioners have 
received the most attention in regard to cult cinema and industry. Kevin 
                                                   
11 For Mathijs and Mendik, political economy is one part of a four-part taxonomy of cult cinema, 
included alongside reception, the film’s anatomy (i.e. issues of genre, content and style) and 
cultural status (“the way in which a cult film fits a time or region”) as qualifiers for inclusion 





Heffernan’s Ghouls, Gimmicks and Gold: Horror Films and the American Movie 
Business, 1953–1968 (2004) is a remedial to the privileging of textual analysis 
in horror film studies, writing that “a cultural or aesthetic account of the horror 
film unmoored from its economic history seems . . . wholly inadequate” (6). 
Heffernan brings to the fore issues of technology, distribution, exhibition, 
marketing, ancillary markets and production in an investigation only limited by 
its temporal specificity. In the introduction to Merchants of Menace: The 
Business of Horror Cinema (2014), editor Richard Nowell notes additional value 
in a media industry investigation, presenting the opportunity to reframe the 
enquiry around practitioners rather than spectators, to perceive the text not in 
the manner of what “‘we collectively believe it to be’ . . . but rather what they 
collectively believed it to be” (2). 
 Looking towards the independent sector, Alisa Perren and Yannis 
Tzioumakis have led the way in instigating an industrial focus. Perren’s Indie, 
Inc. (2012) provides a corrective to the numerous polemical writings on this 
sector, dismissive of the so-called “cult of personality” (11) she found to 
dominate Peter Biskind’s Down and Dirty Pictures: Miramax, Sundance and the 
Rise of Independent Film (2004). In Perren’s own words, Indie, Inc. is a 
“historical analysis of shifting industrial practices and cultural discourses about 
independence, indie, Indiewood, and Hollywood during the 1990s” (15). Perren 
charts Miramax’s growth from a distributor of concert films and foreign titles to a 
multi-platform Disney subsidiary, determining the company to be emblematic of 
a structural reorganisation that took place in Hollywood in the 1990s, particularly 





“indiewood” film replaced midrange productions on the studio’s roster.12 
 Tzioumakis’s expansive work in this field has scrutinised industry through 
the changing discourses of the word “independent,” charting how its fluctuating 
usage “expands and contracts when socially authorised institutions (filmmakers, 
industry practitioners, trade publications, academics, film critics and so on) 
contribute towards its definition at different periods in the history of American 
cinema” (American 11). Though he asserts that independent cinema can be 
organised into “distinct trends within fairly clearly demarcated periods of time” 
(“‘Independent,’ ‘Indie’” 30), Tzioumakis recognises that such periods are not 
absolute and draws upon historian Penelope J. Corfield to acknowledge the 
“deep continuities” and “slow gradual trends” that can occur over time 
(“‘Independent,’ ‘Indie’” 30). This said, such organisation enables a historically 
inclusive, industry-focused examination of these periods, charting the “studio 
years” of the mid-1920s to the late-1940s (covering the so-called Poverty Row 
studios), the “transitional years” of the late-1940s to late-1960s (the 
ramifications of divorcement and the rise of exploitation cinema) and 
“contemporary American independent cinema,” (itself organised into several 
sub-phases, including films from the New Hollywood, the mini-majors and the 
independent as studio subsidiary). 
 Tzioumakis and Perren’s surveys are wide-ranging, and like Merritt look 
to films and filmmakers beyond the dominant discourse. Tzioumakis’s edited 
collection The Time of Our Lives (2013), co-edited with Siân Lincoln, discusses 
the lasting sociocultural and industrial impact of Dirty Dancing (Dir. Ardolino, 
                                                   
12 The term “indiewood” denotes mid-budget, often star-driven mass appeal studio productions 
that display generic independent elements—namely, marginal characters and/or visual and 
narrative experimentation (Sexton 71). So-called “indiewood” films include the Coen Brothers’ 
$24 million budgeted No Country for Old Men (2007) for Miramax, and Paramount Vantage and 
Steven Soderbergh’s $48 million Traffic (2000), distributed by USA Films. For more on the 
“indiewood” phenomenon, see Geoff King’s Indiewood USA (2009) and Tzioumakis’s 





1987).13 Perren’s appraisal of production-distribution company Lions Gate, 
meanwhile, surveys the firm’s “adeptness at recognizing openings in the 
marketplace” (“Last Indie” 109), from in vogue “quality independents” such as 
Buffalo ’66 (Dir. Gallo, 1998) to films in tested genres, such as the horror film 
Saw (Dir. Wan, 2004). Building upon these evaluations of marginal 
independents, this thesis presents a rich case study of a small-scale 
entertainment company whose economic, industrial and geographical autonomy 
was, to a great extent, uniquely literal. “The Laurel story”—to borrow a phrase 
used by Rubinstein when writing his annual reports to shareholders (Laurel 
Entmt. AR 1987 3)—can expand the narrative of independent cinema in the US, 
revealing consistencies and deviations across a broader, more heterogeneous 
media landscape, adding greater nuance to our ideas about this sector and its 
“real-world” potentials. 
 Within this history of the firm, a number of key research questions 
emerge. What opportunities and limitations existed on the outer fringes of the 
industry? How did Laurel’s regional positioning effect internal production 
cultures and systems of corporate governance? To what extent did the 
company change over time and how do these changes speak to a current 
historiographical understanding of the independent sector at large? In terms of 
Rubinstein’s boast that Laurel operated in “the European style” to support the 
auteur, what did authorship really mean to the company? Who were the 
stakeholders that had a say over output and how did their involvement, in the 
words of Philip Drake, “problematise questions of both authorship and 
independence” (143)? Further, how does this complicate a textual reading of 
                                                   
13 Produced by independent label Vestron Pictures on a budget of $6 million, the film became a 
global phenomenon, earning over $213 million at the international box office (“Dirty Dancing 





Romero’s work? Where did cult fit into the firm’s strategic agenda and to what 
extent did cult genre restrict and/or enable creative autonomy? What can this 
tell us about cult’s wider place within an economic history of cinema? Finally, 
how were issues of authorship, cult and independence hierarchically arranged 
within the firm? These questions are addressed in this thesis through a diverse 
and interdisciplinary methodological approach. 
 
Methodology  
Schatz observes two distinct levels of media industry analysis, located at either 
the macro-industrial level, dealing with oligopoly, integration, distribution, etc., or 
at the micro-industrial level, concerned with individuals, singular production 
companies and distinct sectors (“Film Industry” 46-51). Allowing that a study of 
Laurel falls into the latter category, in their essay “The Production of Media 
Fiction” (2013) Horace Newcomb and Amanda Lotz stress that “different levels 
of analysis” are crucial to any industrial survey (62). As they advocate, “it is 
necessary, at some point and in some measure, to acknowledge the 
extraordinary range of levels of influence, from the broadest structural 
arrangements to the most particular creative or administrative decisions made” 
(66). Given that individual media entities do not exist in a vacuum, Newcomb 
and Lotz’s “shifting scales” emphasise the interrelationship between five levels: 
1) national and international political economy and policy; 2) specific industrial 
contexts; 3) particular organisations (studios, production companies, television 
networks); 4) individual productions; and 5) individual agents (64-66). 
 With this in mind, Lotz calls for a “mixture of methodologies,” one that 
encompasses a triptych of sociohistorical, industrial and textual analysis 





benefit from a synthesis of ethnographic research, the use of hard empirical 
data and textual analysis (16). Matthew Freeman also endorses a holistic 
“multimethod approach,” reflecting “the fact that media industries themselves 
cross disciplinary divides, operating socially, culturally, politically, economically, 
creatively [and] productively” (196). Crossing these “disciplinary divides” allows 
us to examine Laurel from a number of angles, collating research on economic 
strictures, business management, the sociocultural and sociopolitical 
landscape, the behaviours of individual agents and the industry at large to 
create a holistic portrait of the firm and its output. 
 Getting to know the inner workings of a firm is not without difficulty (not 
least given the temporal distance of examining a company that closed its offices 
over two decades ago) and Lotz and Newcomb stress the importance of 
corporate papers, including interoffice memorandums, records of shareholder 
and director meetings, manuals and revised screenplays, etc. As they affirm, 
these primary historical records “are essential for production research, because 
the documents contain evidence both of conflicting points of view and of 
concrete decision-making related to particular media artefacts” (“The Production 
of Entertainment” 73). At the same time, Lotz and Newcomb recognise that 
“behind-the-scenes” information is notoriously hard to come by, often due to 
inadequate archiving or attachment to a still active company (79). 
 From 1973 to 1979, Laurel was a privately-run firm, and as such its 
corporate papers are not a matter of public record. From 1980 onwards, 
however, Laurel transitioned into a publicly-owned company, requiring the 
submission of detailed reports to US federal agency the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC itself no longer has access to Laurel’s 





After extensive searching, I located these documents through a combination of 
the Hunt Library at Pittsburgh’s Carnegie-Mellon University (Romero’s alma 
mater) and the Butler Library at Columbia University in New York. A BAAS 
Marcus Cunliffe Award in 2016 and a University of Exeter PGR Research 
Support Fund allowed access to these rare materials, making it the first time 
they had been appropriated in an academic study.14 
 Laurel’s SEC reports were produced annually from 1980 to 1988 and 
each document gave extensive “state-of-the-company” information, typically 
consisting of an Annual Report to Shareholders (AR) and a Form 10-K. As the 
SEC’s website summarises, the AR usually appears in the form of a letter from 
the Chief Executive Officer (in this case Richard Rubinstein), outlining financial 
data, market segment information, a list of acquisitions, subsidiary activities, 
partnerships (be they with distributors, financers or creative collaborators), 
plans for expansion and the development of future projects. The Form 10-K is 
designed to provide greater transparency through a meticulous cataloguing of 
the company’s financial condition. This includes production financing, details of 
assets (such as property and subsidiary companies), existing legal proceedings, 
profiles on executive officers, lists of capital resources and liquidity, 
comparisons to activities in the previous fiscal year, staff remunerations 
(including bonus payments, etc.) and stock ownership.  
 These documents also contain a yearly Financial Statement and an 
Accountant’s Report, permitting scrutiny of balance sheets, revenue from a 
film’s release (not box office information, but rather payments received and/or 
Laurel’s share of the box office), packaging and production costs, lease 
payments and income tax payments. A Form 8-K meanwhile attaches a number 
                                                   





of exhibits, including memorandums, employment agreements (Romero’s and 
Rubinstein’s are here in full) and end of contract plans. Laurel’s 1984 Form 8-K, 
for example, is particularly exciting in that it contains Romero’s contractual 
demands as a so-called auteur filmmaker, itemising the creative controls that 
were available to him. The information held within these previously unexamined 
records reveals no less than the spine of the company’s operations during its 
key years of activity. 
 Post-1988, a flurry of merger and acquisitions (M&A) saw Laurel become 
a subsidiary to a number of larger firms, including Spelling Entertainment, Inc., 
Blockbuster Entertainment, Viacom and the CBS Corporation. As publicly-
owned entities, these firms were also required to submit annual documentation 
to the SEC. Laurel’s progress from here until its closure can be traced through 
these reports. Not as detailed in the attention given to Laurel, they are no less 
valuable in illuminating the profound changes to infrastructure and output that 
occurred during this final period of the company’s activities. 
 In union with these corporate papers, the importance of ethnographical 
data cannot be overlooked, where observation and interviews offer vital insight 
into the behaviours and rationales of the firm and its agents. Interviews with 
Laurel personnel and associates are of benefit in additional ways, helping to 
interpret and contextualise empirical data and to fill in those gaps in knowledge 
where no prior data exists. As a consequence, these subjects have been drawn 
from a diverse sample of personnel, collectively spanning various levels of 
corporate hierarchy and stages of development, preproduction, production and 
postproduction across different periods of Laurel’s life cycle. All of these 
participants are speaking for the first time about their specific relationships to 





University of Exeter’s Ethics Committee. 
 Of the interview subjects, John A. Russo worked for Laurel’s parent 
company Latent Image and is best known as the co-writer of Night of the Living 
Dead. John Harrison was a significant collaborator from 1974 onward, working 
for Laurel as an actor, composer, writer and director. Tony Buba is an important 
independent filmmaker in his own right and was among Laurel’s production and 
post-production crews on Dawn of the Dead, Knightriders and Day of the Dead 
(Dir. Romero, 1985). Like a number of Laurel collaborators, Tom Dubensky is a 
skilled multitasker, though he primarily acted as an assistant cameraman when 
working for the company. Financial advisor Barney Guttman, then of Barney 
Guttman & Associates, Inc., was the co-head of a consortium of regional 
investors that financed Martin. David Ball is a freelance producer, film 
accountant and completion guarantor representative who worked on 
Creepshow and Day of the Dead as a representative of the financiers. He later 
worked with Laurel directly as the producer of Creepshow 2 (Dir. Gornick, 
1987). William Teitler remains active as a Hollywood producer, getting his first 
producing job on Laurel’s television series Tales from the Darkside (1983-
1988). Ed Lammi, meanwhile, recalled his experiences in going from an 
associate producer on Day of the Dead to becoming Executive Vice President 
of Production for Sony Pictures Television. Mitchell Galin joined Laurel in April 
1985 as vice president of production and was a leading figure in taking the 
company forward, second only to Rubinstein. Finally, and most importantly, 
George A. Romero was an essential contributor to this thesis and, in an 
interview conducted in April 2016, provided insight into corporate structure and 
his personal expectations for the company he co-founded. 





al. caution that we must be mindful of the self-representations media industry 
figures make, remembering that “the offscreen production of media is itself a 
cultural production, mythologized and branded much like the onscreen textual 
culture that media industries produce” (2). Given the temporal distance of the 
events discussed, shifting viewpoints, record-setting or lapses in memory must 
also be considered. Additionally, these subjects are only a representative 
sample and some leading personnel are notable by their absence. John Mateer 
has recorded the “closed-door facade of the media industries” (qtd. in Freeman 
2), while Freeman notes the industry’s “tendency to often withhold information 
for commercial advantage” (2). This may have been the case with Rubinstein. 
To date, he remains active in the industry as founder of the independent 
production company New Amsterdam Entertainment, Inc. and as president and 
chief shareholder of the MKR Group, Inc. The principal business of this latter 
company is to “monetize the value” of a number of Laurel assets (see Capcom 
Co., Ltd v. The MKR Group). Given the continued value of these assets in 
ancillary markets, it is unsurprising that Rubinstein’s door has remained closed. 
 To compensate for this absence, additional primary resources, as 
recommended by Gough-Yates, encompasses textual analysis (with a close 
inspection of important Laurel productions) and “hard empirical data.” Trade 
publications such as Variety, specialised periodicals, fanzines, the national and 
regional press (particularly the New York Times and Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) 
and promotional materials add scope to this investigation. Through these 
materials, one can find extant interviews with leading personnel (including 
Rubinstein), industry-focused advertising, box office reports, legal 
considerations, details on marketplace trends, release patterns and information 






 The interdisciplinary methodology employed here also incorporates 
significant theoretical concepts from business studies. Laurel was a small 
business enterprise (in business studies, so-called small and medium-sized 
enterprises are referred to as SMEs) and parallels between individual firms and 
internal systems of organisation can be made across industries, with the 
entertainment industry no exception. For example, Eric Gedajlovic et al.’s 
findings on the founder-managed firm can tell us much about Laurel’s 
development and corporate identity. Research by Sharon Gifford or Michael 
Porkorny and John Sedgwick can shed light on risk and entrepreneurial 
behaviour. Taking into account theories such as David Jobber’s articulation of 
the marketing concept and Ruth Alsop et al.’s ideas of opportunity structures 
can offer new ways of looking at the independent sector as a whole.15 With this 
in mind, it is important to state that this is not an economic study and is not 
intended to tell businesses how to organise their operations. Instead, this thesis 
draws upon existing statistical findings from business studies (based on careful 
samplings and controls) as part of a comprehensive evaluation—one part of a 
mixed methodology, rather than as a research model in and of itself. 
 This thesis is only one case study, and while models of business may be 
utilised across industries and sectors, we cannot assume that Laurel’s 
behaviours were universally applied across production companies in the 
independent film sector (indeed, part of the value of this study is an emphasis 
on heterogenous activities). But as economic geographer Bent Flyvbjerg 
                                                   
15 Business theory was not some esoteric concept for Laurel. Richard Rubinstein was himself a 
business graduate, obtaining a Bachelor of Science degree at the American University in 
Washington D.C. and an MBA in business administration at Columbia University in 1971. What 
particular strands of analysis Rubinstein sweated over in the classroom is not known, but it is 






reports, “the advantage of the case study is that it can ‘close-in’ on real-life 
situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in 
practice” (114). The interdisciplinary approach of this case study therefore 
pushes closer to disclosing the everyday behaviours of the firm, taking into 
account the social interactions, motivations, self-representations and problem-
solving that made Laurel Entertainment the company that it was. 
 
Chapters 
Chapter One documents the emergence of Laurel’s parent company Latent 
Image within a wider American film marketplace. Beginning in the late 1950s, 
just prior to Latent Image’s inception in 1963, this chapter places developing 
trends in independent cinema under the spotlight, asking how a so-called New 
York “provincialism” and the manifestos of leading players including John 
Cassavetes, Jonas Mekas, the New American Cinema Group and the avant-
gardists impacted and delimited the sector at large, both geographically and 
aesthetically. On the west coast, analysis turns to a fragmenting 1960s 
Hollywood and the changes that led to a reliance on the creative and 
generational currency of up-and-coming director-auteurs. Aligned to the 
Hollywood “new wave” in several important ways, Romero instead elected to 
establish his own production company in Pittsburgh, a space in isolation from 
recognised centres of industry. The reasons for, and ramifications of, this 
decision are fundamental to this evaluation. 
 Shifting to the micro-industrial level, Chapter One presents a 
comprehensive examination of Latent Image, charting its development from a 
regional advertising firm into an ambitious, and at that point entirely singular, 





the company’s infrastructure and intent, ignoring the post-Fordist, egalitarian 
production culture that sat in determined opposition to traditional modes of 
filmmaking. Taking into account this corporate method for the first time strongly 
challenges an auteur-centric reading of Romero’s early work, particularly Night 
of the Living Dead. Amidst bold experimentation, Latent Image’s unique 
industrial placement tended inevitable obstacles and the company’s gradual 
reliance on exploitation product is considered in the context of a restricted 
independent marketplace. At the same time, attention to the internal work 
relations and changing power dynamics uncovers the decision-making that led 
to the formation of Laurel in 1973. Integrating economic theory such as the 
marketing concept and leadership management will add nuance to our 
understanding of the independent and exploitation sectors during this period. 
 Chapter Two traces Laurel’s growth from a subsidiary into a corporate 
entity in its own right. By inspecting the partnership between Romero and 
Rubinstein at this formative moment in their alliance, this chapter brings to the 
fore questions of “real-world” independence and the strategies employed to 
cultivate this space. Issues of risk, risk management and entrepreneurial 
behaviour are centralised here, highlighting the link between Rubinstein’s 
knowing offset of risk and Romero’s creativity. Paying close attention to 
Rubinstein’s corporate agenda admits a deeper insight into the role of the 
independent producer/entrepreneur; an awareness of Gary S. Becker’s concept 
of “human capital”, meanwhile, appraises Rubinstein’s place within the 
company, gauging the importance of his personal expertise and the canny risk 
management that was crucial in taking the company forward. 
 A study of these risk averse strategies draws upon Laurel’s manipulation 





ancillary markets (television, book publishing and foreign film imports) where 
product, to a large extent, was designed to fail. Laurel’s efforts to manage risk 
leads to a discussion of corporate identity and branding, looking at the risk-
reducing policies behind Romero’s reputation as a “cult auteur.” Laurel’s 
relationships with overseas agents and distributors can also be equated to risk, 
becoming an essential part of the company’s formative revenue building. In 
such an arrangement, partnership with an Italian consortium on Dawn of the 
Dead gave away Romero’s creative control in international markets. How this 
contradicts the supposed authorial sanctity of the American independent sector 
makes for an intriguing appraisal, particularly since this consortium was headed 
by horror filmmaker Dario Argento, an auteur whose cult reputation eclipsed 
Romero’s in overseas territories. 
 Chapter Three surveys a period of maturity and professionalisation, 
dating from 1979 to 1982. Now a publicly traded and owned enterprise, Laurel 
faced growing responsibilities to shareholders, becoming legally bound to a 
transparent system of operations. The influence this exerted on production 
content, internal infrastructure and commercial agenda is reviewed, paying 
attention to the restrictions placed on Romero’s improvisational production 
methods. Issues of professionalisation have been underexplored in relation to 
cult and independent filmmaking, appearing to contradict a rhetoric that situates 
these fields above corporate and regulatory interests. What these standardised 
systems of governance meant to Laurel as independent/cult film practitioners is 
measured in connection with this apparent dichotomy. 
 Chapter Three can be seen, in part, as a remedial to the ideological 
perceptions that surround cult and independent cinema. Yet Laurel’s 





sought permanence, the company brokered ties to the major studios for the first 
time, potentially contradicting Romero’s anti-establishment persona. In view of 
this, I evaluate the techniques employed by Laurel to reassert (or reconfigure) 
an identity of dissent, both through engagement with the press and through its 
feature films. Knightriders is presented as an evocative case study, with the 
firm’s changing structures of governance disclosing an entirely new reading of 
the film, one that conveys Romero’s own apprehensions about this period of 
maturity and his feelings regarding a so-called “spirit of independence.” 
 As professionalisation gave Laurel industrial credibility and money in the 
bank to develop new projects, Chapter Four considers a concurrent decline in 
filmic output. Critical to this stage of enquiry is Laurel’s footing as a standalone 
production and development company only, operating without the resources to 
finance or release product itself. Beginning in 1981, this chapter evaluates how 
high-profile external partners such as novelist Stephen King and Marvel Comics 
pushed the company towards more expensive genre fare, from epic post-
apocalyptic science fiction to superhero origin stories. Indeed, the company’s 
plans for an eclectic range of feature films brings into focus the packaging and 
sale of these objects on national and international film festival circuits, asking to 
what extent Romero’s creative agency was dependent on these and other 
external marketplace parameters. Laurel’s three-film production deal with 
distributor UFDC is also measured, paying close attention to the compromised 
production of Day of the Dead and how this contributed to Romero’s departure 
from the company in 1985. 
 Issues of agency are brought to the fore in this chapter, pertaining to 
leadership roles as much as the marketplace. Initially conceived to facilitate 





creative leader, now beholden to shareholders, a board of directors, external 
partners and a growing staff of employees. If the independent film producer is 
often arranged as a counterpoint to director artistry, examination of Rubinstein’s 
agency sheds light on the broad range of players who sought to benefit from his 
fiscal imperatives. Aside from those with business interests in the company, this 
extended to an assortment of talent, as the Rubinstein-initiated Tales from the 
Darkside television series sought to manufacture a platform for creative 
development. This chapter draws upon agency theory as a distinct field of 
economics, making plain Romero and Rubinstein’s roles as corporate leaders 
and questioning how the individualist demands of the auteur sat in accord (or 
discord) with the responsibilities of a producer partner. 
 Chapter Five looks at Laurel’s regeneration in the wake of Romero’s 
departure, mapping activity from 1985 to the company’s abrupt closure in 1994. 
This chapter opens by assaying the effect of corporate restructuring, noting the 
significance of pre-syndicated, cult television shows Tales from the Darkside 
and sister show Monsters (1988-1991) to sustainability. Laurel’s purchase of a 
number of externally produced filmic properties that had already been 
exhausted on the theatrical and home video markets (including Jonathan 
Demme’s 1984 Swing Shift) is also surveyed. In Romero’s absence, Laurel’s 
self-initiated productions appeared to rely heavily on Stephen King as a new 
creative figurehead, and the firm collaborated with the author on Creepshow 2, 
Pet Sematary (Dir. Lambert, 1989) and television shows Golden Years (1991) 
and The Stand (Dir. Garris, 1994). While considering the importance of King to 
the company’s survival, this chapter also offers a closer look at corporate 
officers such as Mitchell Galin, studying the role senior management played in 





 In 1989, Laurel merged with Aaron Spelling Productions and the global 
television distribution company Worldvision to form Spelling Entertainment, Inc. 
An appraisal of the consequences of this merger provides the basis for this 
chapter, looking at what this meant for the company and what it tells us about 
M&A trends at the macro-industrial level. As one of the many entertainment 
companies caught up in so-called “merger mania” (Lubatkin, “Mergers” 218), 
this review of Laurel moves away from the major players to consider this 
industry-wide realignment from the standpoint of an SME. We will see what 
merger meant to Laurel, surveying the subtle, if profound ways it transformed 
the company. Chapter Five concludes by looking at Spelling’s later merger with 
corporate giant Viacom, Inc., a pairing over which Laurel had no control and 
that ultimately resulted in the firm’s closure on 23 November 1994. 
 
Conclusion 
In a 1979 interview with Chris Auty, Romero registered his determination to 
remain independent of Hollywood, expressing amazement that anything 
survives the studio system at all. Yet survival in the independent sector, a 
survival that traversed four decades of production, was perhaps even more 
remarkable. Rubinstein’s suggestion that Laurel did little more than provide an 
auteur filmmaker with “brush, palette and canvas” is in keeping with ideas of 
artistry and authorship in the independent sector. But, as the company’s above 
corporate profile implies, “the Laurel story” was far more than that, the division 
between creativity and business parameters more complex and intertwined than 
either Romero or Rubinstein (for numerous conflicting and corresponding 
reasons) cared to admit. A historical review of the company they founded will 





shedding light on the industrial practices, corporate partnerships, business 
methods, creative decision-making and opportunity structures that made 
survival away from Hollywood possible. Within this study, issues concerning 
auteur filmmaking, cult film and independent cinema are considered and 
expanded upon, revealing new ways of thinking about media entities on the 






























“Between Genre and Art”: Industries of Independence, 
1963-1973 
 
Named for the official state flower of Pennsylvania,16 the Laurel media entity 
began active production in 1973, initiated following a tumultuous period that left 
co-founder George A. Romero on the verge of bankruptcy. In partnership with 
Richard P. Rubinstein, Laurel operated under a number of guises, beginning as 
Laurel Productions of Pennsylvania, rebranding as Laurel Tape & Film, 
transfiguring into the Laurel Group and settling as Laurel Entertainment, Inc. on 
14 December 1979. With a corporate mandate to package and produce “motion 
pictures primarily for distribution to the theatrical, television and videodisc and 
video cassette markets” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1984 2), Rubinstein’s 
business knowhow provided the capital, creative control and regional autonomy 
Romero long desired. Prior to this, Romero’s isolated industrial position was 
precarious. Laurel Productions of Pennsylvania began as a subsidiary of his 
company the Latent Image, Inc. and, though the parent enjoyed commercial 
success with its horror feature Night of the Living Dead, Romero’s growing 
determination to produce personal, idiosyncratic work met with underlying 
                                                   
16 To be precise, the Mountain-laurel (Kalmia latifolia), a wildflower native to the eastern United 
States that neatly symbolises the company’s regional specificity and its intent to flourish without 





restrictions within the independent sector. 
 This chapter contextualises Laurel’s formation within a transient 
American film industry,17 beginning just prior to Latent Image’s formation in 
1963. By scrutinising what Tzioumakis calls a “prehistory” of independent 
cinema (Hollywood’s Indies 6), Laurel’s own prehistory is revealed, shedding 
light on its parent’s attempts to cultivate space for off-Hollywood product. At the 
macro-industrial level, I consider a restricted marketplace, detailing the evolving 
production, distribution and exhibition parameters of Hollywood, the New York 
independent/avant-garde and exploitation. Latent Image’s complex relationship 
with these sectors aligns with issues of economic practice, business orientation 
and the marketing concept. At the micro-industrial level, Latent Image’s 
corporate infrastructure is analysed in detail, particularly its attempts to pioneer 
a product orientated, democratically organised work method in radical departure 
from institutional norms. Looking at the firm’s ambitions to reconcile 
independence and industrial permanence, I evaluate the broader limitations that 
eventually resulted in corporate restructuring. 
 
1.1. Early Alternatives: “Manhattan Provincialism” and Small Screen 
Innovation 
In the late 1950s, George Romero took a traditional first step into film 
production, working an entry-level position on the second unit of Hollywood 
pictures It Happened to Jane (Dir. Quine) and Alfred Hitchcock’s North by 
Northwest, both released in 1959. That same year saw the completion of John 
Cassavetes’s Shadows, often cited as a pivotal moment in the history of 
American independent cinema (Fine 81). For critic and filmmaker Peter 
                                                   






Bogdanovich, “Shadows was the first post-Golden-age-of-Hollywood 
independant [sic] film and it turned its back on all the glossy and bankrupt big 
movie rules and called for a new honesty, a final abandonment of the American 
studio formula” (qtd. in Kouvaros 4). Self-financed and shot on location in New 
York with a cast of non-professionals, Cassavetes affirmed “the very powerful 
and romantic ideology of the lone and uncompromising filmmaker who works 
with a dedicated circle of friends and who goes to great lengths to see his 
distinct vision on the screen” (Tzioumakis, American 174). 
 This notion of an uncompromising filmmaker with a “distinct vision” was 
the stuff of heady discussion among cineastes and film magazines of the day. 
In 1948, Alexandre Astruc advocated cinema as a “means of expression, just as 
all other arts before it, and in particular painting and the novel . . . the 
filmmaker/author writes with his camera as a writer writes with his pen” (17, 22). 
If cinema were to be a legitimate art form, it seemed to demand a legitimate 
artist at its centre. Expanding on this notion of “la caméra-stylo,” Cahiers du 
cinema writer François Truffaut situated filmmakers Jean Renoir, Robert 
Bresson, Jean Cocteau and Max Ophuls as more than mere directors, they 
were “men of the cinema”—auteurs (16).  Named la politique des auteurs by 
Andre Bazin (in a 1957 Cahiers article that actually voiced his misgivings), US 
critic Andrew Sarris later added three primary qualifiers: 1) technical 
competence; 2) the distinguishable personality of the director; and 3) interior 
meaning, the latter signifying nothing less than the “élan of the [director’s] soul” 
(“Notes” 7). 
 Sarris’s “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962” was published in Film 
Culture magazine and placed “commercial” directors like Hitchcock alongside 





filmmakers deemed to make art for art’s sake (5). Other commentators were 
less generous. In the previous year, Film Culture founders Jonas and Adolfas 
Mekas used the pages of their magazine to print “The First Statement of the 
New American Cinema Group," distancing industrial and marketplace 
considerations from the authentic creative process, writing, “we believe that 
cinema is indivisibly a personal expression. We therefore reject the interference 
of producers, distributors and investors until our work is ready to be projected 
on the screen” (131). 
 The New American Cinema Group was inspired by Shirley Clarke’s 1958 
cooperative Filmmakers Inc. and sought to establish an autocratic space for 
American Art Cinema from its New York base. While Clarke’s Filmmakers Inc. 
was largely about providing resources (Rabinovitz 110), the Cinema Group was 
ideologically motivated and auteur-centric. Indicatively, on seeing Cassavetes’s 
Shadows, Mekas praised the film for catching “the tones and rhythms of a new 
America” (qtd. in Macadams 228), awarding it Film Culture’s first Annual 
Independent Film Award. But when Cassavetes channelled additional funds into 
an extensive reshoot and re-edit to provide a clearer sense of narrative 
progression, Mekas deemed this second version a betrayal of the independent 
spirit, no more than “a bad commercial film, with everything that I was praising 
completely destroyed” (Mekas and Hoberman 241).18 
 Cassavetes’s traditionalist inclinations distanced him from his 
independent peers, a disunion augmented when he directed his second feature 
Too Late Blues (1961) for Paramount Pictures. If his directorial dalliances in 
Hollywood proved short-lived, as an actor his star-status remained profitable 
                                                   
18 For a detailed exploration of Shadows and the film’s production background and iterations, 
the work of Cassavetes biographer Ray Carney provides a rich entry point, see American 
Dreaming, pp. 20-62, Cassavetes on Cassavetes, pp. 48-101 and Carney’s BFI release 





and appearances in studio genre films like Rosemary’s Baby provided a 
revenue that could be filtered back into independent production. Cassavetes 
may have set the tone for an independent film aesthetic, but his method of 
financing was untenable, offering no viable framework for independent 
filmmakers emerging from without, rather than within, an established system. 
 Unable to generate substantial monies themselves, the Cinema Group 
continued to pursue alternatives to the “artistic threat” of mainstream producers 
and distributors. On 8 January 1962, the Group announced the Film-Maker’s 
Cooperative, a loose network that collated films for rental from a single 
distribution point.19 The Cooperative sought “a reformist industrial practice 
based on the European New Waves . . . a middle ground where thematic 
seriousness and aesthetic integrity would meet popular accessibility” (James 
102, 104). Though initially successful,20 Mekas felt an increasing need to 
champion the avant-garde after the movement was overlooked at the first New 
York Film Festival in September 1963. Mekas labelled the Festival “an Enemy 
of the New Cinema” (qtd. in Decherney 181) and from that point forward pushed 
the Cooperative towards a more exclusive roster. 
 If this was prohibitive to independent cinema outside the avant-garde, 
then so too was an inability to see past New York, or more accurately 
Manhattan, as a site of activity. David Curtis observes the importance of this 
space to the New American Cinema Group, seeing a “loosely defined trade 
association of low-budget feature filmmakers, whose membership was based 
on personal association” (262). Manhattan’s Greenwich Village, a “historic 
                                                   
19 Under this remit, the Cooperative considered all films equal and, partly in response to Amos 
and Marcia Vogel’s refusal to show Stan Brakhage’s Anticipation of the Night (1958) at their 
Cinema 16 film society, Mekas proclaimed that “no film will be rejected from it” (qtd. in Curtis 
256).  
20 Andy Warhol’s Chelsea Girls (1966) mixed avant-garde technique, Warhol’s sellable name 
and salacious appeal to become an early success for the Film-Maker’s Cooperative, grossing 





mecca for bohemians” (Banes 5), was central to this network and the large 
demographic of educated young people attending Columbia University and 
NYU also helped sustain a localised avant-garde scene. Despite the presence 
of other regional cooperatives and film societies in the United States (notably 
Bruce Ballie’s Canyon Cinema in San Francisco), discourse during this period 
often treated “New York” as an interchangeable word for “independent”.21 In the 
1960s, the face of independent cinema was therefore one of provincialism. 
 The importance of Jonas Mekas et al. to American art film cannot be 
overlooked, providing sanctuary to a number of important filmmakers during this 
period, including Warhol, Kenneth Anger and Robert Frank. For all that, their 
limited resources could not support this movement beyond the avant-garde 
(Sitney, “New American” 71-72) and numerous filmmakers had to look 
elsewhere for points of entry into production. Ideas of what independent cinema 
should be (or should not be) also narrowed, with definitions based on the 
personal value judgements of these self-appointed guardians of the sector. In 
turn, such definitions were far from universally agreed upon, often subject to 
infighting and internal debate (MacDonald 53-54). The exclusivity of these 
ideologies was matched only by the exclusivity of space, confining production, 
to a large extent, to established bicoastal centres. In spite of his own New York 
upbringing, Romero regarded this space as closed off. “I never knew 
Manhattan; I was a Bronx kid,” he once explained. “I fled before I even knew 
what New York was about” (Vallan). 
 What Romero did know about Manhattan was determined by a Bronx 
gang culture that regarded the borough, in his own words, as “enemy territory” 
(Vallan). When he did venture southward, his visits were touristic; “I had one 
                                                   
21 For an example of this interchangeability, see New American Cinema Group, “Film Unions 





aunt and uncle who had a little bit of dough and they would show me Manhattan 
and take me to shows,” he told interviewer Raymundo Monell. “I think that’s the 
only way I got a little more cultured.” For Romero, Manhattan was urbane yet 
other, associated with prosperity, culture and opposition. The bourgeois world 
shown to him by affluent relatives was far removed from his day-to-day 
upbringing as the only child of a first-generation Cuban father and a second-
generation Lithuanian mother. Romero’s parents emphasised the importance of 
education and job security, pushing him towards university at Pittsburgh’s 
Carnegie Institute of Technology (later renamed Carnegie Mellon University). 
Intriguingly, Romero’s father earned a modest income as a commercial artist 
and this balance between business-related pragmatism and artistic imperatives 
would be a source of tension and consolidation in Romero’s career to follow.22 
 It was while a student that Romero undertook his Hollywood internship, a 
process he found wholly disillusioning. As second unit assistant on North by 
Northwest, he recalled never seeing director Hitchcock on set, instead finding a 
“mechanical” structure of separately operating divisions incongruous with 
perceptions of an artist-driven medium (Kane 26; Romero, “In Conversation”). 
Such organisation was common in the late-1950s and A-pictures typically 
operated under a process of decentralised manufacturing inspired by the 
automotive industry. Douglas Gomery explains that “the process of actual film 
production was divided into specialized units. From finding appropriate stories 
to writing scripts to actual shooting to cutting, workers handled only their own 
                                                   
22 There is no way accurately to measure the influence this had over Romero’s future as an 
independent filmmaker, though the implications are compelling. Romero was intent enough on 
emulating his father to train as a commercial artist at university, before dropping out without 
earning a degree. Gange paints a colourful picture of Romero’s formative years, torn between 
artistic irreverence (at age 14 he was arrested for throwing a burning mannequin from a rooftop 
while making an 8mm short film) and a more conservative upbringing. Given Romero’s 
perceived waywardness, his family sent him to Suffield Academy preparatory school, which in 
turn led to acceptance at Carnegie Tech (Zombies 9-15). These tensions between an artisanal 





tasks. Unionization solidified specific jurisdictions” (“Hollywood” 119). In their 
original manifesto, the New American Cinema Group raged against the barriers 
imposed by unionisation, arguing that the restrictions put on non-union 
members had made Hollywood a “closed shop” (“Film Unions” 137). Romero 
concurred, feeling that you had to be “born royalty” to progress (Vallan). The 
mainstream industry was something elitist (overseen by absent kings no less) 
and his distaste for this infrastructure strongly influenced the organisation of his 
own company four years later. 
 Romero’s re-entry into the industry began after abandoning both 
Hollywood and academia, identifying avenues of progression within Pittsburgh’s 
emergent television sector. Television’s post-war dispersion through North 
America was rapid, with 108 television stations in operation by 1952 and over 
fifty million households with a television set by the mid-1960s (Boddy 51; Rielly 
39). Regional centres for television production soon developed and Pittsburgh 
established its first station WDTV on 11 January 1949. As a bicycle courier for 
Pittsburgh’s WRS Motion Picture Laboratory, Romero witnessed first-hand 
16mm news footage being processed, synchronised, mixed and edited, later 
remembering how he would sit in “dusty old film labs . . . with the editors, editing 
newsreels with real glue, smoking cigarettes all the while and gluing the footage 
together to try and get a coherent news story out of it” (Romero, “In 
Conversation”). This tactile, hands-on environment (or at least Romero’s 
perception of it as such) suggested filmmaking as something tangible and, in a 
working-class milieu, achievable—sitting fiercely at odds with his views on 
Hollywood and New York at the time. 
 Romero made additional in-roads after purchasing a 16mm camera with 





Gazette reported that “camera crew director” George Romero was supervising a 
series of films on “how to entertain youngsters in Pittsburgh” for WQWD-TV 
(“Newest Fun” 37). On 20 December 1963, Romero procured investment from 
local Roller Palace owner Vincent D. Survinski to initiate Latent Image, a 
regional advertising firm specialising in industrial and commercial product. 
Romero was the nominal president and was joined by Lawrence J. Anderson 
and Russell W. Streiner, serving as vice president and secretary-treasurer 
respectively. Each was a major shareholder in company stock. According to 
journalist Mike May, 1960s Pittsburgh was “a nexus for advertising agencies,” 
thanks largely to its thriving steel industry and status as the nation’s third largest 
corporate headquarters. For Banks et al., this type of environment is crucial to 
the success of such small business enterprises, where cultural businesses 
thrive “in the milieus, networks, clusters, embedded knowledge and informal 
infrastructures of the city” (454). 
 In these formative days of television, “in-product advertising,” where a 
show’s host promoted the product during a live broadcast, was the industry 
norm. Yet a 1955 issue of trade magazine Billboard observed discernible 
advantages to pre-recorded ads shot on film, listing the benefits of “open-end” 
syndication (where a filmed product could be resold across a multitude of 
networks) and the “attention-getting eye appeal” of edited film footage (Plotnik 
19). Within a year of incorporation, Latent Image presented itself as a specialist 
in this field, able to take clients “from initial idea through to the finished product, 
in color, black and white, sound and what have you” (Allan, “Pittsburgh on 
Location” 16). The firm gained a reputation for doing “high-quality work on a 
small budget” (Forget 14) and won awards for its pre-recorded, highly stylised 







Fig. 1.1. Latent Image Advertisement. “TV/Industrial Film and Tape Directory.” Back Stage, 1 
Dec. 1967, p. 105. 
 
 In April 1965, Southwest Pennsylvania credit corporation the Regional 
Industrial Development Company (RIDC) noted Latent Image’s viability and 
advanced $40,000 for a studio and new equipment, housed at 247 Fort Pitt Blvd 
in Downtown Pittsburgh. RIDC president Robert H. Ryan hoped the loan would 
stimulate the local growth of a fast-developing advertising industry (Allan, “Film 
Firm” 9) and the investment allowed Latent Image to court higher profile 
clientele, including H.J. Heinz, Calgon, US Steel and larger advertising firms 
looking to avoid the high cost of outsourcing to New York, such as Lando, Inc. 
(Fanning, “A Word” 31). These commissions were reinvested into the company 
and by 1973 Latent Image boasted three 16mm cameras, a 35mm camera, a 
Super-8 camera, two Nagra operated sound recorders, 1/4inch record facilities 
and their own film editing bays (Rubinstein, “Update” 23). As the firm moved 
into feature films, these “full service production facilities” (fig. 1.1) allowed it to 
bypass heavy rental fees and union contractors. 





 Aside from providing fertile ground for industrial growth, the advertising 
sector had a demonstrable impact on form. Jeremy G. Butler proposes that 
“stylistic excesses and violations are used by commercials to snap viewers out 
of their dreamlike connection with television narrative, to shock them out of their 
television lethargy and make them sit up and take notice of the advertised 
products” (117). Commercials such as Latent Image’s 1967 The Calgon Story 
(which parodied Richard Fleischer’s 1966 sci-fi film The Fantastic Voyage) 
showcased rapid cuts, harsh edits, whip-pans and crash zooms, all slashed 
together with an absence of master shots. Romero subsequently transferred 
this self-labelled “cubist” editing style to the big screen (Block, “Filming” 22),23 
evident in the aggressive close shots of ghouls devouring human flesh in Night 
of the Living Dead and the brutalist editing of military invasiveness in The 
Crazies (Dir. Romero, 1973).24 Here, these films assert impact—impact as part 
of product differentiation and political engagement. 
 That this compositional audacity emerged through specific industrial 
strictures demonstrates a pragmatism in contrast to the ideology of the New 
American Cinema Group. This said, like Mekas et al., Romero was looking for 
alternatives to Hollywood, particularly in terms of the decentralised process he 
identified during his brief internships. Latent Image therefore adopted a post-
Fordist infrastructure that accentuated a “new ‘flexibility’ in labour practices and 
relations” (N. Heffernan 4). For many, post-Fordism, or flexible specialisation, is, 
in its ideal (or perhaps that should be idealised) form, the solution to the rigid 
industrial practices of mass or decentralised production, doing away with the 
                                                   
23 In the 1960s, a number of directors getting their start in small screen production moved into 
feature film, including Robert Altman, Arthur Penn, Sam Peckinpah and Sidney Lumet. These 
filmmakers, each in their own way, were part of the changing face of Hollywood production 
during this period. 
24 According to Stew Fyfe, The Crazies has an average shot length of around 2.8 seconds. In 






assembly line “to increase the skill levels and flexibility of the workforce, to 
provide team work structures, and to seek out specialized niche markets for 
high quality, high value products and services” (Grint 301). 
 At Latent Image, staff members (often friends from university such as 
John A. Russo, or family members such as Russ Streiner’s brother Gary) 
operated without formalised job classifications, becoming part of a small, hands-
on unit skilled in a number of production roles, including direction. Barker and 
Jane advocate that the purpose of flexible specialisation is to eliminate rigid job 
demarcation lines and to “create a more horizontal labour organization with an 
emphasis on worker co-responsibility” (168). Latent Image was to be a “multi-
trained, non-hierarchical workforce” (B. Russell 108), reliant on a fluidity that 
maximised creative freedom and profit potential (Block, “Filming” 23). Romero’s 
role as company leader was to facilitate knowledge sharing, passing on the 
technical expertise he had acquired from his informal apprenticeship at WRS. 
This coordination of skill-levels is evidence of the company’s democratic 
leadership style, a technique that empowered individuals at all stages and 
facilitated participatory decision-making (Gastil 953). Such democratic 
leadership is often associated with fresh ideas and product originality (Goleman 
85; Gibb 259). 
 In the context of industrial films and advertisements this method made 
sound business sense. As John Russo recalls, Latent Image’s burgeoning 
roster of clientele and overlapping assignments made having a skilled, 
independently minded workforce essential (Complete 26-27). More surprisingly, 
as the company began to transition into feature films, this democratised 
infrastructure remained in place and Romero initially handed directorial control 





(Complete 44). Speaking in 1984, Romero stated that his intent was to create a 
“communal sense of collaboration with creative contributions from all involved” 
(Gange, Zombies 40). Hardman remembers the production as “a democratic 
group effort” (Reflections on the Living Dead) with on-set decisions agreed to 
through compromise and discussion. Colleague (and onscreen ghoul) Richard 
Ricci adds that the film was “not [done] the way it was normally done with a 
strong central authority” (Affair of the Heart).25 
 In his auteurist analysis of Romero, Tony Williams situates Night of the 
Living Dead and its follow-up There’s Always Vanilla as products of a singular 
vision. For Williams, Night anticipates counterculture themes that would 
predominate in Romero’s later work, notably in the film’s attacks on 
government, the military and the media (Cinema 29). Vanilla meanwhile is said 
to contain “several relevant autobiographical elements based upon the 
director’s experience of filming television commercials” (Cinema 33). This may 
be true, but these films can be more fully understood by considering their 
collaborative production method, the result of an experimental corporate 
infrastructure that stressed flexibility of labour and shared decision-making. 
Thematically, issues tackled by Night can also be seen in later work by co-writer 
John Russo, particularly his 1982 independent horror film Midnight that explores 
the dysfunctional families, domestic abuse, racism and violence at the heart of 
rural America. Further, the “autobiographical elements” Williams highlights in 
Vanilla belong to the group, not the individual. Streiner and Russo in fact 
                                                   
25 The democratic atmosphere was in-keeping with then popular ideas of communalism, made 
famous in the mid-1960s by so-called “hippy” communes such as Drop City, Tolstoy Farm and 
Ken Kesey and his Merry Pranksters (Miller 74-75). According to Timothy Miller, these 
communities were often “devoted to radical politics, anarchism, sexual freedom, the sharing of 
labour, creation of arts and crafts, land development, ethnicity, and a dazzling array of visions of 
assorted seers and cranks” (75). The Latent Image colleagues shared at least some of these 






appear onscreen as themselves, seen performing their “day jobs” of directing 
and producing regional television commercials. 
 Given that Romero was a key creative member of this collective, it is not 
surprising that recurrent themes should appear in his later work. In spite of his 
directorial credit, however, Romero was not the traditional creative authority and 
did not have final say over content. Romero was the most hands-on technically, 
typically handling the camera during production (though not always) and almost 
entirely responsible for the physical task of editing, allowing easier comparisons 
to be made when looking at the “cubist” montage style of Night and later 
Romero productions. This said, as far as Latent Image’s first feature film is 
concerned, Streiner recalls that, after a rough cut was assembled, the core 
creative team gathered to discuss all decisions regarding “what should go and 
what should stay. In that regard it was committee edited” (Surmacz 24). Latent 
Image’s initial production method should not be overlooked in the headlong 
rush to valorise Romero as auteur, especially when what is revealed instead is 
a deviation from the rigidity of Hollywood practices and the presentation of 
radical alternatives to traditional production processes.26 
 Pauline Kael’s 1963 rebuttal of the auteur theory situates film as a 
collaborative medium, arguing that the role of director is inextricable from “the 
roles of the front office, the producers, writers, editors, and all the rest of them” 
(23). Her ire fell especially on Mekas and his independent filmmakers, “already 
convinced about their importance as the creative figures—the auteurs” (24). In 
the late 1960s, Jean-Luc Godard, a former Cahiers writer and pivotal nouvelle 
vague auteur, grew equally sceptical about notions of creative autocracy, 
                                                   
26 Gary Anthony Surmacz’s article “Anatomy of a Horror Film” in 1975 was an early attempt by 
Latent Image colleagues Russ Streiner, John Russo and Karl Hardman to restate the 





initiating the Dziga Vertov Group to explore collective planning. In collaboration 
with other filmmakers (and numerous militant groups), the production of films 
such as 1972’s Tout va bien co-directed by Jean-Pierre Gorin fostered a Marxist 
agenda, the very infrastructure a challenge to capitalist society’s “glorification of 
the individual” (MacBean 32). As Anthony Chase puts it, Godard drew “a 
distinction between making political films and making films politically; in the view 
of a militant director like Godard, genuinely radical films could only be made 
through a process that broke sharply with conventional film production 
practices” (142). 
 Over in Manhattan, Andy Warhol also minimised authorial intervention, 
refusing to direct actors or, as with Blow Job and Eat (both 1963), using just one 
extended shot to eliminate editorial choices (Grudin 128). Unlike Godard, 
Warhol insisted that he was simply making an asset of limited finances, telling 
Joseph Gelmis that if you can make films “look better bad, at least they have a 
look to them. But as soon as you try to make a better movie look good without 
money, you just can’t do it” (69). Latent Image was similarly impoverished, yet 
strove for a professional veneer that would be sellable on the open market. 
Flexible specialisation kept costs down, with principal crewmembers performing 
multiple tasks in front of and behind the camera; Romero for example served as 
co-writer, editor, actor and director. Figure 1.2 shows a complete budget for 
Night of the Living Dead, divided into four subsections that formally demarcate 
production roles. 
 In practice, these roles were loosely adhered to (indeed, no casting 
director, location manager or production designer are listed in the film’s 
onscreen title sequence, and photography is collectively attributed to “The 





as and when required in a collaborative workspace (Surmacz 16). 
 
 
Fig. 1.2. Night of the Living Dead budget breakdown. “Stills Photo Gallery.” Night of the Living 
Dead. Elite Entertainment, 2002. 
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c. Screenplay (scripting) 
d. Location Search 
e. Make-up Testing 
f. Talent Contracts 
g. Production Design 
h. Legal Fees 
TOTAL: $14,000.00 
 






a. Location Fees 
b. Sets 
c. Set Furnishings 
d. Equipment Rentals 
e. Crew 
f. Film Stock 
g. Music 
h. Editing 
i. Sound Effects 
j. Lab Work and Finishing 
k. Titles and Special Effects 
TOTAL: $60,000.00 
 
4. Artwork and Advertising: 
a. Pre-sales Exploitation 








Prepared for Image Ten, Inc. by 
Russell W. Streiner – Vice President 








 In 2010, Baltimore-based filmmaker Matthew Porterfield also referred to 
his film Putty Hill as an egalitarian production, and, like Warhol, embraced 
budgetary limitations as a deliberate aesthetic. Underlining flexibility, Porterfield 
rejected “the division of labor and totalitarian authorship characteristic of most 
film productions, even those made on the smallest scale, still beholden to a 
model developed off the Pacific coast and commodified in the dead shadows of 
Manhattan” (Hope). If Porterfield felt this represented a “fresh approach to 
American regional cinema” (Hope), it had the virtue of already being tested in 
1960s Pittsburgh. 
 Latent Image was inspired by a practical method that had reaped 
dividends in the advertising sector. In the crossover to film production, the firm 
utilised a post-Fordist infrastructure to stretch resources as far as possible, 
saving monies across all areas of production to create a professional and 
competitive product. Romero and his Latent Image colleagues firmly believed in 
the artistic potential of democratised filmmaking, putting it to the test on their 
first feature film. As such, previous readings of Night of the Living Dead as the 
work of a singular auteur are, at the very least, a gross reduction, ignoring the 
innovative creative process behind its construction. In an understated, 
workaday manner, Latent Image pushed a creative radicalism that, as with 
Godard, “broke sharply with conventional film production practices” (Chase 
142), even surpassing the auteur-focused Manhattan independents. By 
subduing the director-leader, Latent Image championed an egalitarian film art 
unheard of in bicoastal centres. This was both far from Hollywood and the 






1.2. Independence with Overheads: Post-Fordism and Pragmatic 
Radicalism 
The radicalism demonstrated in Latent Image’s corporate infrastructure was 
offset by a pragmatic evaluation of the marketplace. This “pragmatic radicalism” 
was evident in Night of the Living Dead, the firm choosing a film in a sellable 
genre that nevertheless went far beyond permissible boundaries of screen 
violence. Production was instigated by a limited partnership of ten individuals, 
comprising Latent Image employees and peers from the advertising sector, 
including Marilyn Eastman and Karl Hardman from Hardman Associates and 
attorney David Clipper. The collective was incorporated as Image Ten shortly 
after and legally separated from Latent Image to protect the parent from 
financial liabilities. Additional investors from the partner’s commercial clientele 
brought the budget up to $114,000. These external backers reinforced an 
obligation to create a product that, at the very least, had the marketplace 
potential to return investments. 
 The advertising sector may have afforded a platform for regional 
production, but acquiring theatrical distribution was more problematic. 
Tzioumakis observes that in the late 1960s, avenues for distribution were 
largely limited to the major studios (American 181), with exploitation cinema a 
notable exception. By 1968, exploitation had become associated with 
“spectacles of sex or violence in quickly, and cheaply made feature length 
narratives publicly exhibited in legitimate, but often not very respectable movie 
houses” (L. Williams, Hard Core 96).27 Exploitation was frequently defined by an 
oppositional bravura that promised “something unavailable elsewhere” (J. Ross 
                                                   
27 Dating back to early cinema, exploitation was originally defined by “advertising or promotional 
techniques that went over or above typical posters, trailers, and newspaper ads” (Schaefer 4). 
These films relied heavily on ballyhoo and marketing acumen and usually focused on taboo 





63) and included transgressive cult product such as sexploitation, films about 
drug use, gang or biker films, Blaxploitation actioners, atomic monster movies 
and horror. 
 Part of exploitation cinema’s growth came as a result of changing 
audience demographics. An MPAA survey in March 1968 indicated that sixteen-
to-twenty-four-year-olds now made up 48% of box office admissions (qtd. in 
Bodroghkozy 55). Thomas Doherty records that exploitation companies had 
been catering to this audience from as early as 1955, narrowing focus to “attract 
the one group with the requisite income, leisure, and gregariousness to sustain 
a theatrical business” (2). While, as Doherty suggests, the studios were at the 
forefront of this shift—MGM’s Blackboard Jungle (Dir. Brooks, 1955) displaying 
teen appeal with a rock ‘n’ roll soundtrack and themes of juvenile rebellion (75-
76)—the majors proved slow in abandoning a traditional (and monolithic) family 
audience. American International Pictures (AIP) co-founder Samuel Z. Arkoff 
held no such trepidation. “We saw the rebellion coming,” he boasted. “But we 
couldn’t predict the extent of it, so we made a rule: no parents, no church or 
authorities in our films” (qtd. in Seate 23). 
 In economics, the production of goods to meet the consumer’s needs is 
known as the marketing philosophy, or the marketing concept. Here, “customer 
orientation is the logical basis for profit planning” (Kotler 11) and rather than find 
the right customer for the product, it is deemed most beneficial to find the right 
product for the customer (Kotler et al. 17). The marketing concept asks, “what 
does the customer want and how can I give it to them?” In Table 1.1, David 
Jobber illustrates the key elements of the marketing concept, pronouncing 
customer satisfaction as the backbone to all corporate goals and efforts. To 





between market segmentation and market aggregation. In the former, the total 
heterogeneous market is divided up into several homogenous segments, while 
in the latter, it is the goal to attack the mass market and reach as many 
customers as possible (82). As Hollywood fixated on an aggregated 
marketplace, AIP espoused a single-segment concentration strategy, directing 




 A strategic movement towards a segmented youth audience was aided 
by industry wide changes in content regulation. Until 1953, all films produced by 
                                                   
28 Given the use of genre, star and product differentiation, there is an argument that the studios 
engaged in a softer form of market segmentation, aiming diverse product to a variety of 
consumer segments. This said, under the PCA, product was at least theoretically open to all and 
the mass market remained the ideal. In the late 1960s, the implementation of the CARA ratings 
system saw a stronger focus on segmentation. 
MARKETING CONCEPT 
The achievement of 
corporate goals through 
meeting and exceeding 
customer needs and 
















The belief that 
corporate goals can be 
achieved through 
customer satisfaction 
Source: David Jobber. Principles and Practice of Marketing. 6th ed., McGraw-Hill, 
2010, p.4. 
Table 1.1  





the major studios adhered to the Motion Picture Production Code (PCA), a one-
size-fits-all censorship mandate founded by Hollywood trade association the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to cater to a unified family 
audience. In 1953, Otto Preminger’s The Moon is Blue was successfully 
released without the Code’s Seal of Approval, suggesting, in the words of Peter 
Lev, that “the Production Code, written in 1929, was no longer a good fit with 
audience expectations. The PCA responded by being more flexible” (90). 
Additional abstainers and adjustments followed, permitting exploitation 
companies greater liberty to produce sensationalist, teen-focused material. The 
growth of exploitation cinema was well-met by congruent exhibition spaces, 
including the grindhouses on 42nd Street in Manhattan and the suburban drive-
ins that readily took advantage of a trending teenage automobile culture 
(Medovoi 136). 
 In 1965, LIFE magazine reported that AIP flourished in this environment, 
its “first 150 releases—none of which cost as much as a million dollars to make 
and only its later efforts as much as half a million—have brought in a total of 
$225 million” (A. Levy 81). Predictably, “the success of AIP influenced other 
independent producers, providing an example that nearly everyone was willing 
to follow” (Clark 41). This included Jack H. Harris Enterprises, Cambist Films 
and Continental Releasing. With the market expanding, horror was a natural 
choice for Latent Image’s move into features. Russell Streiner recalls that with 
no distribution agreement in place prior to production, “we had to do the kind of 
picture that we were almost assured of being able to sell” (Surmacz 15). The 
resulting film Night of the Living Dead revelled in scenes of bodily carnage, 
including decaying flesh, immolation, cannibalism and parricide. An aghast 






Until the Supreme Court establishes clear-cut guidelines for the 
pornography of violence, Night of the Living Dead will serve quite nicely 
as an outer-limit definition by example. In a mere 90-minutes, this horror 
film (pun intended) casts serious aspersions on the integrity and social 
responsibility of its Pittsburgh-based makers, distrib Walter Reade, the 
film industry as a whole, and exhibs who book the pic, as well as raising 
doubts about the future of the regional cinema movement and about the 
moral health of filmgoers who cheerfully opt for this unrelieved orgy of 
sadism. (qtd. in Hervey 16) 
 
As Image Ten eyed a consumable market, the film’s nihilism alienated a 
number of distributors. AIP were apparently squeamish about the downbeat 
conclusion (Hervey 14), which sees protagonist Ben (Duane Jones) mistaken 
for one of the undead and gunned down by a redneck posse. Image Ten 
resisted requests for a happy ending and instead partnered with Continental 
Releasing, whose parent company Walter Reade was best known for importing 
high-profile international films such as the UK’s Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning (Dir. Reisz, 1961). In 1964, Walter Reade reported annual losses of 
around $491,000 (K. Heffernan, “Inner-City” 64), attributed by Variety to 
“disastrous results from artie releases” (“Nice” 7). 
 Continental looked to offset this decline with a roster of more commercial 
features and Night of the Living Dead neatly fit the bill. The film was sold as an 
exploitation feature to the inner-cities and drive-ins and advertising played up 
the violent content, with posters declaring “They keep coming back in a 





exploitation producer William Castle’s Macabre (1958), Continental even issued 
a joke $50,000 life insurance policy to anyone who the film “frightened to 
death.” Such techniques contributed to a global box office of around $30 million 
(Grant 65).29 
 Perhaps more provocative than the violence was the apparent political 
radicalism that lay behind it. Much has been made of the casting of African 
American actor Duane Jones in the lead, still a rarity in American cinema. 
Though the Image Ten crew maintain that Jones was simply “the best person 
for the part” (Russo, Complete 75), theorist Adam Lowenstein upholds that the 
political ramifications of this decision were unavoidable, particularly in Ben’s 
climatic murder by the posse, stating, “you can’t not think of lynchings . . . you 
cannot not think of the kind of freedom marches in the South. You can’t not 
think about the civil rights struggle” (qtd. in Contreras). Night of the Living 
Dead’s ghouls meanwhile have remained an open metaphor, representing 
everything from Nixon’s “silent majority to the endless corpses returning home 
from Vietnam” (Gange, Zombies 38). Indeed, Romero’s status as a 
revolutionary sociopolitical commentator galvanised around his Dead series. As 
Romero himself put it, these films illustrate “a new society replacing the old and 
devouring it—in this case, literally” (Biodrowski). Contrarily, critic Steve Beard is 
sardonic in regard to this radicalism, writing: 
 
[Romero] started out making commercials for US Steel, Alcoa, Heinz and 
Duke Beer, outfits similar to those whose mass-produced commodities 
                                                   
29 In the mid-1970s, Image Ten filed litigation against Continental and Walter Reade, accusing 
them of withholding profits and failing to capitalise on Night’s “key-run potential” (Russo, 
Complete 101). In January 1980, rights to the film reverted back to Image Ten, with Laurel 
Entertainment serving as the executive agent (“Living Dead Now Alive” 34). Further 
complications arose when Reade changed the film’s title from Night of Anubis and omitted the 
copyright declaration on the new prints, allowing the film to be freely exhibited without fees 





he would later trash in Dawn of the Dead. His production company, 
Image Ten [sic], was set up in 1963 within earshot of Pittsburgh’s 
declining steel mills, and occupied an ambivalent position in the 
economic fabric of the town. Parasitic upon the local branches of big 
Fordist companies for employment, it operated flexible post-Fordist 
labour practices and was staffed by a small ‘family’ of highly-skilled 
workers who treated the office as a home from home. It was within this 
makeshift environment that Night of the Living Dead was conceived, 
financed, filmed and edited. Schooled in selling corporations a flattering 
image of themselves, Romero took his revenge by defaming the 
reputation of the people they served. (31) 
 
This so-called ambivalence between Pittsburgh as a Fordist corporate centre 
and Latent Image as a post-Fordist entity is intriguing, challenging the extent of 
the firm’s ideological break from mainstream culture. As we have seen, King 
has positioned American independent cinema as a “challenge to Hollywood” 
(American 1), sitting in direct opposition to a “debased” mass culture (Kellner, 
“Media” 97). Indeed, in the 1930s, the Frankfurt School30 iterated a perception 
of American “popular culture” that still echoes in an analysis of independent 
cinema today, where, “controlled by giant corporations, the cultural industries 
were organised according to the strictures of mass production, churning out 
products that generated a highly commercial system of culture, which in turn 
sold the values, lifestyles and institutions of American capitalism” (Kellner, 
“Cultural” 204). Through their commercial work, Latent Image was literally 
selling “the values, lifestyles and institutions of American capitalism,” yet its 
                                                   
30 For more on the history of the Frankfurt School, and their importance to the study of media 





features openly criticised these structures. 
 The company operated on the fringes of an established system, 
acceding to corporate commissions to generate space for politically aggressive 
cinematic work. Even as it focused on theatrical releases, Latent Image never 
abandoned its commercial work and, by 1972, the advertising department 
contributed $150,000 to its annual revenue (Wylie D-12). This subsidised 
almost all of the firm’s day-to-day SME primers such as payroll, utilities, rent, 
equipment costs, bills and other services. Latent Image’s use of horror was 
equally utilitarian, appropriating a sellable framework on which the firm could 
showcase its capacity for feature film production. Night of the Living Dead’s box 
office suggested to the RIDC the start of a “Hollywood East” and in 1970 they 
invested $80,000 into Latent’s next feature There’s Always Vanilla. When 
added to the financial speculation of local businesses, this totalled to around 
$100,000 (Ehrich 1; Crawford 2017). Latent Image's facilities, equipment and 
services, all purchased through the firm’s advertising revenue, were valued at 
roughly the same amount, bringing the total budget to $200,000 (Russo, 
Complete 102). 
 Since there were no clear pathways open to regional film production in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and a galvanised independent sector had not yet 
materialised, the firm constructed new in-roads on its own terms, balancing 
artistic and infrastructural experimentation with a commercially-minded output. 
For Beard this was hypocrisy; for Latent Image it was pragmatic. In accord with 
King, Sherry B. Ortner writes, “from very early in the history of the industry, 
there were challenges to the Hollywood hegemony, with various attempts to 
create alternative sites of movie-making outside of the big studios” (“Against 





to cultural hegemony was more surreptitious. If the firm’s compromises were far 
from the romantic polemics of the New American Cinema Group or John 
Cassavetes, Latent Image was nevertheless a "real-world" alternative—
independent cinema with an overhead. 
 With There’s Always Vanilla, the company took additional risks in terms 
of content, firmly pressing against the industrial barriers imposed on 
independent production in the early 1970s. Taking the RIDC at its word, Latent 
Image contrived There’s Always Vanilla as an “imitation of a Hollywood film” 
(Kermode, “Twilight’s” 56), citing The Graduate (Dir. Nichols, 1967) and 
Goodbye, Columbus (Dir. Peerce, 1969) as influences (Yakir, “Morning” 64). 
The film was to be “just a fun romp” according to screenwriter Rudolph J. Ricci 
(Gange, Zombies 43), designed to showcase the firm's versatility as artists and 
as an adaptable workforce. 
 Vanilla details the relationship between Chris (Ray Laine), a session 
musician tired of hearing himself “on other people’s records,” and Lynn (Judith 
Ridley), a local actress disenfranchised by her work within the local advertising 
sector. But if Vanilla is a film looking at “the American hippie’ four or five years 
from now” as Romero claimed in 1969 (Ork and Abagnalo 22), then it is a 
caustic examination, slowly exposing the callous centre behind Chris’s free-
spirited veneer. Despite Ricci’s proclamation, the film addresses a number of 
social issues, including unwanted pregnancy, abandonment and abortion. In the 
darker second half of the film’s narrative, Chris glibly admits that “there must be 
150 kids that look like me,” a revelation that causes Lynn to hide her pregnancy 
and search for a solution in a seedy back-alley clinic. 
 As an emulation of Hollywood product, There’s Always Vanilla tapped 





20) increasingly targeted by the majors31. The $40 million domestic box office of 
33-year-old director Dennis Hopper's Easy Rider (1969) had "demonstrated to 
studio executives that experience was not always as profitable as youthful 
energy” (Belton 302), both in front of and behind the camera. Studios now 
turned with frequency to film school graduates, where students were versed in 
popular theories of the day. As Todd Berliner points out, “journalists, film critics 
and professors began to rely on the [auteur] theory as the foundation for film 
analyses” (177-78). Graduate filmmakers adopted this classical notion of the 
auteur self-consciously (Bernardoni 8), and “auteurist convictions,” nurtured in 
academia, “were practised in earnest in films like Coppola’s The Godfather 
(1972) and Scorsese’s Mean Streets (1973)” (Schatz, “General Introduction” 8). 
 James Bernardoni argues that filmmakers outside of academia were 
equally, if sometimes indirectly, influenced by the auteur theory, “since auteurist 
premises informed much of the critical community’s commentary on their work” 
(8). Kleinhans hints that this was also true for the avant-garde, where 
historiographical reviews, including P. Adams Sitney’s Visionary Film (1974), 
favoured those filmmakers who “had access to the organs of publicity” and were 
thus active in their own extratextual construction as auteurs (“Reading”). It could 
be said then that the auteur theory was “in the air” during this period, having a 
direct impact on films and filmmaking across sectors and sites of production. 
This was no less true in Pittsburgh, where an embrace of the auteur theory 
would redraw Latent Image’s corporate mandate and approaches to leadership. 
 As the nominal director of Night of the Living Dead, Romero was at the 
forefront of critical interest, singled out in a 1969 issue of Interview magazine 
                                                   
31 Chris is very much the type of “unmotivated hero” that Thomas Elsaesser sees as prevalent 
in contemporary Hollywood productions, displaying “an almost physical sense of 
inconsequential action [speaking of] a radical scepticism about American virtues of ambition, 





and a 1971 Newsweek feature that placed Night as a “bona fide cult movie . . . 
made in and around Pittsburgh by George Romero” (Zimmerman 118). The lack 
of credit given to his collaborators became a source of resentment and Russo 
namechecked the Newsweek article as a specific annoyance (Surmacz 27). 
How much this anticipated Romero’s move towards auteurist filmmaking can 
only be speculated on, but during this period Latent Image’s egalitarian 
infrastructure faltered. On There’s Always Vanilla, Russo recalls “internal 
arguments over the script, the concept, the cast, the production schedule, and 
the functions of key production personnel” (Complete 105). Romero attributed 
this to their achievement with Night, where individual players, emboldened by 
success, were no longer willing to accede to their collaborators (T. Allen 45; 
Rubinstein, “Update” 22). Not least of all Romero himself, who recalled being 
“frustrated by the compromises, both creative and social, that were forced by 
our democratic process . . . I came out of it wanting all the controls, wanting to 
be the auteur” (Kane 94). 
 Though effective on Night of the Living Dead, There’s Always Vanilla’s 
lack of a strong central authority proved the partnership’s undoing. 
Disagreements over content, coupled with ongoing commercial obligations, saw 
a planned six-week production schedule expand to over a year (Gange, 
Zombies 44). In his influential essay on leadership, Cecil A. Gibb recognises 
that “the democratic leader has the complex problem of giving each individual 
satisfaction as an individual, protecting the group as a whole, and satisfying his 
own aspirations or benevolent intentions” (259). Romero it seems was no longer 
able to balance such factors, not least in terms of his own creative aspirations. 
More so, it was not clear who could now actually claim leadership, democratic 





conceded creative leadership as part of the participatory corporate culture he 
initiated. Producers Streiner and Russo had vital agency and their shared 
authority on set led Romero to verbally, if not formally, reject his directorial 
credit on Vanilla, dismissing it as a film that was not a legitimate representation 
of his work (Digging up the Dead). 
 Given the industry-wide push towards directorial authority, “in which the 
personal point of view is all important” (Renan 46), the failure of Latent Image’s 
egalitarian infrastructure is perhaps unsurprising. After the frustrations of 
Vanilla, Latent Image pushed for a clearer hierarchy between departments and 
company leaders. In this context, Romero recruited Alvin C. Croft as a more 
formal executive vice president and general manager (“Men and Business” 35), 
a divisive move that led Russell Streiner to sell his stock and leave the 
company. Alongside his brother Gary, John Russo and Rudolph Ricci, Streiner 
formed New American Films, Inc., a regional production unit in direct 
competition with Latent Image (Russo 2016). Notwithstanding this marketplace 
rivalry, Romero was timorous about the separation. “I’ve always had a business 
partner and up until then it was Russ Streiner," he later explained. "And then all 
of the sudden I was out on my own” (Romero 2016).  His subsequent difficulty 
in guiding the company from a business perspective, a failure that essentially 
finished Latent Image as an active film production unit, reinforced his feelings 
that he needed a partner whose interests extended no further than the bottom 
line. 
 
1.3. Day of the Director: Auteurist Product, Exploitation Distribution  
Romero’s first major responsibility in his reorganised company was to court 





genre product, Romero still felt confident he could sell the film, later citing the 
success of David and Lisa (Dir. Perry, 1962) as precedent, a $185,000 regional 
independent that earned around $2.3 million in rentals (When Romero Met Del 
Toro; “Top Rental” 71). Like Night of the Living Dead, David and Lisa was 
released by Continental, but this same distributor was unable to agree terms 
with Latent Image in regard to the firm’s second film (Russo, Complete 101-02). 
In the meantime, Latent Image attracted monies from a Pittsburgh-based 
brokerage firm committed to raising $750,000 for Romero’s next three films 
(Gange, Zombies 49). Romero was undeterred by Vanilla’s inability to find 
distribution and planned the company’s next feature Jack’s Wife, his first as 
authoritative leader, to be another character-focused regional drama. 
 The film tells the story of Joan (Jan White), a dissatisfied middleclass 
housewife whose lack of fulfilment leads her to experiment with therapy, drug 
use, promiscuous sex and, finally, witchcraft. In its critique of bourgeois 
America, Jack’s Wife parallels what Staiger calls “the proto-indie,” an 
assortment of films made in 1960s New York that in many ways articulated 
Mekas’s “middle-ground” of accessibility and aesthetic seriousness; films such 
as Clarke’s The Connection (1962), Jim McBride’s David Holzman’s Diary 
(1967), Brian De Palma’s Greetings (1969) and Robert Downey’s Putney 
Swope (1969). Staiger observes compelling similarities between these films, 
based on consistency of themes, subversive politics, stylisation, location and 
reception (“Proto-Indie” 219-22). In this context, There’s Always Vanilla and 
Jack’s Wife, with their own “negative reaction to the contemporary bourgeois 
world” (“Proto-Indie” 220) seem worthy of recognition. Yet issues of distribution 
may have played a part in their exclusion from Staiger’s analysis. 





SMEs that specialised in importing highbrow overseas product, including Sigma 
III, New Yorker Films, Donald Rugoff's Cinema V and Irvin Shapiro's Films 
Around the World. Given that production monies had to be sourced elsewhere, 
non-genre American independent products were still scarce and foreign imports 
remained central to these firms and their distribution rosters. In 1965, Dennis 
Hopper expressed his frustration at this lack of opportunity for home grown 
independents, remarking, “five years ago . . . there were fifty art theatres in the 
United States, now there are six thousand . . . fifty theatres to six thousand in 
five years. No American films for six thousand theatres” (qtd. in Ray 269). 
 As Romero looked to find a home for There’s Always Vanilla, Russell 
Streiner’s New American Films designed its first (and, as it transpired, only) 
feature film The Liberation of Cherry Jankowski (Dir. Russo) for the burgeoning 
sexploitation market, a market then thriving thanks to changes in the rating 
system and a voguish interest in adult film (Wyatt, “Stigma” 254-57). Cherry 
Jankowski remained unreleased until 1976 when Constellation Films re-edited 
and re-titled it The Booby Hatch and added it to their roster of soft-core sex 
comedies, including The Naughty Stewardess (Dir. Adamson, 1974), The Boob 
Tube (Dir. Odin, 1975) and Game Show Models (Dir. Gottlieb, 1977). New 
American Films’ calculated approach was understandable, particularly given the 
successful use of market segmentation with Night and the limited number of 
independent distributors available. Almost concurrently, John Cassavetes was 
struggling to find a home for his A Woman Under the Influence (1974) and 
despaired at the lack of supportive outlets, telling Ray Carney: 
 
[The distribution companies] take precautions against failure. They put 





appetite for it. They’ll put action scenes and production values in, things 
that don’t have too much to do with the films that we make. I have to put 
a rape scene in or a nude scene, or I have to shoot somebody in the 
face for this film to be “good”! (Cassavetes 356) 
 
Cassavetes used his star cachet and personal wealth to distribute A Woman 
Under the Influence himself, spending eighteen months booking the film around 
the country and promoting it on popular American talk shows (Fine 304). 
Although financially successful, as Carney explains the process was 
“expensive, time-consuming and discouraging,” eventually bringing 
Cassavetes’s total expenditure to more than $1 million (Cassavetes 360). In 
1971, after the impressive box office returns of Billy Jack (1971), director Tom 
Laughlin announced plans to self-distribute seven major films over a two-year 
period (“Burly” 7), soon finding that his company could not afford for individual 
releases to underperform at the box office, with each production dependent 
upon the success of the last (Walker 30). Joe Camp’s Mulberry Square 
Productions also began by successfully self-distributing, in this case the G-rated 
feature Benji (Dir. Camp, 1974). In the 1980s, however, the company strained, 
passing the release of Benji the Hunted (Dir. Camp, 1987) onto Disney’s live 
action subsidiary Buena Vista. 
 Without reserves of capital, self-distribution was far beyond Latent 
Image’s means and There’s Always Vanilla wasn’t released until 2 March 1972, 
almost two years after the completion of principal photography. Distributor Lee 
Hessel and his Cambist Films had profited from the release of domestic and 
international sexploitation, yet increased competition from 16mm hard-core 





compete with the strong 16mm material . . . you have to offer more than rutting 
bodies. Audiences are tiring of that and are demanding storylines and character 
interest along with the straight sex” (“Cambist’s Hessel” 7). The acquisition of 
Vanilla was an attempt to variegate, purchased as part of a package deal that 
included frontend financing on Romero’s next film The Crazies. Once outside of 
its familiar marketplace, however, Cambist seemed unsure of how to sell 
Vanilla, eventually repackaging it as the sexploitation film The Affair. The new 
promotional material obscured the original text and the poster replaced Lynn 
and Chris with a black and white photograph of an undressed young couple 
(neither of whom appear in the film) passionately kissing on a brass bed (fig. 1.3 
and fig. 1.4).32 
 This inability to find sympathetic distribution was echoed in the release of 
Jack’s Wife. Following the promised brokerage firm investment, Romero set 
aside $250,000 for the film and secured a $100,000 bank loan to begin 
production. Mid-production, the brokerage firm declared bankruptcy, leaving 
Romero no way of paying back the loan (Gange, Zombies 49). According to 
lead actress Jan White, to entice investors Romero rewrote the screenplay to 
include explicit sex scenes that he never intended to shoot (The Secret Life of 
Jack’s Wife). This subterfuge attracted exploitation distributor Jack H. Harris 
Enterprises who later, on seeing the final 130-minute cut of the film, pushed 
Romero to include more graphic material (Scott 12). When he was 
unwilling/unable to do so, the film was taken from him, cut by 30-minutes and 
repackaged as the sexploitation film Hungry Wives in Southern states Texas, 
Ohio, Kentucky and Georgia. The new theatrical trailer foregrounded the film’s 
                                                   
32 For a detailed overview of Cambist Films and its relationship with Romero, see Tom Fallows. 
“‘More than Rutting Bodies’: Cambist Films, Quality Independents and the “Lost” Films of 





few chaste sex scenes and added a sultry voice over that promised “Hungry 
Wives…with an appetite for diversion.” 
 
 
Fig. 1.3 and Fig. 1.4. Changing US advertising campaigns, There’s Always Vanilla becomes 
The Affair. “There's Always Vanilla (1971) Photo Gallery.” IMDB. https://www.imdb.com 
/title/tt0166843/ mediaviewer/rm3728551680. Accessed 22 Mar. 2018; “There’s Always Vanilla 
(aka The Affair) (1972) Original U.S. One Sheet Movie Poster.” FFF Movie Posters. 
https://fffmovieposters.com/shop/theres-always-vanilla-aka-the-affair/. Accessed 22 Mar. 2018. 
 
 So limited were the theatrical releases of There’s Always Vanilla and 
Jack’s Wife that Robin Wood would refer to them as Romero’s “unknown films” 
(Lippe et al. 5). Critic Travis Crawford, albeit an admirer of these films, regards 
Romero as “idealistic and naïve” in thinking he could create an alternative 
industry in Pittsburgh outside of the horror genre (2017), even though, as we 
have seen, regional bodies such as the RIDC shared the director’s ambitions. In 





in the independent sector. The first was what he called an “idea or theme” 
picture (i.e. non-genre product such as Jack’s Wife), which represented a 
gamble because, as the firm had discovered, such films did not have obviously 
marketable components. The second type, exploitation, on the other hand was 
considered economically “safe” because of its apparent built-in audience base 
(Wylie D-12). 
 Croft’s comments are telling, implying that for Latent Image to survive, 
Romero had to subjugate artistic imperatives for a fuller concession to 
marketplace trends, the antithesis of his motivation behind corporate 
restructuring in the first place. Now operating under a traditionally organised 
system of leadership, this move to more sellable product was Romero’s 
decision to make, indicating his resignation that the marketplace was limited. 
Insubstantial box office returns seemed to require a corporate rethink and the 
disastrous production of Jack’s Wife left Romero in debt in excess of half a 
million dollars (Gange, Zombies 65). Romero later reflected that There’s Always 
Vanilla and Jack’s Wife demonstrated that “the film industry is not going to 
accept serious little dramas from some upstart in Pittsburgh . . . those two films 
taught me what the odds were against that kind of small personal film” (Seligson 
77). 
 In line with his reading of the marketplace, Romero redesigned Paul 
McCollough’s original screenplay for The Crazies into a loose reworking of 
Night of the Living Dead, replacing undead ghouls with insane townsfolk and 
upping the violence. Romero told Dan Yakir that The Crazies was designed to 
go out “into the drive-ins—it’s a potboiler, a B-movie, an action melodrama, at 
least on the surface” (“Morning” 64). The frontend deal with Cambist also 





allowing him to cut Romero’s preferred edit by 15-minutes (64). Romero’s self-
conscious desire to make more personal films in the independent sector was 
not institutionally reciprocated, exposing limitations and demanding alternatives. 
A reliance on exploitation distributors undermined artistic freedom and his films 
repeatedly fell to the mercy of investors with their own ideas about the market. 
By 1973, Latent Image's industrial longevity seemed to necessitate a 
standardisation of product and corporate thinking. 
 The exploitation sector is, of course, not totally anathematic to auteurism 
and filmmakers such as Russ Meyer have found parameters equitable to artistic 
expression.33 Within production-distribution houses AIP and Roger Corman’s 
New World Pictures, budding New Hollywood auteurists Francis Ford Coppola, 
Martin Scorsese, Jonathan Demme and Peter Bogdanovich were also allowed 
room to develop, their “language and aspirations” advantageous in attracting 
that lucrative teen market (Corman 91-92). Like Romero, Corman had explored 
a diversified marketplace and in 1962 momentarily put aside drive-in features to 
initiate more personal, politically-engaged directorial work. Corman self-
financed an adaptation of Charles Beaumont’s The Intruder (1962), a racially 
charged novel concerning political opportunism and integrationist tensions in 
the American South. “It was the only film we didn’t make any money on,” 
remembers co-financier Gene Corman. “And it was our best film” (Corman’s 
World). Roger Corman was more matter-of-fact about this commercial failure, 
explaining: 
 
                                                   
33 Meyer was the writer, director, producer, editor and sometimes distributor of sexploitation fare 
such as The Immoral Mr. Teas (1959), Faster Pussycat! Kill! Kill! (1965) and Vixen! (1968). 
Referred to in equal parts as an “exploitation auteur” (Fischer 24) and limited fetishist (Briggs 
20), Meyer’s infatuation with heaving bosoms was sellable. As Chris Chang writes, “it’s hard to 
think of any filmmaker who so carefully integrates public economic livelihood with personal 





The public simply didn’t want to see that particular kind of film . . . after 
The Intruder, I tried to do a film that would work on two levels. This is 
really the core of my filmmaking philosophy, without getting too 
grandiose about it. On the surface level would be an entertainment film, 
a genre film, an exciting film of a certain type, and on a deeper sub-
textual level would be a film that would have some meaning to me. 
(Dixon 147) 
 
This “two level” approach was not that dissimilar to Romero’s own. Jack’s Wife 
openly picked up on Betty Friedan’s bestseller The Feminine Mystique (1963), 
intended as a serious appraisal of female subjugation as it follows a suburban 
“housewife-mother” denied a name in both the film’s title and the staid cocktail 
parties she attends with her husband. The film pointedly draws us to themes of 
middle-class domestic entrapment, beginning with an avant-garde dream-
within-a-dream as Joan imagines herself led around on a leash by the 
domineering Jack. As the film progresses, such dreams become more visceral 
and Joan has a repeated nightmare in which an omnipotent masked intruder 
pursues her through her family home. Joan’s inner-psyche, her absence of self 
away from the demands of family, is central to the narrative. In yet another 
dream, she imagines herself as an eternal consumer, literally introduced to her 
own life, husband and teenage daughter by a smarmy real estate agent. 
 Joan’s growing obsession with spells and occult paraphernalia (all 
purchased on her husband's MasterCard) is presented as little more than a 
bourgeois 1970s fad, in congruence with fondue sets and wife swapping. 
Nevertheless, Romero felt such lip service to horror tropes (in themes of 





Tony Scott in 1973, “Jack’s Wife is an intelligent commentary on what goes on 
in the mind, yet its commercial enough that I’m sure, in fact I know, that it’s 
going to be released” (13). In accord with Corman’s “two levels,” Romero 
claimed to be “trying to walk the line” between marketability and personal 
expression (13). Even as The Crazies offered a fuller compliance with 
exploitation demands, the film still makes space for sociopolitical commentary, 
drawing on broadcast images of Vietnam, where, according to Romero, “every 
day the Six O’Clock News showed the pain and mutilation of war in our living 
rooms” (qtd. in Fallows and Owen 42). The film indirectly places Vietnam at the 
centre of the text, from scenes of scared kids-as-soldiers invading a rural 
community to the self-immolation of a priest, the latter an uncomfortably close 
facsimile of real events in Saigon. 
 If genre offered a marketable hook for Jack’s Wife and The Crazies, 
Romero also presented these elements as auteurist choices, insisting that all of 
his work contains an “acute insight into the darker side of human nature” 
(Billson 278). Unlike a rhetoric that situates horror as a form of “cultural detritus” 
(Sconce 372), Romero held no such valuation and in interviews frequently 
(admittedly somewhat defensively) defended the genre as a legitimate art form 
(Jones, “George Romero” 35). In this context, Romero’s auteurist proclivities 
seem closely integrated to an economic livelihood. At best, the filmmaker’s 
relationship with genre was ambivalent. Publicly he lauded horror’s artistic 
credibility; professionally he exploited its bankability. Nevertheless, he claims to 
have been limited by the reductive industrial parameters the forced him 
repeatedly into this sector. “I’m trapped in a genre that I love” he later conceded 
(qtd. in Fisher), highlighting a fascinating conundrum for both the company he 





 For his part, Roger Corman’s own acceptance of marketplace restrictions 
was fuller than he originally intended. In 1970, Corman formed New World 
Pictures to better control content after numerous fights with his AIP bosses (G. 
Morris). As president of a company, however, Corman’s responsibilities shifted 
to overseeing feature films that “are marketable within a highly competitive 
industry” (Corman 91). According to Night Call Nurses (1972) director Jonathan 
Kaplan, Corman imposed a strict working template on his filmmakers that “laid 
out the requirements of the genre. Exploitation of male sexual fantasy, a 
comedic subplot, action and violence, and a slightly-to-the-left-of-centre subplot” 
(Hillier and Lipstadt 44). Rather than demonstrating a committed political 
agenda, the leftist “subplot” was again aimed at the youth demographic (Hillier 
and Lipstadt 44), indicating an increased sagaciousness behind Corman’s 
thematics. 
 This “top down” approach to film production returns us to the marketing 
concept, where product is carefully developed to meet consumer demands. 
Brownlie and Saren closely associate the marketing concept with the era of “big 
business, mass consumer sovereignty, excess supply over demand and ever 
increasing ‘consumption’” (38). As such, other business models have been 
appropriated based on differing corporate demands and desires. Table 1.2 was 
compiled by marketing professor Jim Blythe and provides a useful overview of 
four key business orientations, divided into production, product, selling and 
marketing. 
 The methods summarised in each category are not absolute or 
determinedly separate, bleeding into each other as different strategies are 
appropriated at different times. This said, the ideas of business orientation, 





the first time, can help us understand the corporate thinking behind such 
production and distribution companies. More so, it underlines important 
differences between types of independent cinema, where, even within the 







A focus on manufacturing, on improving the process so as 
to reduce costs and increase efficiency and on making a 
profit through selling large volumes of goods. 
Product Orientation The focus here is on quality and on product features. 
Product orientation aims to produce the best possible 
product with the maximum number of features. 
Selling Orientation The company seeks to use aggressive and sometimes 
devious selling techniques to move the product. Profit 
comes from quick turn over and high volume. 
Market Orientation 
 
Defining what customers want and ensuring that the 
company’s activities are arranged in a way which will 
achieve customer satisfaction. 
Source: Jim Blythe. Principles and Practice of Marketing. 3rd ed., SAGE Publications, 
2014, p. 7. 
 
 Companies like AIP and New World can be said to be market orientated. 
At New World, common practice indicated that each production would only 
begin once executives had identified an exploitable subject matter based on its 
“commercial potential” (Corman 92). This project would then be passed down to 
a writer/director who would adapt the material within a defined template. New 





allowed their target audience to dictate content. AIP typically undertook careful 
market research in schools, colleges and advertising agencies, using feedback 
to generate a title, a poster and a concept (in that order) before a writer was 
hired to pen the screenplay (“Guardian Interview”). Though such methods did 
not necessarily produce inferior filmic output, it is important to recognise that 
AIP and New World’s primary agenda was the manufacture of saleable goods. 
“We made those pictures because we sensed a trend” explained Arkoff (Strawn 
265). 
 Exploitation producer-distributors including Jack H. Harris Enterprises 
and Cambist followed suit, carefully watching the marketplace to determine 
output. If releases failed to attract a sizeable audience, such companies 
revealed the selling orientation at their core, using “devious selling techniques” 
to resell There’s Always Vanilla and Jack’s Wife as soft-core or sexploitation. 
Exploitation producer David E. Friedman argued that this technique was not 
viable for long term survival, telling David Chute, “the first rule is, you must 
never continually burn the sucker” (“Wages of Sin, II” 61). Nonetheless, New 
World also used selling orientation when they felt it was called for, (in)famously 
adding the same stock footage of an exploding helicopter to any trailer they felt 
needed livening up. As Corman was fond of saying, “there's no law that says 
every scene in a trailer has to be in the picture” (Abrams). 
 In her examination of the relationship between business orientation and 
the arts, Simona Botti advocates that “the Artist” must, at the level of creation, 
be scornful of market considerations, producing “pure” artistic material that does 
not and should not consider marketing strategy and policies. Only once the 
work of art is completed can the marketplace be considered (22). This 





ideology of the Manhattan avant-garde and the canonical independents that 
followed. Distinctions have been made between “art for art’s sake” and 
“utilitarian or crafted objects” that are produced to the specification of external 
parties, be it a patron or a marketplace (Fillis 32). Elizabeth C. Hirschman takes 
a broader view, suggesting that there are three potential audiences that the 
creative person must consider: 1) the public at large; 2) peers and industry 
professionals; and 3) the self. Hirschman insists that each audience can and will 
be considered during the creative process. Any prioritisation between the self 
and the mass “is based upon the value orientation of the creative individual” 
(47). 
 What then of the dominating value/business orientation of Romero and 
Latent Image? In print, Romero poured scorn over an industry that prioritised 
marketplace concerns over aesthetic considerations, telling Edward L. Blank 
that “the deal is the thing today. The product is usually secondary in the minds 
of the people creating the package” (“Thrilling” 134). As a creative individual, 
Romero aspired to start from the bottom up, beginning with an evocative story 
or concept that allowed room for his unique formal stylisation and sociopolitical 
concerns. This said, as president of a solvent production company he could not 
be so single-minded, and each project contained vendible components that 
could later be teased out or exploited in the marketplace. His attempts to “walk 
the line” between auteurist self-expression and industrial continuance could be 
detected on screen, where even his feminist drama Jack’s Wife alludes to 
horror film tropes. As one critic observed, Jack’s Wife is “a strange, 
experimental film . . . torn between genre and art” (Pirie 548). 
 This push-pull between product and market orientation was something 





Romero’s leadership, Latent Image sought to take fuller advantage of the 
exploitation market and with The Crazies sacrificed creative authority for the 
financial certainty the project suggested. For all that, Lee Hessel’s own 
optimism for the project was misguided and instead of targeting the drive-in 
markets and grindhouses, Cambist placed a large billboard in Times Square 
and on 23 March 1973 released the film simultaneously in three first-run New 
York theatres. The Crazies failed to recoup its budget and Romero was again 
left with a creatively compromised box office failure. As he told freelance 
journalist Richard Rubinstein shortly after the film’s release “[The Crazies] is still 
not a film I can say is totally mine . . . I’m still looking for that situation where I 
can do the film myself, which I still have yet to do” (“Update” 23, 24). 
Fortuitously for Romero, his interviewer was a recent business graduate with his 
own ideas about independent film production. 
 
Conclusion 
While Night of the Living Dead used market segmentation to achieve 
commercial success, Latent Image’s subsequent attempts to variegate output 
exposed a delimited independent sector, suggesting to Romero the economic 
assurance of cult/genre product. But if American distribution networks in the 
1960s and early 1970s were largely restricted to the majors, the avant-garde 
and exploitation, a study of industry methods, particularly in reference to Latent 
Image’s occupational environment and intent, betrays greater diversity. Latent 
Image’s unique post-Fordist infrastructure initially favoured collaboration and 
democratic leadership, boasting an egalitarian organisational structure as 
radical as it was pragmatic and at odds with bicoastal practices (and, indeed, an 





marketing concept further demonstrates a multitude of industrial approaches to 
the production of filmic texts, where output was determined by the 
value/business orientation of an eclectic array of filmmakers, producers, 
businesspeople and stakeholders. The tensions between product and market 
orientation evident within Latent Image positioned the firm somewhere between 
exploitation and an ideology later consistent with the canonical independents, 
blurring the boundaries between sectors that have, for the most part, up until 




























From Cradle to Grave: The Birth of The Laurel Group 
and the Cultification of the Living Dead, 1973-1979 
 
On 23 April 1979, three days after the US domestic release of Dawn of the 
Dead, an article on George A. Romero appeared on the front page of the 
Village Voice. Headlined “Knight of the Living Dead” and written by Tom Allen, 
the profile contained interviews with Romero and Laurel Group co-founder 
Richard Rubinstein and was lavish in its praise,34 confident that this “truly 
independent movie will pose the challenge of the decade to the way films are 
made, rated, and marketed in America. I think it’s going to be the biggest cult 
blockbuster of all time” (1). Not simply impressed by the film and its writer-
director-editor, Allen marvelled at Laurel’s scope, noting that in six years the 
company had made two feature films, produced seventeen sports and 
entertainment documentaries for television, imported twenty-three foreign films 
for domestic distribution and placed thirty-eight books by authors including 
Anthony Burgess, J.B. Priestly and Dick Gregory with leading publishing 
houses. Despite the corporate potential this demonstrated, Allen determined 
that these machinations were all “geared to one simple objective: To turn 
Romero loose” (45). 
                                                   
34 In fact, so taken was Allen with Laurel that in 1984 he joined the company, serving as script 





 If Laurel’s public face was one of deference to an artist-leader, closer 
inspection of corporate activities suggests a more complex agenda. Covering a 
period from 1973 to 1979, this chapter investigates the business methods, 
instigated and led by entrepreneur Richard Rubinstein, that saw Laurel affirm its 
position within the independent sector. I consider the company’s polymorphic 
funding strategies in relation to production output and corporate agency, 
particularly Laurel’s manipulation of state and federal laws. The firm’s attempts 
at diversification and augmentation through multinational partnerships, the latter 
of which had profound implications upon the company's auteurist 
proclamations, is also surveyed. I ask what Laurel’s “European style,” auteurist 
infrastructure meant during this period, contextualising this hierarchical remit 
within the firm’s broader business agenda. Issues of risk are central to this 
discussion. By observing the “real-world” strategies used to maintain 
independence, this chapter explores risk and risk management to problematise 
classical notions of independence and authorship, while in the process 
reconceptualising ideas of the cult filmmaker. 
 
2.1. “Turbulent Environments”: Human Capital and Risk Aversion 
As There’s Always Vanilla looked for distribution, on 9 December 1970 attorney 
John F. Bradley applied for a certificate of incorporation for Laurel Productions 
of Pennsylvania on his client George Romero’s behalf (24). Laurel was to be a 
subsidiary of Latent Image and a certificate of incorporation set up this new 
endeavour as a legal body in its own right, entirely separate in law from its 
parent’s shareholders and directors, and vice versa (Needham and Dransfield 
100). Ultimately, no projects materialised under this banner and the timing of 





this period. The collapse of the company’s egalitarian infrastructure had a toxic 
effect, resulting in Romero’s attempt to cultivate a pocket of autonomy away 
from the collective. The departure of the Streiners and John Russo et al. made 
Laurel Productions of Pennsylvania temporarily redundant, putting Romero 
back in the driver’s seat and able to steer the parent company in whichever 
direction he pleased. But by 1973, following the back-to-back commercial 
failures of Vanilla, Jack’s Wife and The Crazies, Latent Image ostensibly 
ceased operations as an active production house (Gange, Zombies 64-65).35 
 Partnership with Rubinstein saw a revival of the Laurel brand. Gange 
indicates (somewhat tritely) that this merely served to bypass the $500 fee 
associated with forming a new company (Zombies 64). What Laurel actually 
offered was an opportunity to distance the filmmakers from the string of Latent 
Image releases that had failed to return monies to investors. Even more 
significantly, as a subsidiary of Latent Image, Laurel had access to the facilities, 
personnel and holdings of its parent. And as a legally distinct unit, it shared 
none of Latent Image’s debt or financial obligations (OECD 69). Latent Image 
would now serve as a studio space and house for equipment only, still situated 
at 247 Fort Pitt Blvd. These facilities were described to Rubinstein in detail 
during his 1973 interview with Romero for Filmmakers Newsletter and this 
wealth of physical capital seemed to intimate opportunity to the fledgling 
producer (“Update 22”). 
 Rubinstein’s interest in the creative industries dated back to his New 
York City-based videotape production service the Ultimate Mirror, Ltd., formally 
registered with the New York Division of Corporations on 24 March 1972. In his 
own words, Rubinstein was interested “in taking television as I then knew it out 
                                                   
35 Alvin Croft also appears to have left the company during this period, joining the Philadelphia-





of the hands of the ‘establishment’ and into the hands of the people” (“Richard 
P. Rubinstein”).36 At this time, television was controlled by the “big three” 
networks of NBC, CBS and ABC and “it was difficult, if not impossible, for new 
suppliers and distributors to enter the marketplace” (Budd et al. 46).37 Instead, 
Ultimate Mirror began by selling short video documentaries to high schools, 
colleges “or anyone with an interest in art, sculpture or television” (“VT Program 
Guide” 49). Projects included a conversation with George Nobel entitled The 
Thing About Sculpture (1971) and Breathe Deep NYC No Charge (1972), a 
video that followed “Post-Minimalist sculptor” Gordon Matta-Clark’s efforts to 
give “canisters of ‘clean air’” to passers-by (Roberta Smith E30). In his work 
with Nobel and Matta-Clark, Rubinstein showcased an attentiveness to fringe 
artists that would bear fruit in his relationship with Romero. 
 The attractiveness of Latent Image's physical capital notwithstanding, 
Rubinstein was primarily investing in the company’s founder. Indeed, in 1973, 
where Latent Image began and Romero ended, was not easy to establish. In 
their analysis of founder-managed firms, Gedajlovic et al. describe the abiding 
link between corporate identity and creator-personality, viewing the nascent 
founder-managed firm as “an incarnation of its founder” (902). Founder agency 
is said to shape corporate direction, driving decision-making through a 
“multitude of background (informal) institutional influences, including their 
upbringing, education, social contacts, cultural heritage and work experience” 
                                                   
36 Rubinstein named the company after philosopher Marshall McLuhan’s declaration that 
television was “the ultimate mirror of society” (“Richard P. Rubinstein”). This intent to 
democratise television production was aided by the release of lighter, more affordable 
technology, such as Sony’s first handheld video camera the DV-2400 Video Rover Portapak, 
released in 1967. 
37 The major networks may have sourced its programming from independent production 
companies, but as reported by Mark Alvey, by 1963 independents like Desilu and Filmways 
“became top suppliers of primetime product, and as producers teamed up with old line majors or 
powerful agents, the term ‘independent’ became more and more ambiguous, and sometimes 





(902). This often results in an idiosyncratic output that reflects personal 
objectives rather than the larger corporate interests of the firm (902). 
 If Latent Image/Laurel was George Romero in 1973, then it was far from 
a guaranteed investment. The box-office success of Romero’s filmic output was 
erratic and his determination to remain independent appeared led by an anti-
corporate, anti-establishment agenda that rejected the mainstream out-of-hand. 
In 1972, Romero told journalist Alex Block that he would rather abandon 
narrative feature film entirely than conform to industry standards of production 
(“Filming” 24). Such thinking did not suggest a profit-maximising endeavour and 
had in fact left Romero nearing bankruptcy. 
 Even without such caveats, the film industry was fraught with dangers for 
the would-be investor and as a recent business graduate Rubinstein was no 
doubt exposed to less irregular career pathways. Creative industries such as 
film, television and music have been described as turbulent environments 
where traditional bureaucratic, professional and craft leadership techniques 
offer no guarantee of financial success (Peterson and Berger 97). For Michael 
Porkorny and John Sedgwick, the film industry is particularly high-risk, with no 
“methodology for predicting with any level of accuracy which of the large 
numbers of films released annually will turn out to be hits” (“Financial” 181). In 
the creative industries, Mark Banks et al. extend this thinking about risk to 
include SMEs, where the economic fragility of these start-up companies is 
especially “embedded in risk,” necessitating a need to be “innovative, flexible, 
creative, ideas driven [and] constantly changing” (453). 





have been underexplored.38 Pokorny and Sedgwick have led the way in a 
sparsely populated field, offering a quantitative analysis of the economic risk 
associated with classical Hollywood and the blockbuster. They determine that 
the major studios typically offset risk by producing a “portfolio of films” of 
divergent content and scale, hoping that successful projects will compensate for 
the expected losses elsewhere (“Risk Environment” 209; “Financial” 188). 
Within this system, the issue of an individual film’s profitability is less important 
than the overall profits of the collective portfolio. As Pokorny and Sedgwick 
attend, “relatively small independent studio/distributors will not have the ability 
to develop sufficiently diversified film portfolios, nor have the financial strength 
to absorb the losses that any film portfolio will inevitably generate” (“Financial” 
188). If one accepts that this portfolio model is unfeasible for a number of 
independents, an alternative analysis of risk management in this sector has, 
however, been limited. Since creative and stylistic risk-taking are key to an 
independent film discourse (Ortner, Not Hollywood 32), the concept of risk 
aversion perhaps presents too inconvenient a juxtaposition—independent films 
are, after all, supposed to demonstrate "bold moves," not careful market 
analysis. 
 Without the financial capital of the majors, risk and risk management in 
independent cinema presents an entirely different set of problems for the 
entrepreneur or small enterprise. Risk was pre-eminent to Rubinstein’s 
business management, and he applauded collaborator Salah M. Hassanein’s 
“enlightened sense of risk. He’s aggressive about risk. He and I think very 
similarly” he told Gange (Zombies 62). Anna M. Dempster views this as a 
                                                   
38 Mette Hjort has gone someway to addressing this lack with the edited collection Film and Risk 
(2012). Hjort places risk as “absolutely central to film” (Introduction 4) and the text extends 
beyond issues of economics to consider risk and performance, style, spectatorship, authorship, 





common outlook among entrepreneurs, where risk taking is “a central part of 
entrepreneurial function and ultimately critical in the creation of economic value 
and innovation” (152). Sharon Gifford writes that the entrepreneur can only 
function if their environment is uncertain, since entering into a marketplace with 
“perfect information” and a guarantee of profit would not necessitate 
entrepreneurial behaviour to begin with (303). Risk-taking in an uncertain 
environment is therefore essential. Banks et al. list a number of advantages for 
entrepreneurs when starting and running a small enterprise, including self-
management, control over decision-making, localised industrial support 
structures and “the relatively low financial risk involved in the start-up of many 
cultural businesses” (458-59). 
 This was certainly the case with Laurel. When Rubinstein joined, the 
company was essentially ready-made, abundant in physical capital and with a 
knowledgeable workforce rich in experience. Economist Gary S. Becker has 
labelled worker knowledge an “intangible resource,” stressing the importance of 
schooling and on-the-job training to future real income and corporate 
profitability. Becker calls this personal acquisition of skill, information, ability and 
experience “human capital,”39 which he breaks down into two types: 1) 
“general,” which proffers a broader, transferable knowledge base usually 
obtained independently at the worker’s own expense; and 2) “specific,” where 
learning is facilitated on-the-job by the company and relates to tasks particular 
to that firm (12-13, 17). For Becker, “on-the-job training is neither completely 
specific nor completely general but increases productivity more in firms 
providing it and falls within the definition of specific training” (17). 
                                                   
39 According to The Economist, this term has not been without controversy, deemed by some to 
reduce people to cold, calculated machines. In 2004, a panel of German linguists voted 
Humankapital the most offensive word of the year. See, “'Six Big Ideas': Gary Becker’s Concept 





 Even though Romero’s egalitarianism was a thing of the past, Laurel’s 
infrastructure remained relatively loose, offering informal apprenticeships to 
almost anyone interested in regional film production. In turn, these “trainees” 
would freelance on Laurel productions in a variety of roles and at a reduced 
wage, if they received any wage at all (Buba 2016; Dubensky 2016). With an 
abundance of freelance workers, the number of employees on Latent Image's 
annual payroll was reduced. Rubinstein was not officially associated with Latent 
Image’s parent company, but nevertheless was given licence to manage 
staffing levels, telling Gange that he was “ruthless in slashing the staff and 
overhead back to a manageable level . . . George, in essence, was trying to 
keep everybody around all the time, and there just wasn’t that kind of business 
to be had. So I became the hatchet man, to some extent” (Zombies 65). Indeed, 
Laurel’s growth was about more than just the so-called human capital of its 
freelance workforce, it was dependent on the personal human capital of its new 
co-leader Richard Rubinstein and his self-acquired business expertise. 
 Contrary to his boastings about risk, Rubinstein’s “upgrade” from 
videotape documentarian to co-head of a full-service regional production 
company necessitated little in the way of personal risk or financial investment. 
Banks et al. posit that the entrepreneur’s “real investment comes from the 
subjective (personal) knowledge which they are prepared to commit to the 
project” (458), immediately demonstrated here by Rubinstein’s management of 
company overheads. Before joining Laurel, Rubinstein invested time into his 
own human capital, through education and personal and professional 
experience. During two years as a Wall Street brokerage consultant, Rubinstein 
handled clients investing in feature film production, while his father, an 





shelter schemes (Gange, Zombies 63). Ultimate Mirror provided insight into 
small-scale media production, and Rubinstein determined to use his amassed 
knowledge to bypass the production barriers imposed by television’s oligarchs. 
Romero may still have seen himself as a feature film director, but Laurel spent 
its formative years producing small-screen content only. To reinforce 
Rubinstein’s agency, the company’s provincial moniker was renamed Laurel 
Tape & Film, Inc., formalised on 25 February 1975 (Berkman et al. 17). 
 
2.2.  Superstars and Shelter-Shams: Tax Shelters and Ancillary Markets 
In April 1975, Rubinstein evidenced his acute understanding of the television 
industry in an article written for Filmmakers Newsletter. Entitled “The Selling of 
O.J. Simpson: Independent Production for Television,” the article focused on 
ten sports documentaries made by Laurel Tape & Film and sold to ABC. In his 
appraisal, Rubinstein considers the relationship between audience aggregation, 
demographics, network affiliate stations and potential profits. This reading was 
complimented by a knowledge of show pitching and potential gaps in the 
marketplace. Rubinstein claims that Laurel prospered due to a dramatic 
increase in the number of sports programmes in the early 1970s. To enter a 
marketplace dominated by the major networks, he determined product 
differentiation to be key, achieved through Romero’s highly-stylised filmmaking 
and Laurel’s access to a number of leading sports stars of the day, including 
American footballers O.J. Simpson of the Buffalo Bills and Franco Harris of the 
Pittsburgh Steelers (“Selling” 28). Harris was the subject of the first produced 
episode “Good Luck on Sunday,” though the Simpson episode “Juice on the 
Loose” was used as the series pilot.  





Rubinstein omits or skates over. For instance, the decision to base these 
specials around ten athletes is intriguing, since Rubinstein and Romero shared 
a general disinterest in sports (30). Even more curious was the decision to 
produce ten episodes on speculation, instead of just one pilot episode, which 
was the industry norm. Rubinstein gives no explanation as to why this decision 
was made, stating only that the company went ahead after receiving monies 
from clients of a securities broker “seeking high risk/high income potential 
investments with protection on the downside by a tax-related investment 
structure” (28).40 He also omits how Laurel obtained access to these 
“superstars” of the sports world. As way of explanation, Rubinstein writes that 
these documentaries were attractive because they gave the subjects agency, 
“their chance to say what they wanted” unfiltered by the interpretations of 
mainstream sports journalists (30). 
 The series (collectively titled The Winners) was in fact initiated based on 
an informed offset of risk and Rubinstein’s expertise/human capital. On 19 
December 1974, George Anderson of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported that 
Romero had received “financial support from Babb Investments” to initiate a 
series of ten “portraits of sports stars” (“Latent Image” 12). Babb Investors was 
a subsidiary of the regional insurance broker Babb, Inc., who advertised a 
professional investment counselling service with expertise in tax shelter 
investment (“Babb Investments” 25). Principally, a tax shelter offers individuals 
in high-income brackets the opportunity to generate losses on high-risk 
investments that offset tax on all of the investor’s collective income, promising 
                                                   
40 Rubinstein writes that each episode had a cash budget of around $100,000, though such 
valuations should be taken with a pinch of salt. In later life, Rubinstein has candidly admitted to 
inflating budgets when talking to the press, doing so on Martin and Dawn of the Dead. As he 
said in 2004, on Dawn of the Dead “I started telling people [the film cost] $1.5 million . . . if I had 
made it sound too inexpensive then it hurt my chances to get [additional] money for it.” He 
claims the budget was actually around $640,000 (Rubinstein and Martin 2004), although this 





deductions and credit far in excess of the participant’s investment (Little and 
Dasner 67-68; Williams Jr. 3). As Calvin Johnson put it, “a tax shelter is an 
investment that is worth more after-tax than before-tax” (qtd. in Braithwaite 17). 
David Cook records that tax shelter schemes financed 20% of all films produced 
between 1973 and 1976 and, “in 1975 alone, more than half of the total films in 
production, completed or released by Columbia, Warners, Paramount, United 
Artists, American International Pictures, and Allied Artists contained some tax-
sheltered funds” (Lost Illusions 338). 
 Rubinstein learned of the relationship between tax shelters and film 
production from his father’s investments and saw Pittsburgh as ideally suited to 
applying this stratagem. For him, this was a city that understood tax shelters 
because of the large percentage of high-income executives and 
businesspersons working and/or living in the region (Gange, Zombies 65). 
Alongside the advice given by Babb Investors, Laurel was aided in tax shelter 
financing by the Pittsburgh-based law firm Berkman, Ruslander, Pohl, Lieber 
and Engel, whose clients included a number of regional sports personalities. In 
point of fact, the firm’s managing partner Marvin S. Lieber provided legal 
representation to both Romero and Franco Harris and just happened to be an 
expert in taxation. 
 In 1982, as the IRS looked to disallow a number of these tax shelter 
write-offs, names of the scheme’s high-income beneficiaries became public 
knowledge. The local press situated Laurel Tape & Film “at the centre of most 
of [Pittsburgh’s] tax court cases” (Kiely 1) and discovered its investors to be a 
“disparate group of celebrities and old-line Establishment types.” This included 
a department store executive, a former U.S. attorney, baseball star Willie 





Rocky Bleier (Kiely 1).41 “Good Luck on Sunday” was credited to the limited 
partnership Television Documentary Associates, and in April 1974 Harris and 
partners of Berkman et al. commissioned Laurel to produce two more sports 
documentaries through the limited partnership Television Documentary 
Associates II. Two months later, Television Documentary Associates III was 
formed to instigate additional content. This was followed by a number of limited 
partnerships serving the same function: A.J. Associates, J.R. Associates and 
Front Four Associates (Kiely 1, A18). 
 The loopholes exploited by these limited partnerships were closed by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976. The IRS utilised an “at risk” solution to “make 
unattractive those shelters sold on a leverage basis” (Surrey 311), as all of 
Laurel’s initiatives had been. From this point on, investors could only claim 
against their own “at risk” investments, rather than against promissory notes or 
non-recourse loans. In the case of investment into “motion pictures and similar 
productions” the “at risk” solution was backdated to 30 June 1975 (United 
States, JCS-26-75 15). In 1976, Ed Blank reported on the resultant anxiety in 
the independent film sector, interviewing regional producer Maurice W. Gable 
who forecast nothing less than the end of independent film production in the 
United States. “This is an incredibly high-risk business,” said Gable. “And it’s 
going to be much tougher to persuade persons to invest” (“Tax Reforms” 8). An 
unnamed “Latent Image spokesman”42 predicted that tax reform would affect 
financing “less in feature films than in the production of such things as our one-
hour sports documentaries” (“Tax Reforms” 8). 
                                                   
41 All of the aforenamed sports stars appeared in front-of-camera on The Winners. The 
opportunity to set the record straight was perhaps then a lesser incentive than these large, tax 
avoidance savings. 
42 This is one of the few occasions where Latent Image was credited as a source of information 
after the formation of Laurel Tape & Film. Whether this was a typo, a miscommunication, or a 





 Rubinstein’s knowledge of tax shelter laws was enhanced by his strong 
relationships with a number of disparate business colleagues and associates, 
not least his mentor Irvin Shapiro, for whom he had worked as an administrative 
assistant at Films Around the World. Shapiro’s company gained prominence as 
a leading distributor of foreign language films, including classic titles Battleship 
Potemkin (Dir. Eisenstein, 1925) and À bout de soufflé (Dir. Godard, 1960) and 
acted as sales agent for a number of domestic production companies. In this 
latter capacity, Films Around the World mediated the distribution of US films on 
the international market, a service they rendered on The Crazies in 1973. 
Rubinstein valued Shapiro’s advice and it was on his say-so that he began his 
association with Romero (Gange, Zombies 64). Former Laurel employee Tom 
Dubensky asserts that it was Shapiro who instructed Laurel to transfer their tax 
shelter expertise into the acquisition of foreign films, advice that Rubinstein 
readily followed (Dubensky 2016). 
 Laurel consequently purchased the US rights to several European co-
productions, including Ten Little Indians (Dir. Collinson, 1974), Le Secret (Dir. 
Enrico, 1974) and Where There’s Smoke (Dir. Cayatte, 1973). As with their 
television product, films were sold to limited partnerships (established and 
overseen as tax shelters by Laurel themselves) and then sold again to more 
experienced distributors. On the sale of the Italian giallo Spasmo (Dir. Lenzi, 
1974),43 distributor-buyer Libra Films re-hired Laurel to shoot graphic inserts for 
the US release. Violence in giallo films was typically depicted in “great detail, in 
a striking visual style” (Willis 109), yet Lenzi designed Spasmo as a conscious 
                                                   
43 Giallo is an Italian subgenre that takes its name from a series of paperbacks first published by 
Monadori in 1929. These stories, bound in striking yellow covers, exhibited “a taste for 
sensationalist reporting of crimes and sexual violence” (Bertellini 214). In Italian, giallo 
translates to “yellow” and the genre was popularised on film in the 1960s and 1970s by directors 





break from such iconography (Revokcom, “Part 1”). Under Romero’s direction, 
additional footage was shot in Latent Image’s first-floor studio space, these new 
scenes depicting a killer in a leather fetish mask committing graphic acts of 
murder. This masked killer, admittedly a part of giallo iconography, served to 
disguise the fact that here he was played by a Laurel crewmember and not one 
of the original Italian cast (Dubensky 2016; Romero 2016).  
 Such alterations, though common in foreign film acquisitions, rest 
uneasily alongside Romero’s auteurist proclamations. His initial incentive 
behind Laurel was to obtain control of material and to safeguard productions 
against interference (either internal or external). To sustain this space, Romero 
appeared willing to sacrifice the authorial voice of other filmmakers. Lenzi was 
incensed when he heard about these changes, disdainful of this process of re-
cutting international releases without directorial approval. He regarded 
Romero’s actions as “reprehensible. He should have refused, or at least he 
should have notified me. I would never do such a thing . . . I have my ethical 
code as a director” he exclaimed (Revokcom, “Part 2”).44 From 1973-76, as 
Romero’s filmic expertise was rechannelled to facilitate tax shelter deals, 
Laurel’s auteurist remit was subsumed. Conceding that working on Spasmo 
was his “most embarrassing moment” (Romero 2016), Romero could at least 
console himself that these schemes kept him working as a media producer. 
This said, Rubinstein’s business expertise continued to dictate corporate 
movements and in 1976, notwithstanding the Tax Reform Act, he expanded the 
partnership’s shelter schemes even further. 
                                                   
44 In his defence, this was something that also happened to Romero when distributor La 
Superstar International drastically recut his film Martin for its 31 May 1979 release in Italy. The 
film was retitled Vampyr and given a new score by Italian prog-rock group Goblin. This was 






 Rubinstein’s next tax shelter partnership led Laurel into book publishing 
and through the brokerage firm Resource Investments, Inc. instigated at least 
two more limited partnerships, including J.W. Associates and Scorpio ’76. A 
detailed description of these partnerships can be found in the 18 May 1983 Tax 
Court hearing “Fox v. Commissioner,” which sought to determine the extent to 
which seventeen investors (referred to as petitioners) “may deduct their 
distributive share of partnership losses” through 1976 and 1977 (974). When 
petitioners filed a redetermination of tax liability, the court questioned “whether 
the purported acquisition of book publishing rights by these partnerships was a 
sham, serving no business purpose and lacking any economic substance” 
(974). 
 These limited partnerships were typically overseen by a general partner, 
usually “an individual (or a corporation) that had expertise in a specific industry” 
(Windish 614). On 28 June 1976, Romero was made general partner of J.W. 
Associates, taking on a role that granted “exclusive responsibility and authority 
in the management of the business and affairs of the limited partnership” 
(Hammer et al. 91). What expertise Romero demonstrated here is questionable, 
since he had no experience in book publishing whatsoever. As revealed in “Fox 
v. Commissioner,” Romero did little more than acquiesce in all decisions . . . 
and sign all necessary papers sent to him by Resource” (979). The focus of 
J.W. Associates' front-facing activities was the publication of John Wilcock’s An 
Occult Guide to South America (1976), a book publicised as “the first 
comprehensive tour of all the magical, mystical sites in South America” (“An 
Occult” 108). Rubinstein’s Ultimate Mirror served as sales agent45 and received 
                                                   
45 From the evidence available, it seems that Ultimate Mirror was no longer active as a producer 






a 10% fee for connecting the limited partnership to New York publishers Stein & 
Day, Inc. In turn, Stein & Day charged an excessive 35% distribution fee, higher 
than usual due to the book’s “limited market potential” ("Fox" 982). 
 In a letter to Resource dated 10 May 1976, Laurel voiced concerns over 
the impending Tax Reform Act, aware that J.W. Associates was under audit by 
the IRS. To demonstrate a legitimate "for-profit” motive, Romero signed a two-
sentence letter to Stein & Day wondering if a discount might “spur some sales,” 
while on 7 December Irvin Shapiro inquired about the film rights to Wilcock's 
book ("Fox" 990). Given Shapiro’s close relationship with the Laurel co-
founders, this was little more than a feeble attempt to throw off the IRS’s 
investigation. Rubinstein was undeterred and on 30 June that same year 
established Scorpio ’76 to purchase six books from Stein & Day, including Dick 
Gregory’s autobiography Up from Nigger, Jean Stubbs’s crime novel The 
Golden Crucible, pharmacology study Forbidden Cures by Steven Friedman, 
M.D. and The Virile Man, a “guide to greater potency” written by Paul G. 
Neimark and Sheldon L. Fellman. All were released in 1976. Many of these 
books had already underwhelmed in advance sales, leading the Inland 
Revenue Commissioner to conclude that “these were not bona fide attempts at 
profitable book publishing” (1018). 
 It is important to clarify that “Fox v. Commissioner” was about a 
redetermination of tax liability, not about prosecuting those involved for tax 
evasion. The kind of tax avoidance exploited here was strongly criticised, giving 
wealthy individuals a means to circumvent their “fair share” of tax contribution to 
public services such as education, physical infrastructure, healthcare and 
defence (Payne and Raiborn 474). Mark Rowney calls such tax avoidance “the 





illegal. Pittsburgh-based filmmaker Tony Buba says that tax shelters actually 
support regional development, encouraging “investment in something that 
would be considered high risk in order to promote job growth. A lot of 
filmmakers and film techs got their start because of the shelter” (Buba 2016). 
There is a clear ambiguity surrounding the use of tax shelters, yet Buba insists 
that it was this system that allowed Laurel to thrive, and in turn to instigate a 
regional base of trained professionals who would continue to work within the 
industry. “There’s a whole crew base [in Pittsburgh] because of Laurel,” says 
Buba (Buba 2016).46 
 Romero later recalled his frustration at Rubinstein’s funding strategies, 
accusing his partner of “always looking for sleazy little deals. I kept saying ‘man, 
let’s make another movie!’” (Romero 2016). This depiction of Rubinstein as the 
scheming producer, stereotypically at odds with an artist only concerned with 
making art, is in keeping with what Spicer et al. refer to as the “grubbiness of 
bottom-line concerns" (1). Nonetheless, it was Rubinstein’s so-called “human 
capital” that lead the way, using his business and marketplace knowledge to 
establish a solvent production company based on degrees of risk and risk 
aversion. These tax shelter schemes cannily offset risk, producing content 
where economic failure was not merely an irrelevance, but something actively 
solicited by high-income investors. And as demonstrated in the Village Voice, 
Laurel’s tax shelter moves into television, distribution and book publishing could 
later be respun, presenting an expansive, multifaceted entity with broad ranging 
                                                   
46 Ethics surrounding tax avoidance remains a fiercely argued subject in both government and 
society. In April 2016, the so-called “Panama Papers” revealed that “Mossack Fonseca, a 
Panamanian law firm, had helped 14,000 clients worldwide create offshore accounts to conceal 
assets or dodge taxes,” including the father of then UK Prime Minister David Cameron. See, 






capabilities.47 Questions arise as to what exactly Romero’s auteur status meant 
within this context; was it the ultimate objective, as Allen suggested, or simply 
an additional means to offset risk? 
 
2.3. “A New Nightmare”: Cult, Branding and George A. Romero’s Martin 
Between 1969 and 1972, the seven major studios reported record losses in 
excess of $500 million (Belton 302), resulting in a “phasing out of the New 
Hollywood in favour of the blockbuster era, a politically conservative, 
neoclassical style of filmmaking” (Buckland 11) evident in Spielberg’s Jaws 
(1975) and George Lucas’s Star Wars (1977).48 Michael Allen notes that this 
economic downturn also drove the majors towards a more proactive distribution 
of foreign imports (78). Academy Award Winners such as Italy’s Investigation of 
a Citizen Above Suspicion (Dir. Petri, 1970) at Columbia Pictures and France’s 
Day for Night (Dir. Truffaut, 1973) at Warner Bros. demonstrated the 
mainstream viability of overseas titles. In 1981, UA Classics became the first 
studio division dedicated to the release of “‘art’ or non-commercial films, 
generally from abroad” (Slide 213). 
 As an independent, Ben Barenholtz’s Libra Films offset studio 
competition by promising overseas producers a higher profit against the firm’s 
smaller overheads (Segrave 197). Libra’s acquisitions included provocative 
content like Sebastiane (Dir. Humfress and Jarman, 1976), Maîtresse (Dir. 
Schroeder, 1975) and Laurel tax shelter imports Where There’s Smoke, Le 
Secret and Spasmo. Aside from distribution, Barenholtz also ran the Elgin 
Theatre in Manhattan and in 1970 instigated the midnight movie craze with the 
                                                   
47 If Tom Allen’s summation is correct, and that Laurel published around thirty-eight books, then 
the firm’s tax shelter schemes were far more wide-reaching than the endeavours listed here. 
48 For Tzioumakis, this embrace of more commercial filmmaking saw some audiences turn to 





exhibition of Alejandro Jodorowsky’s psychedelic western El Topo. Late night 
screenings of Pink Flamingos (Dir. Waters, 1972) and The Rocky Horror Picture 
Show (Dir. Sharman, 1975) followed, cementing the midnight movie’s reputation 
for “radical aesthetics” and “anti-establishment” sensibilities (Mathijs and Sexton 
14). Even as this trend spread nationally, the Elgin remained central and J. 
Hoberman suggests that “by experimenting for several years, Barenholtz 
developed a sense of what could play well at midnight—what would develop a 
cult or become a fashionable must-see and what wouldn’t” (Hoberman and 
Rosenbaum 314). 
 Despite this ability to detect the cult potential of a film, Barenholtz argued 
that “you can’t make a cult film intentionally, it doesn’t work. It’s the audience 
that creates the cult, it’s not the filmmakers” (Midnight Movies). As seen in the 
introduction, this is in keeping with a critical analysis of cult cinema, where fan 
consumption and subcultural capital are leading organising principles. In writing 
about cult stardom, Matt Hills says “the processes associated with a star 
becoming cult are often strongly linked to subcultural audience discernment, 
recognition and valorisation rather than marketing-led or industry/PR-related 
constructions of stardom” (“Cult Movies” 22). Closer analysis of Laurel’s 
branding will, however, demonstrate that a self-conscious, market-led utilisation 
of cult is entirely possible. 
 Peter Hutchings has explored cult through the reception of the work of 
Italian filmmaker Dario Argento, identifying paradigms crucial to the filmmaker’s 
subcultural appeal, based on excessiveness (in illicit content and form), 
transgression and marginalisation, the latter referring to a “location within 
critically disreputable genres such as horror, or marginal in terms of box office 





in his film’s violent excess, stylistic bravado, transgressive sociopolitical themes, 
use of horror and his difficulty in attracting a mass audience post-Night of the 
Living Dead. Night itself had been a sizable box office success, but the sense of 
taboo generated in contemporary reviews also proffered an underground 
currency. Romero’s specific subcultural appeal was tangible, and, in its review 
of Martin, Variety labelled him “a Pittsburgh-based auteur” whose “insistence on 
bloody and dramatic close-ups” would be eaten up by an identified fanbase 
(Poll 27). The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, meanwhile, observed “a popular cult 
director among movie buffs because of the enduring appeal of his first feature 
film” (Anderson, “Romero’s ‘Martin’” 14). 
 This appeal expanded when Night hit the midnight circuit in Washington 
D.C., leading Paul D. Zimmerman to label it a "bona fide cult movie for a 
burgeoning band of blood-lusting cinema buffs" (118). Jancovich situates the 
midnight movie as something of a ground zero for cult, a phenomenon that 
brought together an eclectic assortment of films for consumption by bourgeois 
audiences: 
 
[Cult fandom] grew out of a series of economic and intellectual 
developments in the post-war period, a process which created selective 
film markets that were defined by a sense of distinction from 
‘mainstream, commercial cinema’. Indeed, it is the very ideology which 
insists that these markets are free from economic criteria which needs to 
be criticised. (“Cult Fictions” 317)  
 
Director John Waters sees the midnight movie as an implicitly commercial 





a brand name, it was a genre” (Midnight Movies). Contradicting Barenholtz’s 
above comments, Waters writes that his film Pink Flamingos was designed as 
cult, purposefully delivering shocking content (a singing asshole, cannibalism, 
vomit, chicken copulation and eating dog faeces) to attract attention (12). If cult 
status had to be acquired authentically, Waters argues that product could also 
be self-consciously pointed in that direction. 
 Waters’s notion of the midnight or cult movie as a genre, or in relation to 
genre, is an important one in terms of a media industry investigation. While 
genre is often discussed in terms of semantics or syntax (R. Altman 108), its 
industrial ramifications are plain to see. Holt and Perren uphold that the use of 
recognisable genre demonstrates “how industry and textual practices combine 
to create strategies for reducing risk, ritualising production, managing audience 
expectations, and codifying marketing practices” (10). Douglas Gomery 
observes that Hollywood “motion picture entrepreneurs have regularly utilized 
the profit-maximizing possibilities of horror movies” (“Economics” 49). But as is 
evident from Chapter One, such calculated, risk reducing strategies extend to 
the exploitation sector and regional independent film productions such as Night 
of the Living Dead. 
 Through Latent Image’s early commercial failures, Romero came to 
understand the difficulty of selling films without a clear marketable hook. As 
such, Laurel’s first feature film Martin consciously adopted horror film tropes. 
Originally entitled Blood and developed for exploitation distributor Joseph 
Brenner Associates, the film instead raised its $85,000 budget through regional 
investment. Martin’s financial service provider Barney C. Guttman states that 
the film was not directly funded by tax shelters and, contrary to the incentives 





investments. According to Mr Guttman, “this wasn’t serious money, it was more 
‘let’s have some fun with an investment,’” and the backers contributed around 
$10,000 each into the production (Guttman 2016). 
 While a genre framework seemed less economically risky (though not 
entirely without risk, as the box office failure of The Crazies had shown), 
Romero’s use of horror was far from straightforward. This is most evident in 
Martin’s ambiguous narrative, where the titular protagonist (John Amplas) can 
be viewed as either an 84-year-old vampire or a teenage boy driven to think 
he’s a vampire by years of systemic family abuse. Geoff King categorises 
Martin as a “genre-complicating film,” where “expectations are not entirely 
thwarted, in many cases, but neither are they entirely realized, creating the 
often-characteristic indie quality of existing in the space between familiar 
convention and more radical departure” (American 167). 
 Horror film conventions are important to Martin. Notwithstanding the 
numerous Hitchcockian suspense sequences, particularly Martin’s breathless 
cat-and-mouse invasion of a middle-class family home, the film is a dialectic 
address to classic vampire texts and films. Martin is disdainful of traditional 
vampire tropes, avowing that he is unaffected by garlic and sunlight, and 
entirely without the hypnotic powers of seduction associated with Bram Stoker’s 
Dracula (1897). Under the alias “the Count,” he calls a late-night radio talk show 
and confesses that “those movies are crazy.” This deconstruction of genre is 
established in the opening sequence, as Martin boards an overnight train and 
stalks a female passenger. Picking the lock to her door (a hypodermic needle 
clutched between his teeth in place of fangs), Martin imagines her waiting 
readily within, her arms outstretched and dressed in a billowing Victorian gown. 





emergence from the toilet in a green face pack. And nor is she willing, instead 
desperately fighting back as Martin sedates her, rapes her and slashes her vein 
with a razorblade to drink her blood. “There isn’t any magic,” Martin later 
reminds us. “Not really.” 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Poster for George A. Romero’s Martin. “Martin (1978) Photo Gallery.” IMDB. 
https://www.imdb.com /title/tt0077914/mediaindex?ref=tt_pv_mi_sm. Accessed 23 Mar. 2018. 
 
 When Martin was obtained for domestic distribution by Libra Films, the 
promotional material played up more conventional horror film iconography. 
Posters featured either glaring vampire fangs dripping blood or skeletal hands 
reaching down for a crucifix (fig. 2.1). The theatrical trailer also centred on the 
film’s use of archetypal motifs, such as crosses and a Dracula cape and fangs 





tropes). Furthermore, Martin contains a number of black and white sequences 
of a remembered or imagined past (depending on which reading we apply) that 
appear in the trailer in full colour, downplaying the film's ambiguity to suggest a 
mystical narrative progression that follows Martin from the 19th century to 
present day. 
 Described by Romero as a more personal, human story (Yakir, “Morning” 
63), Martin’s fusion of horror and auteur filmmaking returns us to issues of cult 
and subcultural reception, where fan communities rely on cultural status for 
affirmation within peer groups. Jancovich points out the “intrageneric conflicts 
between fans of a particular genre,” where status is earned through internal 
distinction. Horror fans can demonstrate status within the subculture through a 
recognition and valorisation of so-called “cult auteurs.” These consumers can 
then position their “discerning” taste values as authoritative, hierarchically 
above fans whose passions are for more “lightweight” mainstream genre 
product (“Real Shocker” 28). Fandom surrounding the so-called "cult auteur" 
allows subcultural capital through the display of knowledge, differentiation and 
connoisseurship (26). 
 Rubinstein was well aware of Romero’s potential in this context, telling 
the director in that first 1973 interview that “I can see two separate markets for 
[The Crazies]: the neighborhood drive-ins as an exploitation film, and a second 
audience of people who know your work from [Night of the Living Dead] and are 
hip to what you’re saying about the army and bureaucracy” (“Update” 23). 
Romero may have utilised horror as a marketable hook, but what Rubinstein 
recognised was that the cult status of Night of the Living Dead (already 
acknowledged in contemporary reviews such as Newsweek) had made Romero 





transgressive” inclinations were rich in subcultural appeal (Tompkins 207). All 
Laurel had to do was tap into this. Latent Image's commercial failures had made 
Romero a risk for investors,49 and the Laurel brand offered a degree of distance 
between founder and company. Now that connection was reaffirmed, turning 
Romero’s potentially hazardous anti-establishment, anti-corporate posturing into 
an economically advantageous brand. 
 Rick Altman writes of the importance of branding to Hollywood studios, 
comparing marketing strategies to the advertising of household products in a 
supermarket, where brand-name products promise “fantasy, quality, style and 
individuality” (115). As the majors underscore “restricted qualities” (star, budget, 
director, etc.), genre films “can be made and distributed by any producer . . . if 
the exhibition situation highlights genre, then this may be an acceptable 
strategy, but even then the producer must compete on equal grounds with all 
other producers of genre films” (115). Away from Hollywood, Laurel indicates 
how branding can be utilised in the independent sector. Just as the horror film 
market offered a reduction of risk, careful branding of Romero’s image meant 
Laurel did not have to “compete on equal grounds” with other genre 
practitioners. On Martin, Romero’s name appeared on posters as part of the 
title, promising “a new nightmare from the director of Night of the Living Dead.” 
The trailer meanwhile teased “another kind of terror,” situating auteurist 
differentiation (i.e. “restricted qualities”) alongside the seemingly diametric 
quality of genre familiarity to sell the film. 
 Placing the director’s name in front of (or as a part of) the title would 
become a common strategy amongst genre filmmakers seeking marketplace 
                                                   
49 This is unless their strategy was to lose money through tax shelter schemes, but even here, 






distinction, utilised on John Carpenter’s Halloween, Wes Craven’s A Nightmare 
on Elm Street (1984) and again on Romero’s Dawn of the Dead. These 
filmmakers, not uncoincidentally, became the “1970s patriarchs” of horror 
cinema—its “superstars” (Bernardini 163). In “The Commerce of Auteurism” 
(1990), Timothy Corrigan deems such marketing an important extratextual 
component in understanding the film as a whole, creating “a relationship 
between audience and movie whereby an intentional and authorial agency 
governs, as a kind of brand-name vision whose contextual meanings are 
already determined” (45). Meaghan Morris concurs, stressing that the 
extratextual modes of auteur packaging in a film’s promotion (including 
magazine profiles, reviews, trailers, etc.) are “always ready in appropriation as 
the precondition, and not the postproduction, of meanings” (123). In the case of 
Romero and the brand name genre directors that followed, cult distinction was 
not something ascribed in fan reception, it was consciously embedded within 
the text and reinforced in its extratextual delivery to the marketplace. 
 Craig Bernardini has marked Romero’s active participation in fashioning 
his “cinematic image,” evident in magazine interviews and other forms of self-
promotion (165-66, 175). In the late-1970s Laurel hired public relations firm 
PMK to increase the director’s profile across a greater number of platforms. On 
NBC’s Tomorrow Show (1973-1983), host Rona Barrett recognised the 
“sociopolitical message” within Romero’s films and together they unpicked the 
representational value of his zombies. On PBS’s The Dick Cavett Show (1977-
1982), Romero was part of a “masters of horror” panel alongside novelists 
Stephen King, Ira Levin and Peter Straub—his appearance as the only 
filmmaker emphasising his vanguard status within the genre. In a 1982 profile in 





“slasher” competitors such as Don’t Answer the Phone! (Dir. Hammer, 1980) 
and Friday the 13th as “bad films made by people that really don’t care about 
the genre or don’t have any love or respect for it” (Hanners and Kloman 77). 
Corrigan argues that such interviews allow filmmakers to engage with and 
disperse their own “organizing agency as auteur” (“Commerce” 54). For 








 The self-conscious utilisation of cult, authorial distinction and its role 
within the firm can be summarised in the business wheel in Table 2.1, 
representing a cyclical intersection of objectives and outcomes. On a film like 





framework in which to package auteurist product. In turn, this focus on more 
offbeat, personal work offered an unusual, “genre-complicating” film that 
differentiated Martin from other products on the market, attracting a “discerning” 
cult film audience in the process. Romero’s “cult auteur” status could then be 
co-opted and recycled as a form of branding, framing filmmaker intent and 
identification for a specified market segment and once again reducing the “high-
risk” associated with independent film production. Auteurist demands sit firmly 
within this business wheel, an integral part, if far from the ultimate outcome. 
 As an equal partnership built around Romero (or the Romero-brand), 
Rubinstein’s entrepreneurial drive shaped what Ulrich Witt calls “cognitive 
commonalities” (167) within the firm, harmonising seemingly disparate business 
and creative demands to execute a collective agenda. In discussing the 
“entrepreneurial leader,” Witt explains that 
 
a multi-person firm is an organization with an internal division of labor 
which serves the purpose of accomplishing jointly the conception which 
the entrepreneur is unable to realize by her/himself. This purpose is 
attained if all firm members decide, within their respective area of 
discretion, in a co-ordinated way, and if their decisions are consistent 
with the entrepreneur's business conception. To achieve this, the 
entrepreneur's conception must be transmitted to, and adopted by, the 
firm members. (167) 
 
Rubinstein's brilliance was to create a company that satisfied the demands of 
both partners; where providing a platform for Romero’s creative agency (albeit 





Rubinstein regarded Romero as a “creative profit centre” (Harmetz, “From the 
Cecil” H15), Romero was equally gratified by the partnership. “There’s a way to 
stay true to your aesthetic and still resolve your business problems,” he told 
journalist Cynthia Heimel in 1980. “We’ve always been able to negotiate 
ourselves into a position of freedom. Well, not freedom, but as close as we’re 
gonna come” (48). The “cognitive commonalities” nurtured by Rubinstein gave 
Romero the creative freedom he long desired, a creative freedom which in turn 
could be fed back into the distinct, and highly-competitive corporate identity 
deemed vital to success in this high-risk industry. 
 Martin premiered out of competition at the 30th Cannes Film Festival in 
May 1977, immediately attracting distribution in France, Spain and Australia, 
while negotiations in the UK and Germany were on going. Romero explained to 
George Anderson that this quickly put the film “in the black,” marking the first 
time since Night of the Living Dead that a film of his had returned money to its 
investors (“Romero’s Martin” 14). Martin was also the midnight hit that 
Barenholtz intended, playing for 43 consecutive weekend nights, from August 
1978 to May 1979 at the Waverley Theatre in New York (Hoberman and 
Rosenbaum 135). Branding had built a platform for the film’s success and, in 
sequence, became another building block in the construction of that brand. As 
Rick Altman observes, branding or a “signature” on a film can “produce not only 
income but also a supplementary saleable commodity which can in turn be sold” 
(121). Martin re-established Romero's name as a commercial, yet sociopolitical 
independent horror filmmaker. His next film, however, would cement his 







2.4. Author, Autori: Dawn of the Dead, Overseas Investment and the X-
Rating 
As the decade drew on, Romero’s cult appeal expanded beyond domestic 
shores, creating space for Laurel’s planned sequel to Night of the Living Dead. 
Night had impressed at the international box office, generating $18 million in 
overseas returns ("Night of the Living Dead (1968) - Financial"). R.H.W. Dillard 
writes that “lines stretched around the block in so unlikely a city as Barcelona, 
and the Wall Street Journal reported that it was the top money-making film in all 
of Europe in the year of its release” (15).50 The walking dead subsequently 
became a popular fixture in 1970s Euro horror, “born of a desire to imitate Night 
of the Living Dead’s worldwide box office performance” (Schlegel 39). Amongst 
Night’s successors/imitators were the Spanish-Portuguese co-production 
Tombs of the Blind Dead (Dir. Ossorio, 1972) and the Italian-Spanish The Living 
Dead at the Manchester Morgue (Dir. Grau, 1974). 
 Irvin Shapiro recognised the overseas potential of a Night of the Living 
Dead sequel and in his role as Laurel’s foreign distribution agent sent a partially 
completed screenplay to Italian producer Alfredo Cuomo, who in turn brought in 
writer-director Dario Argento to raise monies. Like Romero, Argento was an 
important horror auteur who regarded industrial independence as “one of the 
most important things in artistic life” (Argento 61). Unable to attract financing for 
his first feature film The Bird with the Crystal Plumage (1970), Argento and his 
producer father established the production company Seda Spettacoli to make 
the film themselves. The film’s success established Seda Spettacoli as an 
                                                   
50 Dillard’s quote has been widely circulated yet given the absence of adequate referencing it is 
hard to corroborate these claims. This said, anecdotal evidence from Night co-writer John 
Russo also boasts of the film’s European success, claiming that the film played for more than a 
year and a half in cinemas in Madrid and Rome (Complete 110). Paul D. Zimmerman in 






industry player, and throughout the 1970s Argento productions such as 
Profondo Rosso/Deep Red (1975) and Suspiria (1977) were regularly among 
Italy’s top-grossing films (Celli and Cottino-Jones 178-81). In 1973, Dario’s 
brother Claudio joined the family business and served as a producer on Dawn 
of the Dead. 
 Romero and Argento appeared creatively simpatico and Argento 
regarded Night of the Living Dead as one of his favourite horror movies (Shipka 
125). More than fannish enthusiasm, investment into the renamed Laurel Group 
made financial sense.51 In the mid-to-late-1970s, Argento observed that “the 
Italian film industry was going through another time of crises and I thought 
investing overseas would be a good way of keeping the wolf from Seda 
Spettacoli’s door” (Shipka 125). Between 1974 and 1979, the Italian film 
industry “suffered dramatic losses at the box office and the number of 
domestically made films fell by almost half” (Rigoletto 7). In 1976, television was 
in ascendance and, when the monopoly of the state sponsored RAI (Radio 
Audironi Italiane) was deemed unconstitutional, new broadcasting stations 
entered the marketplace and the demand for content grew exponentially. 
Television now presented competition to domestic film production and an 
additional platform for overseas product. US films and imported television 
shows dominated small screen programming schedules (Brunetta 247). 
 In this climate, Dario and Claudio Argento in partnership with Alfredo 
Cuomo agreed to finance half of Dawn of the Dead’s budget in return for 
international distribution rights in all non-English language territories, with the 
exception of Latin America (Blank “Living Dead” N1). The UK was a contested 
                                                   
51 It is of note that the Laurel Group was in fact an entirely different corporate entity to Laurel 
Tape & Film, emerging as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rubinstein’s Ultimate Mirror in 1977. 





territory and split between parties (Rubinstein and Martin 2004). Niepmann and 
Schmidt-Eisenlohr remind us that “international trade exposes exporters and 
importers to substantial risks, especially when the trading partner is far away or 
in a country where contracts are hard to enforce. Firms can mitigate these risks 
through specialized trade finance products offered by financial intermediaries” 
(1). The Italian investment arrived as a letter of credit (LC), a form of payment 
organised through the respective banks that “substitutes the bank’s credit for 
the buyers and eliminates the seller’s risk” (Cones, 43 Ways 152). Once again, 
Rubinstein’s apparent audacity, bypassing American financers entirely, was 
balanced by calculated risk management. With half the funds secured, Laurel 
drew an additional $325,000 from a consortium of friends, family and investors. 
Romero and Rubinstein themselves personally invested $25,000 each 
(Rubinstein and Martin 2004). 
 Investment into Dawn of the Dead gave Seda Spettacoli considerable 
creative input. In pre-production, every page of Romero’s screenplay (finished 
and overseen in Rome) had to be read, approved and initialled by the Italian 
consortium. Dario Argento even received a script consultant credit on the 
finished film. More dramatically, in post-production Dario insisted on editing and 
overseeing his own version for release in European territories. Here, the film 
was retitled Zombi or Zombies (or, in the divided United Kingdom release, 
Zombies: Dawn of the Dead). More than simply cutting or trimming scenes, 
Argento essentially edited Romero’s footage from the ground up, using 
alternative takes, removing some shots and extending others. In the first seven 
minutes alone, critic Tim Lucas records “at least 10 subtle variations of 
montage, including a different presentation of the title onscreen, different music, 






 In Lucas’s opinion, these changes purposefully removed Dawn's satirical 
focus on a bankrupt, "materialistic society” (42). This is an overstatement, and 
Romero’s bombastic approach to political commentary makes it hard to nullify 
totally the ideological concerns (Dawn is, after all, a film about mindless 
consumers as zombies greedily wandering around an American shopping mall). 
Even so, in the European edit sociopolitical intent is downplayed. After the 
protagonists find refuge in the mall, the space becomes a bourgeois prison of 
their own making. They live in a storage unit converted into a luxurious 
apartment with all mod cons and, as the narrative progresses, the sense of 
boredom becomes palpable. One scene towards the conclusion watches as 
they dress in fine clothes, drink expensive whisky, play cards with real (albeit 
now worthless) money and squabble about whether the TV should remain on or 
off: “what have we done to ourselves?” asks Fran (Gaylen Ross). This scene 
was cut entirely from the European edit, indicative of Argento’s decision to 
extract moments of quietude or pointed annotation. Claudio Argento maintains 
that Romero’s version was simply “too long” (Shipka 125) and their edit is 
around eight-minutes shorter than the US release. 
 One of Argento’s most noticeable changes was to emphasise the music 
by Goblin (billed here as "The Goblins, in association with Dario Argento"). 
Romero utilised some of these tracks himself, placed within a more eclectic 
soundtrack of library music, Muzak and pop. The inclusion of Goblin, however, 
created an authorial problem for Romero. By 1978, Goblin’s synth-pop scores 
for Deep Red and Suspiria had made the group synonymous with Argento. 
Romero therefore minimised their place on the American soundtrack because of 





unfortunately, because I’m very concerned about my track record” (7). This was, 
after all, to give the film its full title, George A. Romero’s Dawn of the Dead—a 
factor important to Romero’s artist-ego and the film’s domestic branding. 
 The LC from the Italian consortium had additional repercussions on 
Romero’s authorial voice. Dawn of the Dead camera assistant Tom Dubensky 
recalls that Argento insisted the film be shot using Technicolor stock, taking 
advantage of a prearranged deal between Seda Spettacoli and the film 
processing laboratory that dated back to Suspiria (Dubensky 2016). Caetlin 
Benson-Allott suggests that since the Technicolor dye-transfer laboratories in 
the US had closed down, processing would have been done in Rome, giving 
the Italians even more control over the product (221). This is, however, 
incorrect, and Dubensky and cinematographer Michael Gornick remember 
completing all processing and colour-timing at Technicolor’s East Coast labs in 
New York—all under Gornick’s supervision. The Italians did work on their own 
cut at Technicolor Italiana, perhaps resulting in Benson-Allott’s confusion 
(Dubensky 2016; Axl and Jscott). Romero was also able to work this contractual 
obligation to satisfy his own artistry, using the Technicolor process to flatten the 
image and emphasise the pop art reds, blues and yellows in emulation of the 
four-colour EC Comics he had adored growing up (fig. 2.2 and 2.3). 
 In terms of day-to-day production, the Italian consortium remained 
hands-off. Though they bound Laurel to a delivery date, they were entirely 
flexible when it came to the filming schedule. As with Martin, the regional 
shooting location allowed Laurel to circumvent union regulations and Dawn was 
shot over a leisurely four-month period, from November 1977 to February 1978. 
This accommodated a mandatory three-week break over Christmas, during 





shooting recommenced, Romero dropped the downbeat conclusion (in which 
the last of the survivors commit suicide) to one of escape and went so far as to 
improvise a custard pie fight, situating the zombies as the literally deadpan 
recipients of this slapstick standard. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3. Four-colour to Technicolor. EC Comics and a still from Dawn of the Dead. 
“Vault of Horror Vol 1 35.” Fandom. http://eccomics.wikia.com/wiki/Vault_of_Horror_Vol_1_35. 
Accessed 23 Mar. 2018; Still from Dawn of the Dead, featuring David Emge. Anchor Bay, 2004. 
 
 The European edit of Dawn complicates issues of creative authority and 
Romero displayed concern when the Goblin score threatened to displace his 
status as the primary creative figure. This said, on the whole Romero seemed 
unconcerned as long as the Italian consortium did not interrupt his hands-on 
creative process. Romero has stressed the importance of on-set improvisational 
freedoms to his ideas of authorial independence (Romero 2016). For Romero, 
authorship was largely the art of creating, the process, the invention.  
 That Dawn of the Dead was ultimately the work of multiple filmmakers 
was extremely rare in American cinema, independent or otherwise. Filmmaker 





two parents” (Bennyx). In many ways, Dawn’s production was a unique 
culmination to the egalitarianism Romero had begun on Night of the Living 
Dead, only here creativity was compartmentalised, divided into equal parts and 
sent out into separate territories. As a consequence, Romero’s autonomy onset 
was maintained, even as his creative control in other areas of production and 
release was rescinded or denied. 
 Also divided was the very concept of the auteur, split between the 
classical notion championed by Sarris et al. and the idea of authorship as 
something commercial. Romero was not naïve about the economic potential of 
this collaboration, telling Variety that each filmmaker was better placed to cater 
material to their designated markets (Werba 40). As the Independent Film 
Journal observed on 21 March 1978, “with Argento’s reputation abroad, and 
Romero’s cult status in the States, the paring would seem a commercial 
certainty” (“Romero and Argento” 12). James Naremore proposes that “in 
certain American contexts, [auteurism] became useful as a kind of marketing 
strategy” (11), but he need not have cast his net so narrowly. Notwithstanding 
Night of the Living Dead’s international success, and Romero’s subsequent cult 
capital in this marketplace, Argento was himself a regular box-office draw on his 
home turf. His name reinforced Dawn of the Dead/Zombi’s Italian heritage for 
domestic audiences and the Italian promotional material astutely ran under the 
banner “DARIO ARGENTO presents a film written and directed by GEORGE 
ROMERO,” allowing both auteur-brands to work side-by-side, with Argento’s 
taking precedent (fig. 2.4). 
 On 18 October, Dawn of the Dead’s Italian distributor Titanus ran a two-
page advertisement in Variety proclaiming that “the zombies are eating up 





six days of release (14-15). The second page reprinted a memo from Titanus 
head Goffredo Lombardo addressed to Dario Argento, reading, “Opening 
release of Zombie is sensational. Congratulations and thanks to both you and 
George Romero. Titanus is proud to be distributing this box office giant” (15). 
This boast of massive, rapidly acquired ticket sales in a North American trade 
paper had a dual purpose: to bolster the international reputation of all parties 
involved, and to assist Laurel in attracting a US distributor. 
 The biggest obstacle in acquiring domestic distribution had been the 
film’s violent content, certain to receive an X-rating from the MPAA. Romero 
upheld that the violence 
was crucial to the film’s 
aesthetic power, “it speaks 
to our fragility, its shocks 
you and makes you wake 
up,” he later said (Porton 
5). Unfortunately for 
Laurel, since its inception 
the X-rating, as Night of 
the Living Dead distributor 
Walter Reade told Variety 
in 1969, “for all practical 
purposes was basically 
connected with dirty 
pictures for a large number 
of the film going US public” 
(qtd. in Wyatt, “Stigma” 
Fig. 2.4. Italian poster for Dawn of the Dead (aka Zombi). 
“Dawn of the Dead (1978) Photo Gallery.” IMDB. https:// 
www.imdb.com/title/tt0077402/mediaviewer/rm86621849. 





243). Although many distributors were quick to exploit this association ("Stigma" 
251), restrictions in terms of audience and exhibition made the X-rating, outside 
of pornography, relatively uncommon. In 1972, Farber and Changas pointed out 
that “approximately 50 per cent of US theaters around the country refuse to play 
any X films . . . and as many as 30 big-city newspapers, along with a number of 
local television stations, refuse to advertise them” (D15). For many, the X was a 
“brand of shame,” or worse, “box office poison” (D15). 
 
Table 2.2 
Leading US Theatre Chains in 1977 
THEATRE CHAIN NO. OF US DOMESTIC SCREENS 
(approx.) 
GENERAL CINEMAS 500 
UATC 500 
MANN THEATRES 250 
COMMONWEALTH 200 
ABC THEATRES 185 
CINEMETTE 150 
Source: Lee Beaupre. “How to Distribute a Film.” Film Comment, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1977, p. 50. 
 
 Rubinstein claims that Laurel only received three serious offers for a 
North American release. The first came from Warner Bros., who proposed $1 
million for an R-rated cut. Filmways Pictures wanted Dawn on the same terms, 
but Warner’s offer essentially priced them out (Rubinstein and Martin 2004). 





Film Distribution Company (UFDC). Hassanein was then executive vice 
president of United Artists Theatre Circuit (UATC), formed in 1926 to secure 
exhibition outlets for United Artists Communications, Inc. (UA), but a separate 
legal body in its own right (Balio 11). By 1977, UATC was one of the largest 
theatre chains in the United States (Table 2.2) and UFDC was established to 
provide an additional stream of content. Overseen by Salah and his son 
Richard Hassanein, UFDC output was infrequent, and frequently erratic and 
releases included the West German soft-core porno The Sinful Bed (Dir. 
Gregan, 1973), the Mexican Jaws facsimile Tintorera: Killer Shark (Dir. Cardona 
Jr., 1977) and the US feature length sketch-comedy The Kentucky Fried Movie 
(Dir. Landis, 1977). 
 UFDC was alone in committing to an uncut version of Dawn, a fact 
reflected in its reduced offer of $500,000, which Laurel willingly accepted. 
Rather than concede to an X-rating and its association with pornography, Laurel 
and UFDC planned to release the film unrated. In place of the X, promotional 
material ran the following warning: “There is no explicit sex in this picture. 
However there are scenes of violence which may be considered shocking. No 
one under 17 will be admitted.” Throughout the film’s first and second run, the 
Laurel partners continued to do the rounds on the national press circuit, taking 
any opportunity to restate the film’s lack of sexual content, while restating that 
the film did contain “blood aplenty” (B. Thomas 40). As Rubinstein explained in 
July 1979 (and not for the first or last time) “no major company will release a 
film with an X-rating. The flaw in the ratings system is that X carries the 
connotation of sex. There is no sex in Dawn of the Dead. Not even a kiss” (B. 
Thomas 40). 





distinct from the X, citing the artistic merit of their Pasolini acquisitions The 
Canterbury Tales (1972) and Arabian Nights (1974) and UFDC’s Dawn of the 
Dead (“UA Argues X” 26). Such public rallying against the X-rating continued in 
the marketing of independent films well into the 1990s, becoming a key release 
strategy for Miramax. As Perren details, when a Miramax film such as Peter 
Greenaway’s The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover (1989) was given an 
X-rating, “the company cried foul to the press then used it as a means to gain 
inexpensive publicity. The company simultaneously exploited the rating by 
drawing attention to the film’s racy content at the same time that it declared the 
X inappropriate and unfair given the “artsy” nature of the film (Indie Inc. 44). 
 Like Miramax, Laurel’s disavowal of the X and its associated “racy 
content” was eagerly transferred into considerable media attention. By 
defending the film’s more extreme content, Rubinstein was reinforcing the 
Romero brand, using the director’s association with violent horror and Dawn’s 
rejection of the ratings system to promise uncensored, licentious thrills; at the 
same time authenticating the director’s anarchic, counterculture persona. If 
Dawn of the Dead were, as Tom Allen predicted, the “biggest cult blockbuster of 
all time,” it was a status carefully nurtured by Rubinstein’s shrewd judgement of 
the marketplace. 
 Getting an unrated Dawn of the Dead onto cinema screens had been a 
calculated risk for Laurel. From the film’s debut at the Cannes Film Festival in 
May 1978 to its national release, Dawn spent nearly a year looking for a US 
distributor who would protect Romero’s directorial vision (domestically at least). 
On the other hand, Laurel had two legitimate offers for distribution to fall back 
upon, and Rubinstein contemplated removing some of the film’s more graphic 





 Risk was then further offset by partnership with the Hassaneins and 
UFDC. Dawn’s lack of a rating threatened restrictions on exhibition and 
advertising, two factors that drove Warner Bros. and Filmways to demand an R-
rating. UFDC on the other hand were a subsidiary of a leading North American 
cinema chain and had no problem with the film’s exhibition. On 20 April, Richard 
Hassanein opened Dawn of the Dead in 200 cinemas across 25 cities, with 
plans for a saturation release of 500 cinemas depending on the film’s initial 
success (“Italo” 34; Anderson, “Triangle” 16). Dawn immediately exceeded 
expectations and within three weeks flaunted strong box office returns with a 
reported $1,490,288, making it the fifth highest grossing film in the week ending 
2 May 1979 (“50 Top-Grossing” 45). This bright start convinced other exhibitors 
to run the film and Rubinstein says that in the end only UATC’s major 
competitor General Cinemas refused to play it (Perry 32). By the final count, 
Dawn of the Dead had a collective worldwide box office of over $55 million 
("Dawn of the Dead (1979) - Financial"). 
 In June 1979, Rubinstein claimed “the key to our success is the creative 
control we’ve had in the past. I believe that’s simply good business” (“Romero-
Rubinstein” 26). As he makes explicit, Romero’s “creative control” was part of a 
“good business” plan, one facet of a corporation strongly driven by 
entrepreneurial acumen and risk management. Although risk management had 
not yet become an integrated part of business infrastructure in the 1970s,52 it 
nevertheless remained a prerequisite when engaging with any marketplace, 
particularly a “high-risk” industry such as independent film production. In Sharon 
Gifford’s “Risk and Uncertainty” (2011), she connects risk to Becker’s concept 
of human capital, where “investment in human capital can generate an apparent 
                                                   
52 During this period, risk management was mostly associated with insurance buying or hedging 





increase or decrease in risk aversion, depending on the type of investment 
made. In either case, those with more knowledge may be apparently willing to 
take more risks, not because they are less risk averse, but because they have 
better information” (304). Such "human capital" investment saw Rubinstein take 
a near-dormant regional production house and transform it into a key player in 
the independent film sector. 
 
Conclusion 
Creative risk-taking is seen as an essential component of independent film 
production, even if notions of economic risk management in this sector have 
been underexplored. How typical Laurel’s behaviour was during this period 
remains to be seen, and this chapter calls for additional scholarship in this area. 
This said, risk did play a crucial part in Laurel’s establishment, dictating method 
and influencing output. Attraction to risk has been seen as a determining factor 
in the behaviour of the entrepreneur, yet as Laurel’s activities from 1973 to 
1979 demonstrate, risk-taking was calculated, offset by investment into human 
capital, knowledge of the marketplace and strategic partnerships with investors 
at home and abroad. The demands of the independent “cult auteur” sat in 
accord with such industry navigation, situated within a business plan that 
emphasised product differentiation and brand appeal. Inside this infrastructure, 
Romero’s creative output was also flexible, exhibited by two very different 
versions of Dawn of the Dead. Far from a simple objective to “turn Romero 
loose,” Laurel was more diverse, guided by entrepreneurial acumen and risk 












“Camelot is a State of Mind”: Professional 
Product, Independent Spirit, 1979-1982 
 
The financial success of Dawn of the Dead at the national and international box 
office evidenced a skilful cultivation of the George A. Romero brand. The 
filmmaker’s propensity for divergent, auteurist production had been an 
impediment to parent company the Latent Image’s solvency, yet in the hands of 
entrepreneur Richard Rubinstein it became an integral part of the Laurel 
Group’s differentiated, and now exceedingly profitable corporate identity. Laurel 
was mutually beneficial to its partners, a space where independent filmmaking 
could be a means of personal expression and economic prosperity, each 
propelling the other and stimulating growth. From Rubinstein’s point of view, 
growth meant legitimacy, a self-made business with the capital to meet 
competitors on a professional level. For Romero, it meant a larger canvas, not 
just in terms of scale and budget, but also in terms of the authority to produce a 
broader range of work. This bore fruit in the company’s next feature film 
Knightriders, a $3 million production that abandoned genre entirely in favour of 
an apparent autobiographical narrative. 
 Encompassing a period from 1979 to 1982, this chapter details Laurel’s 





Entertainment, Inc., a metamorphosis that, as close scrutiny of SEC documents 
reveals, dictated a more formal business infrastructure with greater 
accountability to a range of investors and stakeholders. I consider how these 
concessions contradicted Romero’s anti-establishment persona, inspecting the 
company’s efforts to harmonise diametric entreaties for “anarchic” creativity and 
professional responsibility. This chapter also survey Laurel’s renegotiation of its 
corporate identity through engagement with the press and Romero’s filmic 
output. In this regard, I analyse Knightriders’ autobiographical narrative in the 
context of the firm’s corporate evolution for the first time, proffering a clearer 
understanding of the film and its thematic intent. A study of Laurel’s 
professionalisation provides a unique platform from which to explore seldom 
discussed issues of non-Hollywood corporate governance and independent 
filmmaker (self)image-making. 
 
3.1. Independence with Overheads: Sale of Stock and Professionalisation 
Laurel Entertainment, Inc. was established on 14 December 1979 in legal 
distinction from previous holdings bearing the Laurel name. In November, the 
domestic box office of Dawn of the Dead had risen to around $16.1 million, 
giving Romero and Rubinstein the capital needed to float the company on the 
public stock exchange. On 24 April 1980, underwriters Rosenkrantz, 
Ehrenkrantz, Lyon & Ross, Inc. listed one million shares of Laurel’s common 
stock for sale at $3.25 per share, with $2.95 going directly to Laurel. These 
shares were sold on a “best efforts” basis and Laurel and their investment bank 
set the minimum sale at 650,000 (Rosenkrantz et al. 1).  Stock was then 
advertised in Barron’s National Business and Financial Weekly (“Laurel 





Entertainment Sale #2” 36). By 31 March, Laurel were reporting the sale of 
675,000 shares, allowing the company to begin trading on the NASDAQ 
American stock exchange. This sale of common stock realised proceeds of 
$1,852,280 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1980 F-6). 
  Taking a firm public “typically refers to when a company undertakes its 
initial public offering, or IPO, by selling shares of stock to the public usually to 
raise additional capital. After its IPO, the company will be subject to public 
reporting requirements and its shares often become listed on a stock exchange” 
(“Companies, Going Public”). Floating a company on the public stock exchange 
is an expensive procedure and direct costs include legal fees, audit fees, filing 
fees with a number of government/regulatory bodies, the cost of printing a sale 
of stock prospectus and, finally, payment of a percentage of the profits to the 
underwriters (Bragg 7). The total cost of Laurel’s own public offering (which also 
included stock insurance) was approximately $341,470, an amount deducted 
from their total IPO (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1980 F-6). Given this expense, 
questions arise as to why the partners felt public trading was necessary, 
particularly since the monies earned from Dawn of the Dead could theoretically 
be funnelled back into production of another feature film, allowing the company 
to maintain a clearer sense of autonomy. 
 Economists identify corporate growth as a fundamental part of a firm’s 
organic life cycle. An IPO represents a crucial threshold in this development, 
moving from private, grassroots entity into a larger, more professional 
enterprise. Aside from the release of additional capital, issues of risk-reduction 
also play a part. Gedajlovic et al. observe a number of problems facing the 
privately-owned “founder-managed firm,” where small-scale businesses often 





cooperative ties with skilled colleagues and external distributors. The private 
firm’s lack of transparency can also be a deterrent to potential investors, given it 
restricts their ability to monitor how their investment is being utilised (903-04). 
Going public reduces risk by tempering these facets. For Yung-Chih Lien and 
Shaomin Li, the process of professionalisation that follows the IPO adds further 
currency, facilitating the recruitment of resources, while enhancing “the firm’s 
productivity and competitiveness” (352). 
 Bharat A. Jain and Omesh Kini ascertain that it is hard to answer 
definitively why firms go public, especially given the low-rate of success for 
post-IPO companies, with one third expected to fail outright (1282-83). Success 
is dependent on a number of variables, based on size, managerial ownership 
retention, venture capitalist following, the reputation of the investment bank and 
risk. Jain and Kini argue that “entrepreneurs need to grow their businesses to a 
certain efficient scale before attempting to go public, thereby increasing the 
chance of survival. It also follows that the transition to these states will be 
dependent on risk” (1293).  As we have seen, Rubinstein was both drawn to risk 
and skilled in managing its effects. Speaking to the New York Times in 1982, he 
boasted of his intent to reduce risk by building Laurel into an efficient business 
with a five-year plan (Harmetz, “From the Cecil” H25). The success of Dawn of 
the Dead presented a window of opportunity to begin this elaboration, the firm 
now at an “efficient scale” to formalise growth through an IPO. 
 Laurel preceded this IPO with a flurry of activity and throughout 1979 the 
company appeared in the trade papers with a degree of frequency. On 9 May, 
Variety announced that Laurel’s next film Knights (later retitled Knightriders) 
would be part-financed by United Artists’ international division through foreign 





report on the company, recording, “with Dawn maintaining its b.o. levels, and 
still facing heavy summer playoff, the Laurel Group partners may be closer to 
that position of power that they once envied [in the majors]” (“Romero-
Rubinstein” 6). Alongside Knights, the Laurel founders detailed two additional 
feature films, including a sequel to Dawn of the Dead and a “sci-fi spoof” entitled 
Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon written by Rudolph Ricci. This marketplace activity 
included a re-release of Martin, repackaged to appeal to arthouse audiences 
(“Romero-Rubinstein” 26), and the sale of the non-theatrical distribution rights of 
the firm’s back catalogue to Cinema 5, Ltd.’s 16mm division (“Romero’s” 36). 
 In Laurel’s 1980 Sale of Common Stock Prospectus, the company listed 
a number of additional projects in various stages of development, each 
identified for aspiring investors within a specific genre. These nine projects 
included Knightriders (dubbed an “action-fantasy”), Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon 
(“comedy”), Day of the Dead (a “horror-action” sequel to Dawn), Creepshow (an 
“anthology horror film”) and Cat People (“horror”). Also included on this list was 
The Stand (a “thriller-fantasy” adapted from Stephen King’s best-selling novel of 
1980), Italian co-production Necronomicon (“thriller-fantasy”), Gunperson 
(“action-western/parody”) and Out of This Furnace, a “dramatic” adaptation of 
Thomas Bell’s 1941 novel concerning immigrant communities in Pennsylvania 
(Rosenkrantz et al. 15). Creepshow and The Stand showcased a burgeoning 
relationship with Stephen King and the prospectus logged that King himself 
would pen the screenplays to both (Rosenkrantz et al. 15). 
 This flurry of activity extended into ancillary markets. A Dawn of the Dead 
soundtrack album was released by Varèse Sarabande Records in 1979, an 
officially licensed board game made by Simulations Publications, Inc. came out 





Romero and Susanna 
Sparrow, were published in 
1977 and 1978 respectively 
(fig. 3.1). George Lucas had 
famously uncovered the 
potential of these 
supplementary markets when 
he deferred a salary on Star 
Wars in favour of licensing 
and merchandising rights. 
According to The Hollywood 
Reporter’s Alex B. Block, by 
the end of 1978, toy 
manufacturer Kenner had 
sold more than 40 million 
officially licensed Star Wars 
action figures for a gross sale 
of more than $100 million 
(“The Real Force”). Henry Jenkins records that the successful licensing of Star 
Wars iconography and merchandise re-established the potency of media tie-in 
products (554). If this could be effective in Hollywood, Laurel proved that the 
same synergetic augmentation could be applied to the independents. 
 Ancillary markets would later become a vital revenue for canonical 
independent filmmakers such as Spike Lee and Kevin Smith. Through his 
production company View Askew, Smith opened the retail store Jay and Silent 
Bob’s Secret Stash in 1997, offering a wide selection of tie-in products. Of all 
Fig. 3.1. Novelisation of George A. Romero’s Dawn of the 
Dead, published by St Martin’s Press. “Dawn of the 
Dead: (1978 Novel).” Fandom. http://zombie.wikia.com 







people, auteur theorist Andrew Sarris wrote that Smith’s “flair for merchandising 
and recycling the fruits of his labor is one of the reasons I’m betting on him to 
break out of the low-budget ghetto and into the movie mainstream” (“Kevin 
Smith”). With his 40 Acres and a Mule production company, Spike Lee 
cultivated strong-ties with sportswear manufacturer Nike, appearing in and 
directing several of the corporation’s television commercials in the late 1980s. 
Lee used this association to launch his own retail-clothing store Spike’s Joint in 
August 1990 and New York Times reporter Amy Waldman observed “bus loads” 
of tourists “shelling out serious money for everything from Mo’ Better Blues 
memorabilia to leather jackets to Malcolm X hats” (620). That Lee would use the 
Malcolm X quote “by any means necessary” to sell trainers and beanies 
somehow neatly encapsulates the canonical independent sector as something 
bold, provocative, political and co-opted. 
 Aside from additional revenue, in 1979 Laurel’s move into ancillary 
markets, alongside the development of several new projects and the 
exploitation of its back catalogue, can be seen in the broader context of its IPO. 
These activities were widely reported on, and as former SEC attorney Robert G. 
Heim has written, “to successfully sell its shares to the investing public, a new 
company must have an exciting ‘story’ to tell investors about why they should 
turn over their money to the company” (14). Posturing in the trade and regional 
press was part of a shrewd business strategy. Dawn of the Dead demonstrated 
Laurel’s skill at crafting saleable product and the company’s expansion across 
multiple platforms suggested additional sources of remuneration. Pursuant to its 
1981 Form 10-K, taking Laurel public gave the company stability and proceeds 
from the sale of common stock were “sufficient to meet the company’s cash 





 Lien and Li assert that “an IPO not only represents a crucial threshold in 
a firm’s development, but it also creates an impetus for firms to change their 
corporate governance structures” (347). Briefly, corporate governance pertains 
to the internal organisation of a firm in terms of a system of practices, decision-
making and control (Keasey and Wright 291). Changes to corporate 
governance structures post-IPO are the culmination of the legal demands of 
becoming a publicly-run enterprise and those necessitated by the desire to 
expand. Filatotchev et al. record:  
 
The entrepreneurial firm has a narrow resource base. It is, as a rule, 
owned and controlled by a tightly knit group of founder-managers and/or 
family investors, and the level of managerial accountability to external 
shareholders is low. As the firm grows, it requires access to external 
resources and expertise that may fuel and support this growth, and it 
opens up its governance system to external investors . . . at this stage, 
the balance between resources and accountability starts to shift towards 
greater transparency and increasing monitoring and control by external 
providers of resources . . . [an IPO] represents a dramatic shift from an 
entrepreneurial firm to a “professional” firm with a fully developed 
governance system. (260)  
 
As a legal requirement of the IPO (and as part of a movement towards 
increased monitoring, transparency and accountability) all publicly-owned firms 
must install a board of directors as “the common apex of the decision-control 
system” (Fama and Jensen 311). This said, Rubinstein and Romero were not 





was done on a noncumulative basis, meaning “a shareholder can only vote up 
to the number of shares s/he owns for a single candidate during the board 
elections. The result is that a majority shareholder will elect the entire board of 
directors” (“Noncumulative”). Romero and Rubinstein owned equal shares of 
525,000 (approximately 57.5% combined), giving them majority ownership 
(Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 6). The voting-in of the board took place at 
Laurel’s first annual shareholders meeting in 1980 and, in the final count, 
Romero was elected chairman, Rubinstein became vice president of operations, 
Michael Gornick was appointed staff director of photography and David E. 
Vogel became vice president of finance. The board was completed by Alvin 
Rogel, Lester Rosenkrantz (serving as a designee of the underwriters) and 
Rubinstein’s father Frank (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 11-15). 
 This organisational structure appears to have been fairly typical. In his 
article “Correlates of Board Empowerment in Small Companies” (2007), Jonas 
Gabrielsson concludes that small companies usually initiate a skeletal board of 
between three and seven members, comprising of the owner-manager(s), the 
owner-manager’s family members and outside directors with a personal-
professional relationship to the owner-manager, such as a family attorney, a 
banker or a close friend (689). This type of board is sometimes referred to as a 
“paper board” or a “rubber-stamp board” and as Gabrielsson explains, “the 
paper board is constructed just to meet legal requirements [while] the rubber-
stamp board meets only to formally approve what the owner-manager has 
already decided to do” (689). Though boards in SMEs have been described as 
passive entities (688), they can nevertheless exhibit agency by proffering 
expertise and by giving advice to the owner-manager as and when required. In 





number of board meetings and the need for these board meetings depends on 
the need for advice” (Dekker et al. 531). 
 Once Laurel’s board was in place, its first official responsibility was to 
hire staff members to manage the day-to-day activities of the firm. 
Unsurprisingly, Romero and Rubinstein became the “two key employees” 
(Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1980 F-7), with Rubinstein as president and treasurer 
and Romero as corporate secretary (Moody’s OTC 1980 1137).53 Rubinstein 
and Romero entered into a three-year employment agreement with their 
company and were paid salaries of $60,000 in the first year, increasing by 
$10,000 in each subsequent year of employment. Laurel also afforded 
substantial life and disability cover and insurance policies of at least $250,000 
for each partner (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1980 F-7). By 1984, these 
employment agreements included annual vacation time of six weeks and, for 
Romero, “an annual expense allowance of $5000” for which no accounting was 
required (“Exhibit 10.5” 8-9). 
 Laurel’s salaried roster of employees included Michael Gornick and 
David E. Vogel. Since 1973, Gornick had been a key collaborator, working as 
post-production supervisor for Latent Image and later becoming Romero’s 
director of photography on Martin and Dawn of the Dead. A determined “Jack of 
all trades,” Gornick was also a director and in 1975 helmed The Winners 
episodes “I’m Back: The Rocky Bleier Story” and “Thank God I’m a Country 
Boy: Terry Bradshaw.” Vogel joined the firm in 1979, by his own account simply 
turning up at Laurel’s Fort Pitt Blvd. offices and expressing a desire to “work six-
months for free doing whatever they needed him to—sorting mail, answering 
                                                   
53 A corporate secretary “is responsible for assuring the company stays in compliance with both 
regulatory and statutory requirements.” Duties cover record-keeping, minute-taking, overseeing 






phones, anything” (E. Cook). 
 Apocryphal or not, Vogel’s comments recall the relaxed, post-Fordist 
infrastructure that pre-dated Laurel’s public trading. Tom Dubensky also 
remembers a laissez faire recruitment policy, which required nothing more than 
a display of willing and knowledge of Laurel’s business address (Dubensky 
2016). Over the next decade, as Laurel built strong relationships with a number 
of regional filmmakers, talent was typically hired film-to-film, rather than on a 
permanent basis (Harrison 2018).54 Such practices were again part of 
Rubinstein’s canny offset of risk. Each film or television show was delegated to 
a separate subsidiary company, these “single purpose entities” protecting the 
parent from liabilities and financial failure and legally accountable for the 
production as a whole. By 1981, Laurel subsidiaries included Laurel-Knights, 
Inc., initiated to produce Knightriders, Laurel-Show, Inc. to produce Creepshow 
and Laurel-Moon, Inc. for Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 
1981 1).55 During a production year, staffing could rise to up to 70 personnel 
(Moody’s OTC 1986 1932), yet responsibility to these employees was limited to 
a Laurel subsidiary and a fixed-term contract that expired with that production. 
Gornick and Vogel remained the only permanent members of staff during these 
formative stages of Laurel’s IPO. 
 Despite his comments, David Vogel was far more than just another of 
Laurel’s waifs and strays. Like Rubinstein, he was a Columbia business school 
                                                   
54 Laurel frequently employed the regional production services of the Image Works and 
founders John Harrison, Pasquale Buba and Dusty Nelson worked for Romero and Rubinstein 
in a number of capacities from The Winners onward (Harrison 2018). 
55 Also incorporated into a separate legal entity was Laurel’s studio space and equipment, 
officially owned by the subsidiary Laurel-Communications, Inc. In 1981, Laurel-Communications 
“completed the installation of a new $150,000 post-production and editing facility” (Laurel Entmt. 
Form 10-K 1981 1). Aside from studio space, 247 Fort Pitt Blvd. housed fifth-floor offices, which 
by 1984 cost the company $900 on a month-to-month basis. Not included was “the area 
beneath the stairway at a monthly rental of $50 [and] the area opposite the utility sink and 





graduate and, as Laurel made clear to shareholders, had previously served as 
a management consultant at Booz, Allen and Hamilton, one of the largest 
consultancy firms in the US (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 15). Vogel was 
hired as the company’s first “professional manager,” that is, a high-level 
employee trained in management rather than in the company’s particular 
product or market (Schein 24-25). The business expertise of the professional 
manager presents a number of advantages to the firm, bringing a degree of 
objectivity to decision-making and leading corporate activities for the good of 
the shareholders, not the personal incentives of the owner-founder (Daily and 
Dalton 27). This would create tensions between Vogel and Romero in the years 
to follow. 
 Vogel’s presence allowed Rubinstein opportunity to focus on the 
numerous film and television packages Laurel was juggling at that point 
(Gange, Zombies 144). Vogel’s role soon expanded beyond vice president of 
finance to include aspects of film production and, by 1984, to the corporate 
secretary tasks previously governed by Romero. In terms of production, Vogel 
replaced Rubinstein as the on-set producer (aka the line producer), granting 
him authority over the day-to-day organisational demands of filming. E.L. 
Honthaner explains that the line producer is “the budget-scheduling expert who 
supervises all the administrative, financial and technical details of the 
production,” on set to ensure that the project runs on time and on budget and, if 
necessary, to mediate the sometimes-conflicting demands of the director, the 
cast and the crew (2-3). Vogel appeared to welcome such responsibilities, 
displaying an ambition that by 1993 placed him as president of the Walt Disney 
Motion Picture Group. 





towards a formalised infrastructure based on mainstream industrial standards. 
Knightriders was, in the words of Michael Gornick, the “first of [Laurel’s] big 
budget films” (Axl and Jscott) and the increased scale brought about an 
increased scrutiny from outside parties. Employment of professional talent on 
Knightriders meant dealing with Hollywood unions such as the Screen Actors 
Guild (SAG) for the first time, something Romero had previously avoided to 
facilitate a looser, more improvisational shooting schedule (Auty 28-29). Janet 
Wasko recognises Hollywood as a “highly unionized” industry and Laurel now 
had to contend with strong, potentially prohibitive regulations concerning 
minimum salary (known as scale), working conditions, hours worked and 
residual payments, etc. (41-42).56 Ironically, Knightriders’ principal photography 
took place during a SAG strike beginning 21 July 1980, and shooting was only 
allowed to continue because Laurel had not received the sixty-days’ notice 
required to halt operations. Knightriders actress Christine Forrest recalls that a 
number of SAG members felt uncomfortable working during the industrial 
action, creating an on-set disharmony incongruous with the family-dynamic 
typically purported by Laurel crewmembers (Romero et al. 2013). 
 Away from union concerns, Laurel now had other external partners to 
consider. In another first for the company, Knightriders went into production with 
a domestic distribution deal already in place, with UFDC stepping in to provide 
half of the $3.5 million budget (“AFI Catalog”). This became the first of a three-
picture deal with UFDC. According to UFDC president Richard Hassanein, this 
deal covered the domestic release of Knightriders, a second film of Laurel’s 
                                                   
56 Ed Lammi says that this system of employing SAG actors was still in place on subsequent 
Laurel productions. In this case, though all the onscreen talent would have been union, the 
“below-the-line” employees (i.e. the teamsters, the technical staff and the behind-the-camera 
crew) would not be. In fact, some of the above-the-line crewmembers, including the director and 






choosing and a sequel to the highly-profitable Dawn of the Dead (Karr 14). 
Under these terms, filming for this sequel could begin no later than 18 January 
1985 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 2). Romero would receive $100,000 for 
three screenplays, with an additional $100,000 in director’s fee. Richard 
Rubinstein earned $100,000 in producing fees. These payments would increase 
by $50,000-$150,000 each if the films received a net profit (Rosenkrantz et al. 
18). This investment granted UFDC approval over screenplay, Romero as 
director and Rubinstein as producer. No project would be given the greenlight 
unless a representative of UFDC signed off on all three aspects (Rosenkrantz et 
al. 18). 
 UFDC was clearly attracted to the sequel rights to Dawn of the Dead, but 
Laurel’s professionalisation was another facet when courting such potential 
investment partnerships. The firm’s IPO and its responsibilities to shareholders 
implied trustworthiness, presenting a serious-minded, fully capable business 
partner that a distributor such as UFDC could “bet on.” Cara Reed writes that a 
central facet of professionalisation is a firm’s “legitimization claims,” becoming 
most useful “as a resource and branding strategy . . . rather than an institutional 
process by which to govern an occupational domain” (3). Magali Sarfatti Larson 
notes, “most professions provide intangible goods: their product, in other words, 
is only formally alienable and inextricably bound to the person and personality 
of the producer. It follows, therefore, that the producers themselves have to be 
produced if their products or commodities are to be given a distinctive form” 
(14). 
 Changes in Laurel’s corporate governance presented an industrially 
legitimate entity with a capacity to do business at the highest level. Kevin James 





and immediately recognizable identity, firms attain their strategic objectives and 
gain sustainable competitive advantage over rivals” (8). Drawing on previous 
data, Simões et al. point to a strong link between “a favourable corporate image 
or identity and superior business performance. In addition, there are studies on 
the link between corporate brand and reputation” (153). In these findings, 
Simões et al. cite the work of Bharadwaji and Menon, who in their empirical 
testing conclude that a firm’s reputation can simultaneously increase their 
market share and reduce risk (31). Firms that are in the market of producing 
“intangible” goods need somehow to “tangibilize” such products in the 
marketplace. The firm’s reputation/image can act in this capacity, serving as a 
“proxy for quality and other key buying criteria that cannot be easily evaluated” 
(Bharadwaji and Menon 23). Laurel’s professionalisation served to enhance its 
reputation industrially, becoming a strategic tool through which to attract internal 
shareholders and external investors. 
 If corporate identity can be defined as “the set of meanings by which a 
company allows itself to be known and through which it allows people to 
describe, remember, and relate to it” (qtd. in Vella and Melewar 9), then Laurel’s 
own identity was in danger of developing a schism. Attempts to brand the 
company, and by definition “the personality of the producer,” as a conservative, 
formally-run entity sat in stark contrast with Romero’s persona as an anti-
establishment radical; a persona readily cultivated by the Laurel partners 
throughout the company’s infancy. More so, as Laurel began this 
professionalisation, discourse on American independent cinema began to rest 
upon the sanctification of the amateur. Laurel’s professionalisation placed 
Romero’s authentic cult status (a status with its own financial restitutions) in 





corporate and anarchic, however incompatible these identities might seem, 
would require a skilful negotiation by its founders. 
 
3.2. Brand and Anti-Brand: Corporate Partnerships and Identity 
Management 
Dawn of the Dead’s national and international success saw an increased 
interest in Romero and his work. Reporters applauded his “maverick” status, 
celebrating a “staunchly independent” filmmaker who refused to “sell out” to 
corporate Hollywood (Blank, “No Horsing” 10; Honeycutt D23). In keeping with 
his cult image, in interviews Romero continued to vocalise a mistrust of 
Hollywood, dismissing it as a quagmire of deal-making and cynical market 
analysis (Hanners and Kloman 70). For him, the “economic mechanism” of the 
studios had “nothing to do with movies,” and Romero alleged that real success 
in Hollywood could only be achieved through a total abandonment of one’s 
morality (Burke-Block 25). His status as Laurel’s chairman of the board and 
corporate secretary, where he was beholden to shareholders, professional 
managers and enjoyed a healthy annual salary with numerous benefits, was not 
discussed during this period of enhanced engagement with the media. 
 I do not wish to insinuate that Romero’s distaste for Hollywood was 
anything other than an accurate reflection of his feelings. Nonetheless, it is 
important to understand the usefulness such rhetoric had, factual or otherwise, 
to Laurel Entertainment at that moment in its development. Extratextual 
engagement not only boosted Laurel’s IPO (another facet in generating an 
“exciting story to tell investors”), but also granted a platform from which to 
restate Romero’s brand identity. Laurel’s relationship with public relations firm 





management. Aside from Romero, PMK possessed an enviable roster of A-list 
clients, including Woody Allen, Robert Redford, Tom Hanks and Chevy Chase. 
Michael Cieply of the Los Angeles Times regards the PR firm as essential in 
helping “the client control how his or her image will be affected by the selling of 
a particular movie” (20). Control in the case of Romero meant separating his 
valued cult image from the realities of his corporate activities. 
 This separation was crucial. As Joe Tompkins writes, Romero’s brand 
situated him as a “vanguard director whose supposedly distinctive 
countercultural approach revolutionized horror by issuing a radical challenge to 
society . . . Romero’s reputation promises audiences an authentic cult 
experience” (207, 208). Romero proudly emphasised authenticity through his 
regional distancing, frequently painting this space as something prescriptively 
amateur; his films made by an informal “troupe” of friends whose primary 
motivation was a shared love of the movies (Yakir, “Knight” 45). 
 A coalescence of amateurism and authenticity is common in writings on 
the independent sector, where critics stress the “grassroots” context of 
filmmaking—the “amateur actors” (Bettendorf 24), the “young Americans” at the 
helm (Jacobs, “Reports” 59).57 Writing in 1981, Austin Lamont observed in 
independent filmmakers Robert M. Young (Alambrista!, 1977), Victor Nuñez 
(Gal Young ’Un), John Hanson and Rob Nilsson (Northern Lights, 1978) “a 
conviction that makes them tenacious in reaching their goals. Filmmaking is not 
their jobs, it is there need. They do it because they have to” (16). Numerous 
independent filmmakers have also positioned their work in this manner. Jim 
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the first-time director, mapping out the industrial terrain and pointing towards the state, private 
and overseas bodies that could offer financial support. This attempt to educate aspiring 





Jarmusch calls himself “an amateur filmmaker, not a professional, in the sense 
that ‘amateur’ means love of something, for the form” (Tobias). John 
Cassavetes, meanwhile, famously referred to himself “as a ‘professional’ actor 
and an ‘amateur’ director” (qtd. in Jacobs, Hollywood 28). 
 Media educator David Buckingham views this as typical of the arts as a 
whole; the amateur “seen to enjoy a degree of freedom from commercial 
imperatives, and hence a degree of creativity, that was less available to the 
professional” (25). At its most straightforward, a professional-amateur 
dichotomy is easily defined by payment or non-payment, leading James M. 
Moran to label the perpetual slippage of the term “amateur” from “descriptive 
economic category . . . into prescriptive aesthetic and ideological judgement” a 
misuse (66). In the case of Laurel, this “slippage” was beneficial to the firm and 
its marketplace agenda, masking potential distasteful corporate realities to 
restate the “authenticity” of Romero’s cult director image. Theorists must 
therefore be careful not to take such prescriptive notions of the amateur at face 
value. 
 As Romero took to the press to decry a Hollywood run by “dinosaurs” 
(Gange, “Creepshow” 17), behind the scenes Laurel benefited from closer ties 
to the majors, particularly Warner Bros. The inability to agree to terms on an R-
rated Dawn of the Dead actually kickstarted a relationship that would continue 
on into the 1980s, bearing fruit when Warner distributed Creepshow in 1982. As 
per David Cook, Warner’s partnership with such outside production companies 
was part of “a new industry trend to establish releasing ties with prestigious 
independent units” (Lost Illusions 308). The premature termination of a contract 
with Francis Ford Coppola’s American Zoetrope58 notwithstanding, Warner 
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continued this stratagem with a degree of success, evidenced by subsequent 
partnerships with Orion Pictures and the Ladd Company (Lost Illusions 308). If 
Laurel were not entirely “prestigious,” the company could at least be seen as a 
reliable partner, well-versed in the production of commercial genre product. 
 During this period, Warner was particularly interested in the work of 
horror novelist Stephen King and approached Laurel to adapt his second book 
Salem’s Lot (1975) to the big screen. By the late-1970s, King was boasting six 
best-selling novels released over a six-year period (Lawson BR11), well on his 
way to becoming the “popular culture icon and . . . virtual cottage industry” that 
he is today (Bailey 91). His first novel Carrie, published by Doubleday in 1974, 
was adapted in 1976 by United Artists and director Brian DePalma, generating 
around $14.5 million in US rentals (“Carrie (1976) - Financial”). Richard Nowell 
writes that “robust ticket sales, major academy award nominations, and 
extensive popular press coverage made Carrie one of the highest-profile films 
of its day” (“There’s More” 127). Warner was already awake to this potential 
and, three months prior to Carrie hitting theatres, Executive Vice President in 
Charge of Production John Calley personally sent the unreleased manuscript 
for King’s The Shining to director Stanley Kubrick. Kubrick’s adaptation was 
released in 1980. 
 The Salem’s Lot adaptation was ultimately passed to writer-producer 
Paul Monash at Warner Bros. Television (WBTV), airing as a two-part 
miniseries on CBS in November 1979 directed by The Texas Chain Saw 
Massacre’s (1974) Tobe Hooper. In its stead, on 23 January 1980, Warner and 
                                                   
Warner Bros., who agreed to finance a series of films made under Coppola’s supervision 
(Farber, “George” 5). Zoetrope’s first film under this arrangement was George Lucas’s THX 
1138 (1970), an avant-garde sci-fi experiment that so displeased Warner executives that they 
cancelled the contract and demanded a total return of their investment (Chaillet and Vincent 
30). Despite American Zoetrope’s tumultuous history, it admirably still survives, in some 






Laurel entered into an agreement to develop Cat People, a film based on an 
original screenplay by Michael Laughlin and Bill Condon59 and not a remake of 
Jacques Tourneur’s 1942 film of the same name. That Romero’s Cat People 
failed to materialise did not dissuade Warner from entering a bidding war with 
Universal and Paramount for the domestic rights to Creepshow (“WB Has 
Domestic” 3). Creepshow was originally financed by UFDC as part of the three-
picture deal with Laurel, yet the Hassaneins, not unwisely, took advantage of 
studio interest in the hope of a more expansive, and therefore profitable, 
nationwide release (Martin, “A Casual Chat” 22). Under Warner’s charge, 
Creepshow was held back to accommodate a revised ad campaign, and 
Romero used this time to cut the film by seven minutes and to convert to a 
Dolby Stereo soundtrack. Warner was confident enough in the film to give it a 
saturation release and Creepshow hit 1042 theatres in the United States and 
Canada on 10 November 1982 (Reardon 80). 
 This prolonged courtship with Warner did little to temper Romero’s 
disdain for the majors, instead becoming another vessel through which to 
exhibit anti-establishment credentials. Discussing Salem’s Lot, Romero derided 
the corporate thinking that led Warner to suggest the project in the first place. 
As he told it, Warner executives came to him after seeing Martin at the Utah/US 
Film Festival in 1978, and “in typical studio fashion they reasoned that Martin 
was about a vampire in a small town, Steve had just written Salem’s Lot, which 
was vampires in a small town, so they thought we should meet!” (Fitch). 
Similarly, in 1981, Romero explained that Cat People had been abandoned 
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unknown. Condon later became famous as the director of Gods and Monsters (1998), 
Dreamgirls (2006) and The Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn Part 1 and Part 2, released in 2011 





after going “through the typical studio process of a couple of script drafts and 
blah-blah-blah . . . it became one of those development deals that never 
happened. So it’s not that I resist studios in the right situation. I don’t need a 
studio” (Martin, “George Romero” 33). Again, there is no reason to suggest that 
Romero’s distaste for the studios was inauthentic,60 but his independent status 
was no longer as straightforward as he intimated. 
 Romero bragged that his independence allowed impunity from Hollywood 
decision-making, yet Warner’s investment into Laurel strongly stimulated 
corporate growth. The “pay or play” deal on Cat People agreed that Laurel 
would receive a development fee to “supervise revisions of the existing script by 
a writer acceptable to them,” payable whether the film went into production or 
not (Rosenkrantz et al. 18-19). If the film had gone into production, Laurel would 
have been contracted to receive a total of $300,000 plus 15% of the net profits 
(19). The decision not to go ahead meant Laurel only received around $20,000 
(Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 F-12). Though this amount might seem minimal, 
when taken alongside income earned on short-term interest-bearing securities, 
this was the company’s only source of revenue for the fiscal year ending 31 
March 1981 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1981 8). 
 Good relations with Warner Bros. paid off more substantially on 
Creepshow. Aside from the enhancements made to the film’s release (in terms 
of the scale of distribution, the revised ad campaign, the space made for 
additional post-production work and the inclusion of a Dolby Stereo 
soundtrack), Laurel received $541,577 in a deal that included the sale of cable, 
cassette and TV rights down the line (“Laurel Entertainment Out” 4; “WB Has 
Domestic” 32). Deferred until the fiscal year ending 31 March 1983, these 
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earnings allowed Laurel to report its first year of positive net income since its 
IPO. This increase in revenue was entirely attributed “to the completion and 
delivery of the feature film Creepshow during the first quarter of fiscal 1983. 
Creepshow was responsible for all of the revenue recognized by the company 
during fiscal 1983” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1983 15). 
 On 7 July 1982, Variety reported that Laurel had “accrued additional 
revenues of $1,062,500 and corresponding liabilities of $383,300 in connection 
with the film,” propelling the company out of the development stage (“Laurel 
Entertainment Out” 4). A development stage company “is one in which principal 
operations have not commenced or principal operations have generated an 
insignificant amount of revenue” (Georgiades 12.01). Such entities are subject 
to greater scrutiny and disclosure regulations (Posner). Moving out of the 
development stage is therefore a major step forward in a company’s life-cycle. 
As Rubinstein told shareholders in 1982, “having withstood the long inventory 
cycle associated with the making of Creepshow, we enter our third year as a 
public corporation, no longer as a development stage enterprise but as a 
productive business entity in an industry with exciting profit potential” (Laurel 
Entmt. AR 1982 4). Laurel’s deal with Warner was significant in “enhancing the 
company’s reputation as a recognized independent producer of quality 
theatrical motion pictures” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1983 3). 
 Equally important to Laurel was Warner’s suggestion to collaborate with 
Stephen King. Romero derided this proposal as an example of “typical” 
Hollywood thinking, but King soon became a major partner in their enterprise, 
penning the screenplay for Creepshow and selling the company the film rights 
to The Stand. Rights to the latter were renewed until October 1983 and King 





King’s involvement was 
further indication of the 
company’s legitimacy and 
this partnership was 
encouraged by talent agents 
Adams, Ray and Rosenberg, 
Inc. who, on 25 April 1981, 
entered into a two-year 
agreement with Laurel for 
domestic representation 
(Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 
1981 5). The agency 
specialised in “packaging” 
talent, which, as co-founder 
Lee G. Rosenberg 
explained, is “the process of 
assembling several creative 
elements—director or 
producer or star or any 
combination—with a screenplay and offering them to a financing source in order 
to enhance the transaction” (80). Apropos of this packaging, Creepshow 
posters and trailers relayed the dual credits of its “masters of terror and the 
macabre” (fig. 3.2), belaying a growing corporate influence on Romero’s output. 
 That Romero publicly downplayed the importance of these transactions 
is not surprising. As discussed in Chapter Two regarding the mythologisation 
and branding of offscreen production (Mayer et al. 2), Romero used this space 
Fig. 3.2. Warner Bros. US Poster for Creepshow. 
“Creepshow (1982) Photo Gallery.” IMDB. 
https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083767/mediaindex?ref_=t





to affirm shared values with a subcultural audience, something John Caldwell 
views as equally typical: “‘creatives’ can spike the value of their own personal 
brand by mocking or dismissing the prestige institutional brands that launched 
their careers. In this way, creator brands frequently pose as institutional anti-
brands” (206). Although mainstream institutions played no part in launching 
Romero’s career, Caldwell’s reading does reflect the filmmaker’s disavowal of 
Warner and the studio system. In 1980, Laurel’s professionalisation made this 
identity-management more complicated. Having used Romero’s “anti-brand” as 
a way of authenticating cult/counterculture output, Laurel also needed to 
present a positive, formalised brand image that would be proportionately 
attractive to external business partners and investors. 
 To manage these divergent identities, Rubinstein’s visibility in the press 
increased. Here, a disparity between co-founders was strongly enforced, 
playing on traditional, stereotypical notions that segregate the creative and the 
commercial. On 7 November 1982, Aljean Harmetz’s New York Times profile 
piece on Laurel entitled “From the Cecil B. DeMilles of Pittsburgh”61 depicted 
the partnership as a kind of marriage of convenience, a union between such 
different people that they “don’t even like the same films” (H15). Rubinstein, we 
are told, is a business school graduate with a “five-year” plan, while according 
to a quote from Michael Gornick, “George’s chief characteristic is anarchy” 
(H15, H25). This incongruence was also observed in their separate working 
spaces in Pittsburgh and New York; the former apparently facilitating Romero’s 
creative autonomy, the latter a strategic corporate headquarters from which 
Rubinstein could conduct business (H25). Even so, Rubinstein makes it clear 
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that their skillsets complement each other, stating, “as a practical matter, I give 
up my authority in the creative area 100 percent except as regards to budget 
and George gives up his authority in the business area 100 percent” (H15). 
Romero’s position as corporate secretary, as one example, contradicts such 
neat compartmentalisation. 
 Away from the national and regional newspapers (and, indeed, the trade 
papers where Rubinstein appeared with a degree of frequency), the producer 
engaged with a wide array of publications, including specialist magazines with a 
fannish eye on genre. In an interview with science fiction magazine Starburst in 
1982, Rubinstein echoed his familiar summation of the partnership, telling Tony 
Crawley, “we don’t covet what each other does. I don’t tell George how to direct 
his pictures. He doesn’t tell me how to draw contracts . . . I see my job as 
providing George with the brush, palette, paint and canvas” (“Creepshow” 48). 
Rubinstein goes on to say that during production he was simply there to 
“represent the clock ticking away” on set (“Creepshow” 48); a responsible hand 
behind Romero’s artistic impulses. 
 On the surface, chatter about contract negotiations and book-keeping in 
fan magazines such as Starburst may seem counterproductive, a potentially 
unappealing context in which to discuss one of the genre’s most lauded cult 
auteurs. But Rubinstein’s business perspective again served a wider purpose. 
Broadly speaking, it offered a consistency of their image across medias, 
affirming Laurel’s corporate identity as a professionally run enterprise that 
championed artistic risk-taking. Additionally, Rubinstein used fan magazines to 
showcase his own shared values with Romero and, not least, Romero 
aficionados. In a second interview with Starburst, he joked that “New York is the 





(Crawley, “Richard P.” 36). Geoff King identifies this self-professed “shared 
value” as common amongst independent film executives, who stress that their 
skill in business is lent through a passion for the medium and creative 
enterprises, not as something “more detached and purely commercially minded” 
(Indiewood, USA 30). In public, the partners repeatedly separated the industrial 
and creative sides of their infrastructure, at the same time remaining in unison 
(and ideological superiority) in regard to the authenticity of their independent 
status. 
 As we have seen, the production of media goods is determined by a 
number of economic and creative factors, frequently hard to unpick were one 
ends and the other begins. Yet Laurel’s careful management of its corporate 
identity demonstrates how useful a clear separation of these factors could be in 
regard to branding. Rubinstein’s media visibility allowed Laurel to present itself 
as a responsible corporate entity without sacrificing Romero’s sellable image as 
an anti-establishment cult filmmaker. In reality, these “autonomous bits of turf” 
(Harmetz, “From the Cecil” H15) were not so clear cut. In the press, Romero’s 
business responsibilities were downplayed, while the company’s relationship 
with Warner Bros. was refracted to either affirm Romero’s “anti-brand” or to 
emphasise corporate legitimacy, as and when required. Extratextual 
engagement by both partners created a holistic corporate identity based on 
divergent, yet mutually beneficial skills. Selling this identity of “professional 
independence” was central to Laurel’s concerns following its IPO. Done with 
forthrightness in their engagement with the media, it was also mediated more 







3.3. Case Study: Knightriders and Corporate Identity 
Laurel’s professionalisation was pivotal to the firm’s post-IPO identity. Yet even 
scholars with an interest in Romero’s industrial manoeuvrings tend to overlook 
the importance of this development. In his otherwise insightful analysis of the 
American horror auteur, Craig Bernardini recognises the “self-fashioning” that 
played a large part in Romero’s success, marking an appealing display of 
dissidence and ordinariness, simply a “small businessman” with something to 
say about his country (176). This blue-collar identity is central to Bernardini’s 
assessment, writing: 
 
[Romero’s] legend and legacy are due as much to the success of Laurel, 
the company he founded with Richard Rubinstein in 1973, as to his films. 
The financial vicissitudes of being an independent in an age of 
conglomerates—digging up investors, deferring payments, and all the 
other seat-of-your pants solutions independents find to get films made—
certainly account for the themes that have obsessed Romero throughout 
his career: his quixotic exuberance for tilting at the windmills of corporate 
power (a trope best represented by Billy in Knightriders). (177) 
 
This colourful overview of the firm may have been true in the days of Laurel 
Tape & Film and the Laurel Group, but by 1980 Laurel Entertainment was much 
changed. Following its IPO, the company was now a publicly run enterprise with 
$2 million in the bank, responsibilities to shareholders and lucrative partnerships 
with distributors such as UFDC and Warner Bros. 
 Romero’s identity as a “seat-of your-pants” independent “in an age of 





after it was actually the case. As with Bernardini’s above summation, this was 
seen most prominently in the reception of Knightriders, a film repeatedly framed 
as Romero’s autobiographical reflection upon his own independent status 
(Gange, Zombies 108). Standing in (onscreen) for a film crew, Knightriders’ 
follows an unconventional renaissance fair and their “attempts to resist the lure 
of commercialism” (Stevens 13). According to Fangoria’s Bob Martin (in an 
interpretation consistent with reviews elsewhere), the troupe’s leader, the self-
professed King Billy, or Sir William the Knight (Ed Harris), “could be viewed as 
Romero, the king of independents . . . determined to see things his own way, 
regardless of the hardships” (“Knightriders” 66). At the time, Romero hesitantly 
admitted to identifying with Billy (Blank, “No Horsing” 10), later proclaiming with 
more conviction that Knightriders is “emotional and a bit autobiographical. It’s 
me saying, ‘I won’t compromise’” (Alexander 47). 
 An understanding of Laurel’s professionalisation, however, reveals this 
autobiographical reading to be far from straightforward. By keeping in mind the 
firm’s corporate activities, Knightriders becomes less about a dogmatic refusal 
to compromise (symbolising the bold endeavours of a “determined indie artist 
vs. the system”) and more pointedly about the very nature of compromise in 
real-world terms. In this context, the film can be seen as either a justification for 
Laurel’s corporate growth or as Romero’s attempt to work through and discuss 
these changes artistically. From either perspective, Knightriders seeks to 
reinforce, or perhaps recontextualise, Romero’s authenticity as a counter-
culture figure. 
 To re-orientate the film in this regard, it will be advantageous to first 
summarise the narrative: Knightriders follows a travelling “living history” group 





rather than on horseback. More than just a show, the troupe is a way of life, a 
figurative Arthurian roundtable based on an equality of race, class, colour, 
sexuality and gender unavailable in the mainstream society they have left 
behind. For Billy, this is a space free from moral or ethical compromise, 
preferring to live “hand-to-mouth” on the road than accept the corrupt rule of law 
and commercialism that epitomises his view of the United States. During the 
film’s opening performance, Billy rejects the advice of Morgan, “the infamous 
black knight” (Tom Savini), to pay a bribe to a local deputy sheriff threatening 
foreclosure. As a result, Billy is thrown in jail and made to watch as his friend 
Bagman (Don Berry) is savagely beaten in the adjacent cell. In spite of the pain, 
Bagman laughs off this assault, strengthened by the sense of community that 
awaits their release, a community he regards as an unimpeachable “Camelot” 
fortified by Billy’s idealism. 
 This community is, however, on the verge of collapse. Aside from the 
constant threat of financial destitution, Billy’s rising dogmatism is alienating him 
from the group. He believes that theirs is a spiritual existence and his most 
trusted advisor is a magician and former medical doctor called, appropriately 
enough, Merlin (Brother Blue). After losing in battle in the film’s opening (in the 
film these jousts are unscripted, though strongly safeguarded and based on 
principles of fair play), a wounded Billy retires to camp and recalls to Merlin his 
dream of a “black bird.” For Billy, this bird is a mythical entity that he is sure will 
lead to his destruction. In the meantime, the visceral, death-defying spectacle of 
their performances62 attracts the attention of the sleazy talent agent Bontempi 
(Martin Ferrero). Bontempi’s offer of representation is brought to Billy through 
the troupe’s lawyer Steve (Ken Hixon) and promises to double their income and 
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supply expensive new costumes and cycle equipment. Billy is incensed by this 
offer and rejects it, leading to the following exchange: 
 
STEVE: It's money, Billy. It's all to do with money. Money makes the 
 world go round, even your world. 
BILLY: No, it's just getting too tough. It's tough to live by the code. I 
 mean, it's real hard to live for something that you believe in. 
 People try it and then they get tired of it, like they get tired of their 
 diets. Or exercise. Or their marriage. Or their kids. Or their job, or 
 themselves. Or they get tired of their God. You can keep the 
 money you make off this sick world, lawyer, I don't want any part 
 of it. 
 
If this monologue appears to place Romero’s ideological distaste for the 
mainstream directly into the mouth of his protagonist, it is followed by a 
clearheaded and compassionate response by Bagman, who argues:  
 
BAGMAN: The way I see it is this: you got two separate fights. The one 
 for truth and justice and the American way of life and all that. 
 That's gotta take a backseat to the one for staying alive. You gotta 
 stay alive! Man, you can have the most beautiful ideals in the 
 whole world, but if you die, your ideals are gonna die with you. 
 The important thing is we gotta stay together, we gotta keep the 
 troupe together. And if keeping the troupe going means that we 
 have to take some of this promoter's money, then I say let's take it 






Unable to shake off these words, later that night Billy burns Bontempi’s 
business card and rouses a startled Bagman from his sleep: 
 
BILLY: There's not two different fights. There can't be two different fights. 
 You got to fight for your ideals, and if you die, your ideals don't 
 die. The code that we're living by is the truth. The truth is our 
 code, I can't let people walk on that idea—I can't! 
 
In a Billy as Romero reading of the film, this rejection of compromise can be 
seen as further evidence of the independent filmmaker’s steadfast 
determination to do the same. In truth (the opaqueness of Billy’s response 
notwithstanding), this rhetoric is delivered by a character whose commitment to 
“the code” borders on fanaticism. The film positions Billy as a zealot from the 
beginning, introduced stripped naked and self-flagellating in devout imitation of 
the knights he idolises. His behaviour is erratic and contradictory. At one point, 
he demands that “no one goes anywhere in this outfit without my permission,” 
then later breaks-up an undemocratic group meeting because not all of the 
troupe are in attendance. As his girlfriend Queen Linet (Amy Ingersoll) tells him, 
“everybody here made a conscious, adult decision to be here. To be with you. 
When you go crazy, you force them to rethink that decision,” a proclamation that 
becomes true when Morgan and his crew leave with Bontempi. At his most self-
righteous, Billy refuses to give an autograph to a wide-eyed young fan, later 
screaming at Linet, “I’m not trying to be a hero! I’m fighting the dragon!” 
 In one of the few reviews to explore the negative aspects of this 





half the subject of the tale is fascinating, for it marks him as a director with 
profound reservations about his own complicity in the construction of his artist-
image . . . Knightriders is Romero’s refection on his own role as cult leader” (32, 
33). In Billy’s pageantry (parading around modern-day Pennsylvania dressed as 
a mythical king) Romero could be seen to address the artificiality of his standing 
as “king of the independents,” an identity that is faintly absurd and largely self-
constructed. The monarchical infrastructure of his onscreen knights also recalls 
the controls he fought for, and won, at Latent Image. The film’s reproach of 
Billy’s dictatorial leadership suggests Romero may not have been entirely 
reconciled with his evisceration of Latent’s egalitarian infrastructure. Asked 
about this self-criticism, Romero concedes this is “only because of the Ed Harris 
character. And I felt that way about myself, that I was being too demanding or 
that I didn’t need to stick that closely to a code” (Romero 2016). 
 As Romero’s comments imply, Billy need not be understood as Romero’s 
onscreen avatar in an absolute sense. In its focus on community, Knightriders is 
an ensemble and, unlike their king, the troupe is well aware of the real-world 
concerns that surround them, knowing that overheads must be payed, bikes 
maintained and that an ear of corn costs 75¢ each (in contrast, Steve chastises 
Billy for not knowing how much “gas is selling for, or two-by-fours, or 
hamburgers or anything else”). They enjoy the freedom the commune offers but 
treat the mythos with irreverence. Morgan, who accidentally took his name from 
a female character from Arthurian legend, is the most outspoken, joking that he 
“was never into this King Arthur crap anyway.” And as the film progresses, 
Morgan moves to the centre of the narrative. Though he is narcissistic, 
adulterous and ambitious (he openly desires Billy’s throne), Morgan the black 





as opposed to spiritual and willing to make compromises where necessary. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3. Morgan the Black Knight. Still from Knightriders. Arrow Video, 2013. 
 
 It is Billy’s extremism and devout suffrage that pushes Morgan to leave 
the troupe and start a more commercial enterprise with himself as king, 
rejecting Billy’s crown as a “crown of thorns.” In Morgan’s subsequent career, 
Romero indulges in an unfiltered attack on mass culture (re Hollywood), 
reiterating every known stereotype concerning the moral and artistic bankruptcy 
of the mainstream industry. As a performer, Morgan is decked out in a glittery 
new armour and made to pose in nothing more than a metal codpiece and black 
cloak for a degrading photoshoot— “think medieval sex” the photographer yells 
at him (fig. 3.3). Off camera, Morgan and his followers dive headlong into a 
world of hedonism: poolside parties, drinking, drugs and motel room groupies. 





revealed as superficial, for her nothing more than a brief interlude until her more 
affluent partner gets back in town. The shallowness of this existence is erosive, 
climaxing with in-fighting (“bad craziness” as one-character calls it) and a violent 
motel room punch up that leaves Morgan morally and spiritually adrift. 
 At this moment, headlights appear on the highway and Sir Lancelot-proxy 
Alan (Gary Lahti) rides in from the darkness, come to remind Morgan that “there 
can only be one king at one time. That’s the law.” Morgan thus returns and is 
welcomed as a prodigal son, gladly allowed to challenge for the kingship and 
encouraged by Billy most of all. His ultimate victory is hard fought and, after 
being crowned king, Morgan rejects the deal with Bontempi, telling the agent, 
“y’know those contracts? Burn ‘em, baby” (something Romero was unable, or 
unwilling, to do in reality). Now without a throne, Billy takes to the road, seeking 
out and humiliating the corrupt cop who beat Bagman and handing his 
broadsword to the autograph-seeking fan he previously refused. In a final 
moment of transcendence, Billy imagines himself a real knight errant riding on 
horseback. Lost in this reverie, he loses sight of the road and collides with an 
oncoming truck. The film closes with the troupe gathered at Billy’s funeral, 
saying a final goodbye before being led by Morgan on to another town. 
 In this conclusion, a singular correlation between Romero and Billy is 
somewhat confusing. Examined literally, does Billy’s death point towards a 
future for Laurel Entertainment without Romero’s totemic presence? This is, of 
course, entirely possible and would in fact come to pass in the mid-1980s. Yet at 
this early stage in the company’s development, with its IPO reaffirming 
independence and generating more creative possibilities than ever before 
(including this, his first non-horror film in almost a decade) this seems an entirely 





perplexing, specifically unsure what to make of the “oblique symbolism” of a 
silent Native American biker with a black bird painted on his armour who 
becomes Billy’s squire in the second half of the film (33). 
 Taken in the context of Laurel’s corporate development, Billy’s “last ride” 
and the presence of the black bird and his squire becomes more lucid. Handing 
over his crown can be seen as the moving from one stage to the next, the 
dogmatic idealism once necessary to their independence now replaced by a 
“new reign of pragmatism and sanity” represented by Morgan (Sikov 32). If it’s 
easy to see parallels between Morgan and Rubinstein, Morgan is also Romero, 
a man who has seen first-hand the way the mainstream works (Laurel’s own 
flirtations with Hollywood and a then active relationship with Warner) and found 
his determination to remain independent renewed. Although the Knightriders 
troupe is often deemed a stand-in for Romero’s own group of collaborators63 
(Stevens 13), their measured response to Billy’s fanaticism allows Romero as 
screenwriter to discuss and redefine his ideas about independence, written 
during a time when profound infrastructural changes were taking place at the 
company he co-founded. In the above exchange between Billy, Steve and 
Bagman, as Romero’s reservations about growth and professionalisation are 
made plain, so too is a realist acceptance that this process might be necessary. 
 Onscreen, the knights can only move forward when zealous leadership 
has been buried. In this sense, Billy is not Romero, but a representation of 
something symbolic. This is emphasised by the character’s affinity with magic 
and the foreshadowing of the black bird. As his physical leadership becomes 
increasingly problematic, what he represents remains fundamental to the troupe, 
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a dream to be remembered and kept in-mind, though not to the point of 
destruction. Merlin reminds us that magic is not something otherworldly or 
mystical, “magic’s got to do with the soul,” an internalised desire for self-
fulfilment and independence that Billy ultimately passes down to the group. 
 On Billy’s death, his now knighted squire returns to the group, standing 
amongst the collective as a silent reminder of the former king’s ideals. At this 
moment, it is tempting to regard Billy as a literal representation of the 
“independent spirit” critics repeatedly point us to in their analysis of this sector. 
And how Romero articulates this spirit is fascinating, becoming part of a wider 
image management and reorganisation of Laurel’s corporate identity. 
Knightriders foregrounds authenticity, ridiculing mass culture and presenting an 
at times genuinely romantic vision of a life apart from everyday compromise. But 
it is a film about compromise and the way compromise can be made while 
remaining true to a fundamental principle. As Laurel’s professionalisation 
threatened to pull them away from Romero’s authentic-independent identity, 
Knightriders became a broader mediation of (or, at the very least, a meditation 
on) that changing identity. Knightriders begins by showing an independent 
ideology at its most pious and ends with the most radical representative of this 
creed buried and left behind. The subsequent decision to move forward 




By 1982, Laurel was no longer a “seat-of-your-pants” regional independent. The 
company’s IPO transformed it into a professionalised production unit with a 





shareholders, stronger ties to bicoastal centres and a binding contract with a 
distributor-exhibitor. Professionalisation offered a base from which to produce 
auteur-driven, non-genre independent film, yet sat at odds with Romero’s image 
as a cult filmmaker. Rhetoric surrounding cult and the independent auteur is 
therefore both inadequate and of value, limited in terms of theoretical analysis 
(where identity is complex and, to a degree, self-consciously managed), while 
useful for firms or filmmakers looking to craft a saleable (anti)brand. Seen in the 
context of Laurel’s corporate changes, the film Knightriders becomes a 
fascinating articulation on Romero’s evolving industry status, relocating his 
“radical” identity within a pragmatic model for long term survival. However, as we 
have seen, the film industry, and the independent sector in particular, was far 
from constant. Though Romero may have made peace with Laurel’s need to 
grow, additional adjustments, both internal and at large, would have profound 






















The Once and Future King: Agency and the Limits of 
Control, 1981-1985 
 
Kris R. Cohen’s summary of agency in relation to media studies notes the 
tendency towards “self-consciously political theories of agency, as these have 
done the most work to conceptualize what agency is and how it works.” 
Considering issues of society, culture, subjectivity, representation and 
embodiment, Cohen’s online article “agent/agency” proposes that “agency is a 
theory of power.” This brief is shared by Sarah Buss, who writes, “in order to 
act, one must initiate one’s actions. And one cannot initiate one’s actions 
without exercising one’s power to do so.” Stepping beyond a focus on political 
sociology, Thomas Schatz calls for an examination of human agency in relation 
to media industries, specifically asking if there is space for individual authorship 
amongst the “industrial machinery” and external intermediaries that are 
increasingly brought to the fore by this critical subfield (“Film Studies” 40). 
Laurel Entertainment’s manifesto to facilitate the auteur may seem like an 
answer in the affirmative, but as we have seen George A. Romero’s auteur 
status was complex, part of a wider industrial negotiation that included risk 
management, professionalisation and corporate branding. 





agency. This timeline will take us from the release of Knightriders, in many ways 
the zenith of Romero’s creative ambitions, to his exit from the company on 19 
June 1985, a decision that formally ended the firm’s original auteurist mandate. 
I begin by framing Laurel within a wider institutional context, looking closely at 
agency in relation to marketplace trends and the implications on the company’s 
project development and ambitions (an examination that traverses a 
heterogenous 1980s independent sector). The causal delimitations of these 
changes are measured in regard to the firm’s external relationships, contrasting 
Laurel’s agency to that of its distributor-partner UFDC. Against this background, 
I appraise the material activities that dictated the details of the text, expressly 
Romero’s final film for the company Day of the Dead. I conclude by reviewing 
“agency theory” as a particular principle of economics, allowing a clearer 
understanding of the “agency relationship” between Laurel’s co-founders, not 
least in terms of the “conflicting objectives of the individual participants” (Jensen 
and Meckling 307) that culminated in Romero’s departure. 
 
4.1. “Achievement of Choice”: Portfolios and Project Development 
Through their engagement with the press, George Romero and Richard 
Rubinstein defined Laurel Entertainment as an equal partnership between 
disparate individuals, projecting a corporate identity of professionalism and anti-
establishment cult authenticity, seemingly without contradiction. How this 
compartmentalisation of creative and commercial interests worked on a 
practical level is less clear. On paper, Romero was the firm’s creative 
supervisor and in charge of all of Laurel’s projects in development. Beyond 
Knightriders, his desire to move away from horror was visible in the diverse 





remarkable on this list was a proposed adaptation of Thomas Bell’s Out of This 
Furnace, “a classic of working-class literature” (Sabatos 75) that follows three 
generations of “ethnic Slovak” immigrants living in Braddock, Pennsylvania64 
from 1881 to the 1930s. Laurel optioned Out of This Furnace on 19 May 1981, 
securing the worldwide film and television rights until 1 April 1984 (Laurel Entmt. 
Form 10-K 1981 4). This option was later renewed for an additional twelve-
month period and an unnamed “Emmy award winning writer” was hired to draft 
the screenplay (Laurel Entmt. AR 1982 2). 
 In the early-1980s, an adaptation of Out of This Furnace would have 
neatly aligned with an emergent independent cinema “movement,” placing 
Romero more firmly within the canonical sector. Diane Jacobs observed that at 
the 1979 New York Film Festival, of the six new independent films screened, 
four (Northern Lights, Alambrista!, Heartland and Gal Young ’Un) were set in 
the rural outdoors, and three of those in the past (“Reports” 59). Like Heartland 
and Gal Young ’Un, part three of Out of This Furnace centres on a female 
protagonist and explores issues of gender and independence against a 
developing American landscape. The novel’s look at labour organisations and 
immigration also parallels Northern Lights, a film that turned its lens on 
Scandinavian workers and the formation of a rural worker and farmer alliance in 
1915 North Dakota. Independently-made documentaries Harlan County U.S.A 
and Free Voice of Labor: The Jewish Anarchists (Dir. Fischler and Sucher, 
1980) also dealt with unionisation and worker rights. 
 The critical support these films received did not always make them an 
                                                   
64Though ostensibly a horror film, Romero’s Martin is something of an epilogue to Out of This 
Furnace. Also set in Braddock, the film reveals the same immigrant communities some forty 
years after Bell’s novel concludes. In Martin, the surrounding steel mills, so central to Bell’s text, 
have now closed and this absence of industry creates the graveyard landscape through which 





easy sell for distributors, emerging in a period where no “clearly defined 
speciality film market existed” (Rosen and Hamilton 108). As Northern Lights 
co-director John Hanson wrote in Filmmakers Monthly, his film “was in black 
and white, with no sex or violence, had foreign languages with subtitles, and to 
top it off used a political theme. Either we got negative responses [from 
distributors] or couldn’t get anyone with power to see the film” (21). Hanson and 
his associates ultimately distributed the film themselves. On Richard Pearce’s 
Heartland, the absence of star names (either in the cast or behind the camera), 
onscreen action and “youth appeal” culminated in a lack of interest that allowed 
distributor Levitt-Pickman to leverage a significant percentage of profits away 
from the filmmakers (Rosen and Hamilton 112). Rosen and Hamilton write that 
the Heartland filmmakers were “naïve about distribution, trusting that if they 
made a good film, an advantageous distribution deal would inevitably follow” 
(108). 
 The acquisition of Out of This Furnace was then highly speculative, yet in 
keeping with the firm’s creative and commercial schema. On one hand, the 
project reinforced Romero’s agency as the firm’s creative supervisor, part of a 
longed for and decisive movement away from the violent cult horror that had 
made his name. On the other hand, Laurel’s industrial growth allowed them to 
develop a number of projects simultaneously. Out of This Furnace was just one 
of a number of films in development, including those more firmly rooted in 
genre. In many ways, this recalls the “portfolio of films” strategy identified by 
Pokorny and Sedgwick, where the major studios would produce and release an 
eclectic range of films in the hope that one hit would compensate for the rest. 
Laurel simply adapted this portfolio strategy to the independent sector on a 





 When projects were not part of a pre-arranged development deal with a 
distributor (such as Cat People with Warner Bros. or Necronomicon with Luigi 
and Aurelio DeLaurentiis), Laurel had to meet development costs themselves, 
resulting in potential financial losses if these properties did not move into 
production. Moreover, as a production company only, making films was still 
Laurel’s primary source of income. In 1982, the firm’s total nonconcurrent story 
development costs were approximately $191,153, falling slightly to $187,018 in 
1983 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1982 12; Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1983 F-13). 
The $541,577 initially received from Creepshow’s sale to Warner demonstrated 
that if just one of these projects went forward, then it had the potential to offset 
the development costs of all the other projects combined. Placing a film like Out 
of This Furnace on the books was therefore advantageous to both partners, 
expanding creative opportunities as they spread risk across a diverse portfolio 
of projects. 
 This technique of financing film packages directly through the company 
was achieved through the capital generated by the IPO and granted greater 
creative freedom down the line. Rubinstein told Aljean Harmetz:  
 
Taking seed money [from the studios] puts us in an employer-employee 
relationship . . . if we finance the development ourselves, we can 
approach the industry later as a partner. We always have three to five 
projects in development. It makes good business sense, like holding out 
a deck of cards and asking, “Which one do you want to finance?”. (“From 
the Cecil” H15)  
 





enabling the company to hold off on a deal with financers, film-to-film, until 
production requirements had been met, including production budget, payment 
and final cut. The firm’s IPO gave them bargaining power and the capacity to 
pursue projects under optimal conditions. It gave Laurel the agency to say “no.” 
As an example, producer William Teitler spoke of his disappointment when it 
came to the Laurel project Beauty Kills, recalling an offer of $2.9 to $3 million 
from MGM to produce the film. Rubinstein ultimately held out for $4 million and 
the studio passed (Teitler 2018). To date, the film, like a number of Laurel 
projects from this period, remains unproduced. 
 By 1983, a number of Laurel packages had fallen by the wayside, 
including Necronomicon, Cat People, Gun Person and Shoo-Be-Doo-Be Moon. 
Aside from Day of the Dead, which was still locked into the production 
agreement with UFDC, Laurel had Creepshow 2 (Warner Bros. were at that 
stage scheduled to distribute worldwide) and renewed options on Out of This 
Furnace and Stephen King’s The Stand. Added to this roster was an adaptation 
of Thomas Block’s 1979 “suspense novel” Mayday (which concerns the 
survivors of a mid-air disaster trying to land a commercial jetliner), Calling the 
Shots by Lucia Satrina (a drama about a New York City policewoman), The 
Match (a coming-of-age sports drama written by James Sadwith), Dolls (a 
“horror/fairy-tale” mystery by Steve Nelson),65 Imagine That (a children’s 
fantasy written by John Harrison), an adaptation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
(written by Romero) and an adaptation of L. Frank Baum’s 1902 children’s story 
The Life and Adventures of Santa Claus (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1983 5-7). 
 In the press, Rubinstein emphasised Romero’s agency as creative 
leader. In reality, outside of his own directorial projects, Romero was relatively 
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hands-off in constructing this new portfolio. A number of these projects were in 
fact assembled and sourced by “a core group of four individuals who regularly 
review and report on unsolicited material submitted to management” (Laurel 
Entmt. AR 1982 3). If the material was deemed suitable, senior management 
would then decide if they wanted to take out an option, usually on a short-term 
basis of one or two years with the potential for renewal. Economically, this 
made sense. Bringing in external properties was a means of rapidly enhancing 
the portfolio. Buying this option short-term also meant that Laurel could option 
the property at a reduced premium and, if all sources of investment were 
exhausted, the company could abandon the project and transfer funds to a new 
acquisition. 
 After these properties were acquired and expanded into attractive 
packages (a screenplay/treatment, indicative poster art and promotional 
material), Laurel would attempt to sell them at national and international film 
markets. This included Cannes’ Le Marché du Film, Santa Monica’s American 
Film Market & Conferences (AFM) and MIFED in Milan. Cannes itself was a 
tested selling ground for Laurel and each year they joined the hordes of 
independent producers descending on the French Riviera in search of 
distribution or a pre-sales agreement. Barry Rehfeld writes, Cannes is “the 
international playground of the low-budget producers where rights are sold to 
film, cassette, cable, and syndicated television distributors,” (20). In short, “here 
is a product in need of marketing; there is marketing in search of a product” 
(Lebby 76). The Cannon Group’s co-owner Menahem Golan esteemed Cannes 
as the company’s “Christmas. It’s where we meet distributors from all over the 
world” (Rehfeld 22). 





Variety’s annual Cannes 
festival special.66 
Prominent among the 
firm’s nine-page roster 
was a mysterious single-
page illustration (fig. 4.1), 
later unveiled as 
Mongrel: The Legend of 
Copperhead, a comic 
book adventure film in 
co-production with 
Marvel Comics. The 
screenplay was to follow 
a cyborg sheriff in a near-
future Philadelphia and, 
as Romero described it, 
was a “typical 
introduction of a superhero—how he comes into his powers—and will take him 
through his first series of adventures. It will have some solid social values and a 
little social satire and there will be a lot of weaponry and vehicles” (Harmetz, 
“New Film-Comic” C11). Aljean Harmetz wagered that ancillary markets were at 
the forefront of this enterprise, interpreting that the venture had “less to do with 
movies than with merchandising [and the] amount of revenue from lunch boxes, 
animated television series, toys, clothing, video games, and bubble bath” (C11). 
 In this co-production, Laurel was to package and produce Mongrel as a 
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addresses and contact numbers for those producers in attendance.  
Fig. 4.1. Collaboration with Marvel Comics. “Laurel 
Entertainment, Inc. Advertisement.” Variety 26th 
International Film Annual for Cannes 1983, 4 May 1983, 





motion picture. At the same time, Marvel would pursue “the publishing and 
merchandising aspects of the project” (Laurel Entmt. AR 1983 3). Laurel had 
been after a Marvel property for some time, frequently outpriced when it came 
to more popular characters such as The Fantastic Four and The Incredible 
Hulk. Indicatively, in the mid-1980s, the Cannon Group purchased the theatrical 
rights to Marvel’s The Amazing Spider-Man for a reported $225,000 plus a 
percentage of gross revenues (Hiltzik, “Spidey’s”). This roughly equalled 
Laurel’s collected story development costs for fiscal 1984 (Laurel Entmt. Form 
10-K 1984 F-13). Laurel instead decided to create an original character 
developed in collaboration with artists drawn from Marvel’s famous bullpen 
(Harmetz, “New Film-Comic” C11). 
 Far from the multiplatform Disney subsidiary it is today,67 in 1983, Marvel 
was still the largest worldwide publisher of comic books, selling a reported “5.5 
million copies of 30 different books each month in the United States and 
Canada” alone (Harmetz, “New Film-Comic” C11). Despite this identified 
audience and, more to the point, the box office success of DC Comics’ 
Superman: The Movie (Dir. Donner, 1978) and Superman II (Dir. Lester, 1981), 
Marvel had thus far been unsuccessful in transferring its core properties to the 
big screen. In 1983, The Human Torch at Columbia Pictures, Spider-Man with 
Roger Corman and a live-action X-Men film by Canadian company Nelvana Ltd. 
all stalled, causing Marvel Editor-in-Chief Jim Shooter to situate Mongrel as 
their most fully developed filmic project (Best). The following year, Shooter 
handed Mongrel to artist Bob Layton, who illustrated 48-pages of concept art, 
character design and storyboard/comic book panels (fig. 4.2). These designs 
suggested an epic scale, depicting vast technological palaces, gigantic killer 
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robots, flying cars, violent scenes of warfare and a copper-plated hero not 




Fig. 4.2. Bob Layton’s character design for Mongrel: The Legend of Copperhead. Russ 
Burlingame. “Celebrated Iron Man Writer Bob Layton Shares Plans for a George 
Romero/Marvel Collaboration in the '80s.” comicbook. 12 Aug. 2014. https://comicbook.com 
/blog/2014/08/13/NA/. Accessed 20 Mar. 2018. 
 
 If this were not ambitious enough, Laurel’s The Stand was based on an 
823-page novel that dealt with nothing short of the end of the world. In King’s 





drawing together a sparse collection of survivors in a mystical battle of good 
versus evil. The Stand takes place over dozens of post-apocalyptic locations, 
from an abandoned freeway that has become a vehicle graveyard, to a Las 
Vegas that is eventually annihilated by a nuclear warhead. The novel’s massive 
length caused obvious difficulties in adapting to film and Romero joked that 
“nobody really wanted to do The Stand because they were looking at it 
sideways” (Gange, “Creepshow” 20). King and Romero planned to split the 
novel into two, making Rubinstein’s search for financing doubly hard. King then 
began scaling his screenplay back to a single feature of around three hours in 
length and this version was budgeted at between $15 to $25 million (Gange, 
“Creepshow” 34). 
 On the surface, acquisition of such largescale fantasy projects seemed 
overly ambitious and out-of-step with movements in the independent sector. As 
titles including Louis Malle’s My Dinner with Andre (1981) and Wayne Wang’s 
Chan is Missing (1982) began to exhibit the growing commercial appeal 
surrounding speciality independents, emergent distributors and major 
subsidiaries such as UA Classics, Universal Classics and Orion Classics 
stepped in to provide an additional platform for advancement (Tzioumakis, 
Hollywood’s Indies 3). By 1982, however, despite having Out of This Furnace 
on their roster, Romero had come to feel that rising production costs made the 
chances for success on a small speciality film like John Sayles’s Return of the 
Secaucus Seven (1979) “very, very slim” (Hanners and Kloman 75). Verifying 
Romero’s estimation, Stephen Prince reports that in the early-1980s, 
inflationary forces such as a 45% increase in the price of colour film stock, 
alongside “the studios’ willingness to fund expensive effects-driven pictures, 





Prince’s data, the average cost of a production rose from $5 million per picture 
in 1979 to $11 million in 1981. This was up to $12 million by 1982 (20). 
 In terms of these “effects-driven pictures,” Prince reports that, “without 
question, the decade’s most popular genre was science fiction and fantasy, 
furnishing more blockbusters during the period than any other genre” (288). 
This he attributes to the massive success of Star Wars in 1977. Henceforth, 
money was lavished on productions such as Columbia’s Krull (Dir. Yates, 
1983), which cost $47 million, and mid-range films including Paramount’s $17 
million Star Trek III: The Search for Spock (Dir. Nimoy, 1984) and 
Universal/Lorimar’s $15 million The Last Starfighter (Dir. Castle, 1984). 
Notwithstanding the expense, and a demonstrable growth in speciality 
independent film production, focus on science fiction and fantasy was not 
restricted to studio blockbusters and in the lower budget and independent arena 
existed films like MGM’s The Beastmaster (Dir. Coscarelli, 1982) at $8 million, 
Cannon’s $6 million Hercules (Dir. Cozzi, 1983) and New World Pictures’ $2 
million Battle Beyond the Stars (Dir. Murakami, 1980).68 
 Production of such material by Cannon and New World et al. recalls the 
market-orientated exploitation practices of the 1960s and 1970s, “defining what 
customers want and ensuring that the company’s activities are arranged in a 
way which will achieve customer satisfaction” (Blythe 7). If science fiction and 
fantasy films were in the 1980s what biker and sexploitation films used to be, 
then this product was now placed within a more eclectic production roster. In 
Variety’s 1983 Cannes special issue, independent producer-distributors 
Cannon, New World, Carolco Pictures, Lorimar and Hemdale Film Corporation 
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all showcased diversity. Cannon, in particular, led the way with a mammoth 42-
page, eager-to-please spread that seemingly had it all. Alongside fantasy fare 
like Hercules, the firm boasted major 80s movie stars (from Charles Bronson to 
Roger Moore), exploitation sequels such as Exterminator 2 (Dir. Buntzman, 
1984), horror in House of Long Shadows (Dir. Walker, 1983), erotica 
(personified by Emmanuel star Sylvia Kristel) and even speciality independents, 
notably John Cassavetes’s 1984 Love Streams (“The Cannon Group” 17-59). 
 In 1987, Todd McCarthy in Variety disclosed that the number of 
independent films released in a twelve-month period ending 31 May was “up a 
whopping 44% from last year’s 193, which itself represented a 6-year high in 
indie volume” (“Indies Releasing” 3). Of the 277 independents made during this 
period, Cannon and New World led the way, releasing 42 and 28 films 
respectively, which combined to just over 25% of the overall total (“Indies 
Releasing” 3, 34).  
 Table 4.1 on the following page shows Atlantic Releasing, Shapiro 
Entertainment, Vestron Pictures, Concorde Pictures and Charles Band’s Empire 
Pictures in near proximity, each focusing output on exploitation, horror, genre 
fare, mass-appeal features and the occasional speciality or so-called “quality” 
indie. The independent sector recognised by the trades was deeply 
heterogeneous and speciality distributors stood alongside their market-
orientated peers. As so-called “quality” films began to prove profitable, they 
were placed on the roster of both types of distributor; in the latter type of 
distributor, they were part of an expansive portfolio that catered to a diverse 








“Recent Primary Sources of Independent Films.” 
 
Source: Variety, 17 Jun. 1987, p. 34. 
 
 For Laurel, the decision-making behind the firm’s choice of products was 
part of a manifold internal and external agency. As the professed creative-
leader, Romero pushed for a diversity of product that would expand his 
efficiency beyond the low-budget horror genre in which he felt “trapped.” This 
portfolio of products, often identified by a story acquisitions department 
answering to Romero and Rubinstein, also served to spread risk across a range 
of projects. Largescale endeavours such as Mongrel and The Stand showcased 
G PG PG-13 R X Total
1 1. (27) Cannon ..………………………………………………………… 2 10 3 27 0 42
2 2. (23) New World ………………………………………………………. 0 5 3 20 0 28
3 3. (12) Atlantic Rel ……………………………………………………… 1 1 3 5 0 10
3 6. (5) Shapiro Ent. …………………………………………………….. 0 1 2 7 0 10
3 ⎻ Vestron ………………………………………………………….. 0 1 2 7 0 10
4 ⎻ Concorde ………………………………………………………… 0 1 1 7 0 9
4 4. (8) Empire …………………………………………………………… 0 0 0 9 0 9
5 ⎻ Island ……………………………………………………………. 0 0 3 5 0 8
6 8. (3) Hemdale ………………………………………………………… 0 2 0 5 0 7
7 ⎻ Cinetel …………………………………………………………… 0 1 0 5 0 6
7 ⎻ New Century/Vista ……………………………………………… 0 1 2 3 0 6
7 7. (4) Skouras …………………………………………………………. 0 2 2 2 0 6
7 7. (4) Troma …………………………………………………………… 0 1 0 5 0 6
8 ⎻ Embassy Home Ent. …………………………………………… 0 1 0 4 0 5
8 ⎻ Intl. Film Marketing …………………………………………….. 0 1 1 3 0 5
9 ⎻ Academy Home Ent. …………………………………………… 0 1 1 2 0 4
9 ⎻ Cinema Group ………………………………………………….. 0 1 1 2 0 4
9 ⎻ Cineplex Odeon ………………………………………………… 0 0 0 4 0 4
9 4. (8) Samuel Goldwyn ………………………………………………. 1 0 0 3 0 4
9 ⎻ Trans World Ent. ………………………………………………… 0 0 2 2 0 4
10 ⎻ Circle Releasing ………………………………………………… 0 1 0 2 0 3
10 ⎻ Crown Intl. ………………………………………………………. 0 1 0 2 0 3
10 ⎻ Miramax …………………………………………………………. 0 1 1 1 0 3
10 ⎻ The Movie Store (TMS) ……………………………………….. 0 0 0 3 0 3
10 8. (3) New Line ………………………………………………………… 0 0 1 2 0 3
10 ⎻ Platinum …………………………………………………………. 0 0 0 3 0 3
10 ⎻ Seymour Borde & Associates ………………………………… 0 0 1 2 0 3
Total, above companies ……………………………………… 4 33 29 146 0 212
Total, all other indie* sources …………………………………. 1 9 14 41 0 65
Overall indie total* ………………………………………………. 5 42 43 187 0 277
Grand total, all sources*** …………………………………… 7 81 74 256 1 491
Notes: 
Variety 17 June 1987, pp. 34
*   - Separately identifiable companies, not affiliated with MPAA member companies nor Orion (Filmways/AIP)
** - Includes all indie product plus that from MPAA companies and affiliated producing units plus Orion (Filmways/AIP)
*** Since last year's chart, Island Alive has split into two separate distribution entities, as has Concorde/Cinema Group
Recent Primary Sources of Independent Films
(Based on three or more film ratings issued by the Classification & Rating Administration 
during the period 1 June 1986 - 31 May 1987)
RatingsRank
Last Year







professionalism and enhanced capabilities.69 High-profile partnerships with 
external parties such as Marvel and Stephen King were also attention getting 
(both projects featured in New York Times profiles) and exhibited legitimacy to 
potential investors and shareholders (Laurel Entmt. AR 1983 3). Most 
importantly, Laurel recognised the agency of the marketplace above all else, 
allowing inflated negative costs and zeitgeist trends to dictate their choice of 
projects. 
 In Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to Implementation (2006) 
Ruth Alsop et al. write that while a person or group may be able to choose 
options, the effective realisation of these choices is largely determined by the 
institutional context, or “opportunity structures” within which they live or work.70 
Formal institutions such as the rules of law, regulatory frameworks, private 
organisation and the marketplace dictate the success or failure of these choices 
(13). For Alsop et al., there are three principal indicators of empowerment or 
agency: 
 
1. Whether an opportunity to make a choice exists (existence of choice). 
2. Whether a person or group actually uses the opportunity to choose (use 
of choice). 
3. Whether the choice brings about the desired result (achievement of 
choice). (17) 
 
                                                   
69 The proposed budgets for these films matched the mid-range productions of films like Star 
Trek III, revealing Laurel’s (unrealised) ambitions to become a larger corporate entity.  
70 In keeping with the diverse range of scholarship drawn upon in this investigation, Alsop et 
al.’s text was published by the World Bank and addresses issues of global poverty and 
developmental intervention. This text hypothesises that “interventions to improve agency and 
enhance opportunity structures can increase people’s capacity to make effective choices, and 
that this in turn can bring about other development outcomes” (1). Though the opportunity 
structures addressed in this work are apart from those in film production, the framework for 





The Laurel partners may have established a shared agency when it came to 
their portfolio of films, but in the final count they were disempowered by the 
formal institutions that surrounded them. “Achievement of choice” was often far 
beyond their control. 
 Of the twelve films Laurel advertised in Variety’s 1983 Cannes special, 
only three went into production. And of these projects, Day of the Dead was 
already scheduled as part of a deal with UFDC, while The Stand and 
Creepshow 2 were made after Romero’s departure. Why the majority of these 
films failed to attract investment is due to a multitude of factors, including the 
insignificant financial returns of Knightriders and Creepshow (Laurel Entmt. 
Form 10-K 1986 6), the scope of their ambitions with The Stand and Mongrel, 
the company’s own agency to reject an unfavourable deal, changing 
marketplace trends71 and so on. As Rubinstein justified to shareholders in the 
wake of these disappointments, “it is entertainment industry experience that 
only a small percentage of projects that enter the development stage are 
subsequently produced, and Laurel cannot predict which, if any, of its projects 
in development will come to fruition” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 7). Largely 
restricted by institutional “opportunity structures,” other external intermediaries 
would soon encroach upon Romero’s on-set sovereignty, alienating him from 
the company he co-founded. 
 
4.2. “Inside the Box”: UFDC, Method and Restrictions  
Retrospectively, it is tempting to position Knightriders as the zenith of Romero’s 
                                                   
71 Laurel’s deal with Marvel may have come slightly too late in terms of marketplace trends. 
Michael A. Hiltzik of the Los Angeles Times reports that by 1985 “Hollywood was bored with 
superheroes” (“Untangling” 3). This was later epitomised by the disappointing domestic box 
office gross of Superman IV: The Quest for Peace (Dir. Furie, 1987), which earned little over 
$15 million on a $17 million production budget (“Superman IV (1987) - Domestic Gross”). 






agency as company co-founder. Dawn of the Dead’s box office seemed to 
unlock a space of unlimited creative potential, emboldening Romero to write 
and direct a 146-minute semi-autobiographical non-genre film on which he 
retained final cut. Tony Williams views this as a common industrial practice that 
permits stars and directors to “engage in their most cherished projects after 
box-office success.” He cites Francis Ford Coppola’s The Conversation (1974), 
made in the immediate wake of The Godfather (1972), and Martin Scorsese’s 
The Last Temptation of Christ (1988), which followed his Paul Newman vehicle 
The Color of Money (1986), as evidence of this pattern. To Williams, these films 
“represent projects in which individual talents attempt to break away from 
generic and star vehicles to produce creative statements free from economic 
constraints” (Cinema 99). 
 In terms of production, Knightriders was typical of Laurel’s reported 
creative practices in that Rubinstein remained hands-off. Even with David Vogel 
acting as line producer, Romero’s on-set creative control was apparently 
absolute. This is supported by John Harrison, who later directed the television 
mini-series Dune (2000) for Rubinstein’s New Amsterdam Entertainment. 
Harrison recollects:  
 
[Rubinstein] would never sit down with George and tell him how to write 
a scene or how to shoot a scene or how to cut the movie. He protected 
George . . . what he used to say to all of us was, “I’ve been able to build 
the box. What you do inside the box is okay. But you can’t get outside 
the box.” In other words, “I’ve got the money, I’ve set up the production, 
I’ve got the distribution in place, now go off and make the movie. Don’t 





. . . He wanted to provide the resources and then he would let the 
filmmaker go ahead and do it. (Harrison 2018) 
 
Ed Lammi covered the majority of the organisational production tasks on Day of 
the Dead and also noticed this permissive approach to filmmaking, recalling that 
Rubinstein only appeared on set once a week to check on progress and 
authorise spending (Lammi 2018). It is in this sense that Laurel followed 
“Sarris’s auteur theory of direction,” providing a supportive platform for creative 
autonomy. 
 As Laurel prepared an adaptation of Stephen King’s Pet Sematary in 
1985, Romero and Rubinstein co-signed a memorandum that laid out the 
particulars of the former’s directorial contract, detailing financial terms (payment 
fees, options, profit participation etc.), his credit (“as appropriate and 
customary”) and “creative matters” (fig. 4.3). The memorandum provides a 
fascinating insight into the way Romero’s agency was expressed in legal terms. 
Clauses deemed essential to the so-called auteur were formalised and the 
contract safeguarded Romero’s (referred to as GAR on the document) on-set 
independence,72 his choice of collaborators and final cut. 
 These terms were dependent on the running time, an MPAA rating and, 
most intriguingly, were “subject to any rights of completion guarantor and 
Stephen King’s rights of approval” (“Exhibit 10.13” 2). King’s rights appear to 
supersede Romero’s here, divulging the novelist’s growing importance to Laurel 
as “a substantial creative and financial partner” (Harmetz, “Pet Film” C10). On 
paper, King had power to undermine Romero’s decision-making, though there 
                                                   
72 In reference to post-production, the memo states, “If he desires, GAR may supervise post-
production (but without additional compensation).” The contract also gave him final say on the 





is no evidence that this was ever wielded. That the rights of a completion 
guarantor are also foregrounded is telling, suggesting an additional non-creative 
intrusion into Romero’s sacrosanct space on set. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. Extract of Romero’s directorial demands for Pet Sematary, initialled by Romero and 
Rubinstein. “Exhibit 10.13: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Company and George A. 
Romero Dated March 20, 1985.” Laurel Entertainment, Inc. Form 8-K for Fiscal Year Ended 31 
March 1985. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1985, p. 2. 
 
 On Knightriders, Romero’s on-set freedom was supported by partners 
UA Corporation and UFDC, both of whom allowed Laurel to proceed 
independently once the screenplay and key creative personnel had been 
agreed upon. Former UA Senior Vice-President and Head of Worldwide 





production partner became responsible for delivering the project on time and on 
budget. The production would then operate without direct supervision from UA, 
allowing “independent production in an atmosphere of autonomy and creative 
freedom” (49). UA built a reputation as a patron of the auteur filmmaker, 
exemplified by Woody Allen’s multi-picture deal with the company. As Allen told 
Fortune magazine, “they see the picture when I’m ready to give it to them” 
(Schuyten 131). Balio observes that “despite all the legal safeguards built into 
the financing-distribution contracts, the company bet on the person, the integrity 
of the producer to make the picture as mutually agreed. UA’s producers, with 
few exceptions, had the right to final cut” (345-46). 
 This may have worked (thus far) for UA, but on Knightriders UFDC was 
far from pleased with the final result. Romero claimed Knightriders was “to be a 
commercial picture,” humorously adding “which is why we have stunts” (Yakir, 
“Knight” 45). At the same time, prior to release he could not identify a target 
audience, claiming “it’s not yet defined and demographics don’t always apply” 
(Burke-Block 25). Although initial reviews were favourable, UFDC was 
unconvinced about the film’s profit potential and decided on a limited release in 
New York, Florida and California in spring 1981, before poor returns saw it 
withdrawn entirely (Anderson, “On the Set” 28). UFDC was equally stung by a 
troubled production which saw adverse weather conditions and a threatened 
SAG strike take Knightriders 30% over schedule and 5% over budget (Harmetz, 
“From the Cecil” H25). 
 Production problems on Knightriders unfortunately came at a time of 
broader industrial change, where studios were increasingly concerned about 
the so-called “maverick auteurs” in charge of production. Shortly after 





Heaven’s Gate (Dir. Cimino, 1980) and, as Jack Kroll writes, “everyone knows 
about Michael Cimino’s Heaven’s Gate—pulled from its one theater after a 
week’s run, the biggest fiasco in film history, dollar for dollar, shooting day for 
shooting day, length of run for length of run . . . ego for ego” (58). By 1985, 
Cimino’s film had earned only $2 million in rentals on a cost of $36 million 
(Thompson 50). In his own post-mortem, journalist Michael Dempsey attributes 
Heaven’s Gate’s failure to a series of mitigating factors, including declining 
ticket sales and corporate mismanagement, adding that Cimino’s rampant ego 
presented studio hierarchy an opportunity to “overthrow” the “director as 
filmmaking’s linchpin” (53).73 
 Reports indicate that Heaven’s Gate’s production was problematic, 
slowed to a lethargic pace by Cimino’s perfectionism and the inexperience of 
producer Joann Carelli. As filming dragged on from 16 April to 4 October 1979 
(with reshoots in April and June 1980), UA inserted its own production manager 
Derek Kavanagh to oversee filming, a move antithetical to the distributor’s 
traditional hands-off approach (Final Cut). As reports of Cimino’s hubris played 
out in the press (particularly Les Gapay’s “Unauthorized Progress Report” in the 
Los Angeles Times and a Today Show interview that attacked Cimino for the 
film’s spiralling budget) the studios took collective measures to safeguard 
against a repeat of this so-called “fiasco.” Legal expert Mark C. Phillips writes 
that, as a consequence, completion guarantees “gained attention in Hollywood 
in the 1980s with the sudden proliferation of independent production companies 
and the desire of backers to avoid repeating such notable flops as Heaven’s 
                                                   
73 Like Romero and Knightriders, Cimino was fresh off the biggest hit of his career, in this case 
1978’s multi-Oscar winner The Deer Hunter. In yet another parallel, Knightriders premiered at 
the Los Angeles International Film Exposition in April 1981, only to be overshadowed by the 
rerelease of Heaven’s Gate at the same festival. Now drastically reduced in length, Cimino’s 





Gate” (109). A completion guarantee, as Steve Mangel of UniFi tells us, 
 
assures whoever is financing the production, whether it’s a bank or an 
individual, that the film will be made and delivered within the time period 
specified; that it won’t cost them anymore than the original investment 
and that in a worst case scenario—production is shut down—it’s a 
guarantee that they can get their money back . . . knowing what goes 
on—on a day-to-day basis—is the key to monitoring. (Boyle) 
 
A completion guarantee is now common in independent film production (Gates 
106; Cones, Dictionary 80), typically provided by a third-party bonding company 
who place a representative on set to undertake the monitoring identified by 
Mangel. This representative, or guarantor, will “assure backers that the 
independent will comply with the script and financing agreement. The 
representative must approve every phase of production until the distributor 
accepts the finished product” (Phillips 112). Most studios have the capital to 
self-bond and provide this service internally (Lammi 2018). The higher risk 
associated with independent production, however, frequently necessitates 
additional third-party supervision. 
 According to Michael Gornick, UFDC only “became concerned” about 
Laurel after the box office disappointment of Knightriders (Axl and Jscott). 
Nevertheless, the concurrent fallout of Heaven’s Gate indicates that this 
nervousness was part of a wider industrial shift. Laurel cannot have been 
helped by a Variety review on 8 April 1981 that called Knightriders “the most 
egregious case of auteurist self-indulgence since Heaven’s Gate” (Cart 20). 





place a completion guarantor on its next Laurel co-venture. Creepshow was 
instead to be Laurel’s first fully unionised production and the distributors trusted 
that this greater formalisation would provide the required assurances. 
 To guide the production, Laurel, through its Laurel-Show subsidiary, 
hired professional first assistant director74 Richard Hawley to work alongside 
Romero. Once on set, the AD’s formal orthodoxy was found to be incompatible 
with Romero’s improvisational style. Hawley was replaced by second assistant 
director Carl Clifford, who was then also deemed unsuitable for the same 
reason. Finally, Rubinstein surmised that an internal colleague familiar with 
Romero’s methods would be better suited and he placed Harrison in the role 
(Harrison 2018). In spite of Harrison’s best efforts (and those of other unit and 
production managers), Creepshow began to drift overschedule and UFDC 
insisted that Laurel employ external manager David Ball to monitor production. 
Ball was, and is, a self-titled “bondable” producer, film accountant and freelance 
representative for completion guarantors. He had previously worked for the 
Hassaneins as production manager on Cattle Anne and Little Britches (Dir. 
Johnson, 1981) and has a self-declared “mad passion for moviemaking and an 
even madder passion for tidy accounting and tidy production” (Karr 57). 
 Ed Lammi says that on Creepshow (and then later on Day of the Dead), 
Ball was there to watch the “hot costs”—that is the unplanned components that 
can cause the budget to “swing,” such as overtime hours, additional 
transportation, catering, number of extras, etc. (Lammi 2018). Ball was credited 
as co-producer on Day of the Dead but was for all intents and purposes a 
completion guarantor representative, keeping the film on schedule, on budget 
                                                   
74 The first assistant director (aka the first AD) is on hand to coordinate the logistical side of 
directing and to communicate these requirements to the rest of the crew. It is their responsibility 





and with the power to take over production if necessary. Ball remembers 
Romero’s frustration at having “Salah’s man” on set and, in turn, Ball was 
unimpressed by Laurel’s lax organisational skills. “When they went into the 
proper world of filmmaking, they had to learn discipline,” he stated. “It was my 
unenviable task of having to teach it to them” (Ball 2016). Mark C. Phillips writes 
that this tension is typical of a relationship between the independent filmmaker 
and the guarantor, where “one seeks artistic freedom, while the other attempts 
to keep that freedom within the bounds of fiscal propriety” (98). Once Ball took 
over governance of the set, Romero’s improvisational shooting style essentially 
became a thing of the past. 
 In a Cinefantastique article that coincided with Creepshow’s release, 
Paul Gange wrote, “Romero’s crew is still basically a group of neighborhood 
friends having fun together; no one watches the time clock, no studio chief 
peers over Romero’s shoulder” (17). This is essentially a fiction. In the wake of 
the overruns on Knightriders and wider institutional changes, UFDC demanded 
tighter controls over production, limiting Romero’s agency and on-set decision-
making. Even as Rubinstein endeavoured to remain hands-off, from a business 
perspective he had no other choice than to allow external intermediaries a say 
in Laurel’s production method. In point of fact, Rubinstein appreciated David 
Ball’s organisational skills and later rehired him independently of UFDC to 
produce Creepshow 2. Though the completion guarantor is oft-neglected in the 
study of independent film production, the presence of this figure in relation to 
Laurel Entertainment, both on set and within Romero’s contractual terms (where 
the guarantors approval rights superseded that of even the director), indicates 






 If Romero resented the creative interference of UFDC and its 
representatives, Laurel’s partnership with the distributor was also lacking 
financially. As part of the equity agreement75 between firms, on each production 
UFDC was entitled to a distribution fee, recovery of distribution expenses and a 
recoupment of negative costs, all taken from the distribution income of that 
particular film. Laurel were to receive 50% of the remaining net profits, unless 
the previous film in this contract, as was the case with Knightriders, failed to 
recoup enough revenue to cover these distribution costs. As Laurel’s financial 
statement made clear, the Knightriders deficit, as of 31 March 1983, resulted in 
a reduction of the firm’s net profit participation on Day of the Dead to 25% of the 
first $5.5 million (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1983 F-12). 
 Romero later blamed UFDC for Knightriders’ box office failure, claiming 
the distributor was more interested in its $35 million production Lion of the 
Desert (Dir. Akkad, 1980)—released almost concurrently on 17 April 1981—
than it was his independent drama about the troubles of a Pennsylvanian 
renaissance fair (Romero 2016). In fairness to UFDC, Knightriders was a 
difficult sell. The film’s abandonment of genre rendered Romero’s valued 
identity as an “indie horror” auteur redundant and, lest the film be 
misunderstood as horror, the advertising made no mention whatever of Dawn of 
the Dead or any of his previous films. A revised poster only went as far as to 
add “from the master of action and suspense” to the campaign. At best, 
Romero’s carefully constructed brand image was an inconvenience, at worst, it 
was a perceived liability. By breaking the business wheel that had been so 
successful on Martin and Dawn (which carefully balanced genre, authorship 
                                                   
75 Mark C. Phillips explains the difference between equity and non-equity backers: “equity 
backers share financially in a project's ups and downs, enjoying the profits and paying out to 
creditors on losses. Non-equity backers, by contrast, do not share in a film's profits and losses; 





and cult to create an attractive marketplace brand) Laurel appeared far from a 
fiscal guarantee and UFDC became visibly skittish about future collaborations. 
 The Laurel-UFDC co-production intended to follow Knightriders was the 
science fiction comedy Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon. According to Gornick, the 
project was “like a 50s monster film; it has elements of the movies we grew up 
with. There are special effects involving spaceships and aliens” (Blank, 
“Romero Turns” 53). Tom Dubensky remembers artists constructing a scale 
model of the film’s alien antagonist, designed to look like a pile of spaghetti and 
complete with a retractable penis, this appendage part of the screenplay’s ribald 
humour (Dubensky 2016).76 Unwilling or unable to finance the film, in 1981 
UFDC took the project to Cannes, placing a two-page advertisement in Variety 
that integrated a crudely illustrated poster of the film. The image depicted a 
gaggle of high school stereotypes, including cheerleaders, jocks, greasers and 
sweethearts, all gazing skyward to an equally archetypal flying saucer. Behind 
them, a banner reads “Class of ’54” and the setting, time period and teenage 
characters evoked recent box office hits such as Animal House (Dir. Landis, 
1978) and Grease (Dir. Kleiser, 1978). 
 UFDC’s efforts to raise the necessary funds were ultimately futile 
(Dubensky 2016). In Laurel’s fiscal 1981 annual report to shareholders, 
Rubinstein conveyed that Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon was postponed (3) and by 
1982 the distributor had withdrawn entirely, leaving Laurel to seek financing 
elsewhere (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1982 14). The company’s fiscal 1982 
report stated, “in the event that new financing is found, [Laurel] must arrange to 
refund to the distributor, with interest, the production advances, which the 
Company has received with respect to the project which amount is $137,873, 
                                                   






excluding interest” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1982 14). New financing never 
materialised and by 1983 Shoo-Be-Doo-Be-Moon was no longer on Laurel’s 
development portfolio. For UFDC, Creepshow represented a far safer bet 
because of the clearer brand association with genre and the “talent packaging” 
of Romero and Stephen King. As journalist Deborah Caulfield exclaimed, 
“Stephen King and George Romero—what a team. Thinking of the them brings 
to mind other combinations: vampires and bats, witches and broomsticks, 
werewolves and full moons, graveyards and ghosts” (“Author” 76). 
 Indeed, Romero’s brand identity as a cult horror filmmaker remained of 
primary importance to UFDC. In a 1985 article in Screen International entitled 
“UFD’s Hassanein Interested only in Commercial Feature Films,” UFDC 
advertising executive Terry Powers stated, “the appeal of a horror film such as 
[Day of the Dead] becomes vastly increased the minute the name George 
Romero appears in the opening credits” (172). Still locked into an 18 January 
1985 production start date, UFDC and Romero could not come to an agreement 
on Day of the Dead’s budget. Romero envisioned an epic conclusion to his 
zombie trilogy, featuring a huge cast of protagonists (living and dead) fighting 
for survival above and below ground on a tropical island compound. An early 
draft of the screenplay begins on the streets of a post-apocalyptic Florida (as a 
ragtag group of survivors dodge zombies and engage in a dramatic gunfight 
with pirates)77 and ends with the entire island destroyed in a massive explosion. 
“The first script was like Raiders of the Lost Ark with zombies,” recalled special 
make-up effects technician Tom Savini (Daniel 7). 
 Determined to top Dawn of the Dead in terms of action and violence, 
Romero pushed for an unrated feature that would deliver the onscreen 
                                                   





bloodshed anticipated by his brand identity. In one self-conscious passage of 
the original screenplay, as the undead descend upon their victims, Romero 
gleefully intones, “this is it, gore fans. The gross finale. The intestine-tugger. 
THE ZOMBIES GET THEIR SUPPER. THEY FEAST . . . like Romans at an 
orgy” (Romero 82-83). When the budget for this version was estimated at 
around $9 million, UFDC balked. According to Richard Hassanein, “by Day of 
the Dead it became more and more difficult for theaters to play movies that 
were not rated, so we couldn’t gamble our money on not getting an R-rating” 
(Karr 19). Laurel held firm to produce Romero’s vision, agreeing to scale back 
to around $7 million. UFDC still refused to budge, instead offering half that 
amount. 
 Associate producer Ed Lammi was hired in June 1984 for a mooted 
October start date and was surprised by the lengthily pre-production schedule. 
Lammi soon understood that this was because of the unresolved discrepancies 
between the screenplay and budget, telling Richard Rubinstein something he 
already knew, “‘you’re not going to make this picture for that budget’” (Lammi 
2018). Lammi says that he and Romero spent the summer of 1984 scaling the 
film down, at one point making a final plea to Salah Hassanein for a $7 million 
budget. Salah agreed, providing the film was rated R, to which Romero refused, 
telling Hassanein, “if I scale back to an R-rated movie my fans would abandon 
me.” As Lammi observes, “Salah knew his market” and Romero felt he knew 
where his cult appeal rested, resulting in an entirely new version of Day of the 
Dead written for a top-to-bottom budget of $3.6 million (Lammi 2018). 
 Even with these compromises, Day of the Dead was not the box office 
success hoped for. As Laurel’s fiscal 1986 10-K report told shareholders, 





Laurel does not expect any potential profits to be material.” Indeed, profit 
shares from all of Laurel’s films with UFDC after Dawn of the Dead had “not 
been substantial” (6). Laurel’s relationship with UFDC, despite resulting in three 
completed feature films, was something of a disappointment. The partnership 
steadily encroached upon Romero’s sovereign production space, denying him 
agency to fulfil his creative ambitions, and for little financial reward. If anything, 
UFDC reaffirmed the limits of control available in the independent sector, 
agency ultimately dictated to by the marketplace and external intermediates and 
partners. Romero’s frustrations were heaped onto the shoulders of Laurel and 
Richard Rubinstein, where he deemed the company’s professionalisation a 
failure. Speaking to Fangoria’s R.H. Martin in a colourful interview conducted in 
1985 shortly after his partnership with Laurel was terminated, Romero said: 
 
I found that, within Laurel, I couldn’t take as many chances . . . I sat on 
my ass for three years between Creepshow and Day of the Dead. And I 
think that, had I been an individual facing the problems that faced me 
with the first script for Day of the Dead, I would have told them to shove 
it. Because of the responsibility that I had to Laurel’s shareholders, I 
wasn’t able to do that, couldn’t take that kind of chance. I want to be able 
to do my own projects, take my own risks, without that kind of fiscal 
responsibility. What I’m doing [by leaving] is buying myself a certain 
amount of freedom. (47) 
 
4.3. Tales from the Darkside: Agency Theory, Self Interest and Divorce 
Laurel Productions of Pennsylvania began as a single-purpose platform for 





Tape & Film and the Laurel Group, Richard Rubinstein’s plans appeared in 
alignment with these interests. By 1985, this schema had failed. When the 
company expanded to become the publicly-run Laurel Entertainment, the firm’s 
objectives shifted, now aligned to the demands of shareholders and the day-to-
day necessities of running a profitable enterprise with responsibilities to a 
permanent staff of employees. During this period, Romero made the decision to 
step back from the minutia of running the company, declining re-election as 
chairman of the board and resigning as secretary in 1983 to focus on the firm’s 
creative output. Officially, Romero was still a majority shareholder and retained 
joint ownership of the company. In practice, he acceded managerial control to 
his more business savvy cohort. This separation of ownership and control can 
create “agency problems in the decision process” of the firm (Fama and Jensen 
321) and in this case prompted Romero’s departure. 
 Agency theory has become a key system of analysis in business studies, 
shedding light on corporate governance and the control and management of the 
firm. Stephen A. Ross writes, “we will say that an agency relationship has arisen 
between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a 
particular domain of decision problems” (134). More pointedly, agency theory 
argues that these managers (agents) tend to act self-interestedly, pursuing their 
own short-term goals (be it financial or in terms of career advancement, etc.) 
that are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the principal (Dekker et al. 
518). For Michael C. Jensen, agency theory is based on the “simple tautology 
[that] cooperative behavior between human beings is viewed as a contracting 
problem among self-interested individuals with divergent interests” (331). 





Eisenhardt recognises “differences in interpretation” when it comes to a 
theoretical formula (57). Her own research draws a distinction between “positive 
agency theory” and “principal agent research.” The former is a “less 
mathematical” approach that focuses on “identifying situations in which the 
principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the 
governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-serving behaviour” (59). The 
latter looks for a more formal theory regarding the principal-agent paradigm 
based on logical deductions and mathematical proof (60). Jensen and Meckling, 
though likewise focused on positive agency theory, add normative agency 
theory to the mix, an area of analysis that prescribes how contracts and 
corporate incentives can be structured to ensure that the agent behaves in a 
manner that will benefit the principal’s welfare (309-10). Notwithstanding these 
discrepancies in approach and method, Eisenhardt understands that at “the 
heart of agency theory is the goal conflict inherent when individuals with 
differing preferences engage in cooperative effort” (63). 
 Even without these discrepancies, agency theory is an imperfect model 
in the context of this investigation. The relationship between Romero and 
Rubinstein was not, strictly speaking, a contractual one between a principal and 
an agent. Rather, it was a partnership between two principals with equal shares 
in the company they co-founded—that is, in its final form, Laurel Entertainment. 
The intricacies of principal-agent research and the applied methods that 
proliferate this field also surpass the range of this humanities-focused enquiry. 
Keeping this in mind, Laurel’s hierarchal valuation of the so-called auteur 
nevertheless brings issues of agency to the fore. Equal partner though he may 
have been, Rubinstein repeatedly proclaimed to “believe in the auteur, the 





himself as an agent in the service of Romero’s creative principal. But was this 
really the case, or was there a “goal conflict” at the centre of Laurel’s dual 
leadership organisation? 
 As has been made clear, Laurel’s production output was limited by the 
opportunity structures dictated by external forces. A number of economic 
theorists measure agency through “a person’s scope for achieving that person’s 
valued goal” (Drydyk 251), suggesting that agency theory is about more than 
just control and self-interested behaviour, it is about an individual’s ability to 
implement a desired outcome (Alkire 14). An agent’s inability to reach set goals 
suggests a lack of power, and a lack of power is antithetical to individual 
agency. Agency is therefore only quantifiable through the successful 
achievement of choice (Alsop et al. 18). In terms of film production, the Laurel 
partners were disempowered from realising their goals by larger institutional 
forces. 
 This said, Alsop et al. write that “empowerment is based on tackling the 
differences in capabilities that deny actors the capacity to make transforming 
choices” (15). Rubinstein’s capabilities, his human capital, had been developed 
through television production, and in 1983, with his partner taking a backseat in 
regard to wider leadership responsibilities, he had sufficient control to move the 
company back in this direction. 
 Rubinstein’s entrepreneurial interest in television began with Ultimate 
Mirror, an SME through which he expressed a desire to democratise small 
screen production. Immediately after forming Laurel Tape & Film, Rubinstein 
again pursued this interest, leading the company to produce the tax shelter 
funded series The Winners from 1973 to 1975. In 1983, as Laurel looked to 





television with the series Tales from the Darkside. The series was intended as a 
spin-off from Creepshow, until rights issues with UFDC and Warner Bros. 
pushed Laurel to create an original entity. Like Creepshow, Tales from the 
Darkside was an example of anthology storytelling, in this case emulating the 
science fiction/horror format of popular network shows Alfred Hitchcock 
Presents (1955-1965) and The Twilight Zone (1959-1964). Each Darkside 
episode was fabricated as a self-contained story often based on the work of a 
high-profile writer, including Harlan Ellison, Frederik Pohl, John Cheever, Clive 
Barker, Robert Bloch and, of course, Stephen King.78 
 Typically for Rubinstein, the series was atypical of traditional approaches 
to television production, sidestepping the national broadcast networks in favour 
of first-run syndication. In first-run syndication, programs are offered directly to 
local television stations and “produced at a lower cost per-hour than network 
programs because of the high license fees required for the latter” (Albarran 
173). Darkside was developed with TV producer Jerry Golod and financed by 
Lexington Broadcast Services (LBS) and Tribune Broadcasting Company. Each 
episode cost approximately $124,000 and this amount never altered throughout 
its five-year run (Teitler 2018). In view of the minimal budget set aside for 
production, David Vogel declined control over the series and the project was 
instead overseen by up-and-coming producer William Teitler, whose 
background included commercial work and feature documentaries .79 According 
to Teitler, Rubinstein told him that “‘because you’ve worked on commercials 
then you know what quality is, and because you’ve worked on documentaries 
                                                   
78 Laurel was, in fact, at the forefront of a return to anthology storytelling in the 1980s and 
1990s. The show was followed by Steven Spielberg’s Amazing Stories (1985-1987) for NBC 
and new iterations of The Twilight Zone (1985-1989) and The Outer Limits (1995-2002). As can 
be seen, Laurel not only followed trends during this period; they were also instrumental in 
establishing them. 
79 Vogel amended this when he left Laurel in 1985 to produce Amazing Stories, which boasted a 





then you know how to do things inexpensively’” (Teitler 2018). Rubinstein 
further maximised the show’s output by splitting production between New York 
and Los Angeles and this canny, cost-effective management placed Darkside 
well within Laurel’s capabilities. 
 For Romero’s part, after penning the 1983 pilot “Trick or Treat” (Dir. 
Babalan), he was relatively uninvolved when Tales from the Darkside went to 
series, contributing only three additional teleplays. The 1990 feature film Tales 
from the Darkside: The Movie (Dir. Harrison) also had a segment written by 
Romero, entitled “The Cat from Hell” and based on an original story by Stephen 
King. However, this was simply a leftover story from Creepshow 2 and Romero 
otherwise had nothing to do with this feature.80 In terms of the series 
specifically, creative development was passed on to Teitler and the show’s story 
consultant Tom Allen. Romero later expressed annoyance at the show’s 
cheapness, finding it an unworthy distraction to Laurel’s primary agenda. “I 
wanted to continue to make films,” he stated, “Richard just wanted to go TV. He 
just wanted to do whatever he could to try and boost stock. It was hopeless” 
(Romero 2016).  
 Rubinstein and his Tales from the Darkside partners were unconcerned 
about Romero’s lack of interest in the series, accepting that his brand identity 
was perhaps the most essential contribution he could make. On 20 July 1983, 
Laurel took out a one-page ad for the pilot in Variety, emphasising Romero as 
executive producer and writing in the banner, “the modern master of the 
macabre who packed movie theatres with The Night of the Living Dead [sic], 
Dawn of the Dead, and Creepshow, is bringing his talent for terror to television” 
                                                   
80His most lasting legacy on Tales from the Darkside was the spooky opening narration that 
started every episode: “man lives in the sunlit world of what he believes to be reality. BUT there 





(97). In Romero’s employment agreement with Laurel dated 19 June 1983, the 
importance of his brand value was made clear, formally acknowledging the 
rights of distributor LBS to add “George Romero Presents” to the Tales from the 
Darkside title if they so requested (“Exhibit 10.5” 2). 
 Romero’s contract also stressed that if the pilot went to series, and 
Romero was no longer an employee of Laurel Entertainment, then the company 
would still be entitled to use his name in connection to the show, granting 
Romero 5% of the net proceeds “regardless of whether or not he is acting as 
Executive Producer” (14). Since this contract was written while the pilot was in 
production, it was assumed that Romero would act as the story editor and the 
agreement bestowed upon him approval rights over directors, writers and 
scripts, “subject to budgetary limitations and to contractual delivery obligations” 
(2). He ultimately declined these responsibilities, leaving Darkside’s overall 
management to Rubinstein.  
 Laurel’s division of creative and economic responsibilities was therefore 
complex. Rubinstein and Romero publicly accentuated this disparity as a means 
of establishing a clear yet multifaceted corporate identity. A closer look at their 
employment contracts also proves that they were legally bound to these roles. 
For his part, Romero was contracted to “participate in and supervise” the 
creative aspects of the company’s business (“Exhibit 10.5” 2). Rubinstein, 
meanwhile, had “such authorities, duties and responsibilities in respect of the 
conduct of the business and operation of the company as are provided in the 
by-laws of the company” (“Exhibit 10.6” 2). 
 Returning to Jensen and Meckling’s definition of normative agency 
theory, if these contracts seemed to benefit Romero’s artistry and his welfare as 





control all of the company’s activities. As business leader, Rubinstein was 
charged with finalising agreements between all of Laurel’s creative and 
technical personnel, be they professional advisors, producers, writers, directors, 
performing artists, distributors or others (“Exhibit 10.6” 3). Rubinstein overruled 
his partner’s concerns about a move back into television and Laurel’s activities 
during this period strongly reinforced his agency. Apparently self-interested in 
returning to a medium in which he displayed both passion and expertise 
(human capital), Darkside’s five-year run exhibited Rubinstein’s control in 
determining creative output. In accord with Alsop et al.’s indicators of 
empowerment, Rubinstein’s management of Darkside displayed the existence 
of choice (in his exclusive decision to move into television production), the use 
of choice (based on the talent available and economic capabilities) and an 
overall achievement of choice (production of a financially viable product). These 
factors were apparently unavailable to Romero, on this production and more 
widely speaking. 
 Rubinstein’s decision to push forward on Tales from the Darkside without 
Romero’s full endorsement had additional negative ramifications for his partner. 
In Variety on 3 June 1981, Rubinstein discussed plans to encompass a more 
dynamic range of creative personnel, telling reporter Stephen Klain that the 
company was actively on the lookout for “newer talents, or writers who might be 
more recognized from other media” (6). If this seemed to refer to screenwriters 
and partners such as Stephen King, Rubinstein later told Variety that Laurel 
was “starting to acquire material that is not exclusively for George . . . we’re not 
looking for financing strictly contingent on George directing” (McCarthy, “Laurel 
Sked” 6). The article goes on to mention that while Romero intended to direct 





by screenwriter Harrison on a budget of under $2 million (31). 
 Laurel’s fiscal 1985 Form 10-K makes clear that Tales from the Darkside 
was intended to encourage, nurture and develop relationships with new writers 
and directors. In the first season alone, the company employed thirteen 
directors and seventeen writers (5). Of those directors listed, a number were 
drawn from Romero’s production team, including Harrison, Gornick, Warner 
Shook (an actor who had appeared in Knightriders and Creepshow) and Tom 
Savini. This was all “part of Laurel’s growing plans to bring new talent up 
through the ranks” (Gange, “Trick” 14). In the case of Gornick, his ambitions to 
surpass his role as staff director of photography created disharmony. After 
directing two episodes from Darkside’s 1984 first season (notably “The Word 
Processor of the Gods” based on a story by King), Gornick found he enjoyed 
the responsibilities associated with being on-set creative leader. In turn, he was 
reluctant to join the production of Day of the Dead in his customary role as DP, 
only taking the position because his employers demanded it (Karr 60). 
 From the days of Latent Image, Romero’s open-door policy provided a 
training ground for regional creative talent (Buba 2016; Harrison 2018). Such 
development, however, appeared conditional and Gornick suggests that 
Romero resented the aspirations of his DP, ultimately feeling that Darkside’s 
talent farming interfered with, rather than facilitated, Romero’s own creative 
process (Karr 60). On the other hand, Rubinstein felt that encouraging 
personnel to reach their maximum potential made good business sense. He 
understood that, at this juncture, Laurel’s survival depended on the production 
of motion pictures. To make profits, the company needed to reach the retail 
market more often, a factor made more likely with a wider stable of in-house 





approximately 70 additional individuals during production (Laurel Entmt. Form 
10-K 1985 9), creating strength in depth and moving Laurel closer to producing, 
as intended by Rubinstein, “more than one motion picture simultaneously” 
(“Laurel’s First” 8). 
 In the meantime, as Romero’s feature film projects stalled, during fiscal 
year 1984 company revenue “consisted primarily of license fees earned for the 
television pilot of Tales from the Darkside” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1984 
16).81 The decision to extend Darkside into a series created additional income 
and LBS paid a reported $2.4 million for the first season. This was a healthy 
amount, even if a large percentage was undoubtedly fed back into production. 
By 31 March 1985, Laurel had received partial payment of $902,000 of the total 
license fees for season two. In January of the same year, Laurel entered into an 
agreement with Embassy Telecommunications, Inc. for the foreign television 
rights to the first season of Darkside. From this deal alone, Laurel “recorded 
accounts receivable of approximately $394,000 and accrued liabilities of 
approximately $245,000” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1985 F-12). Rubinstein’s 
motivation for moving back into television, self-interested or not, concerned the 
economic wellbeing and long-term survival of the firm as a whole. 
 Jocelyn J-Y. Desroches et al., in an empirical analysis of SMEs in 
relation to growth, draw upon the work of J.C. Laufer to state, “owner-managers 
and innovators accept and encourage the growth of their firm and are 
concerned mainly with self-accomplishment . . . the artisans, on the other hand, 
do not want their firm to grow, and are extremely concerned with maintaining 
their personal autonomy” (16). How true this sounds of Rubinstein and Romero. 
Building a company around Romero’s creativity may have been, at the outset, 
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convenient for each partner, yet as the company expanded, their individual 
interests moved out of alignment. Once again, this is not uncommon in business 
practices, and economists have noted that the value of an original founder can 
diminish over time (Jayaraman et al. 1222). This is often the case when wider 
corporate demands and obligations to stakeholders move away from the 
founder’s intentions. As growth occurs, the “founders’ opportunism and 
entrenchment” amplifies, often requiring a transference of control. Zahra and 
Filatotchev write that, in this instance, “a robust system of governance and 
accountability is needed to put a ‘straitjacket’ on founders’ opportunism” (895). 
 Romero’s employment contract for 1983 attempted to do just that. A 
pivotal clause stated that, “except as otherwise herein provided, Romero shall 
devote to the performance of his obligations under this agreement such time, 
energy and attention as is reasonably necessary of a full-time employee in his 
position, and he shall use his best efforts for the profit, benefit and advantage of 
the Company” (“Exhibit 10.5” 5). However noble his dogged pursuit of auteurist 
filmmaking, by 1985 it did not appear to fulfil this part of his contract. Agency 
theory assumes that all parties in a business transaction are fundamentally self-
interested, an agent seen to put her or his own incentives ahead of the firm. If 
we accept that all parties in a business endeavour behave in this manner, then 
Rubinstein’s self-accomplishing endeavours at least catered to stakeholders at 
every level, including himself, his shareholders, the firm’s employees, external 
business partners and his founder-partner. Romero’s self-interests, for the most 
part, looked no further than his own creativity. 
 As stated, though agency theory is an imperfect model when applied to 
Laurel, this perspective allows us to consider self-interested behaviour in 





fundamental responsibilities to the holistic corporate entity they had formed; 
Rubinstein was interested in collective growth, Romero in individual 
accomplishment. Romero’s agency problem was that he lacked the opportunity 
structures or level of control to achieve his primary goal. When this became 
apparent, he retreated from the company. Rubinstein later conceded that 
focusing business activities around his partner’s creative output alone was no 
way to run a business (Rubinstein and Martin 2004), made less practical as the 
company continued to expand while Romero’s self-determined incentives 
remained entrenched. 
 After declining to renew his contract terminating 19 June 1985, Romero 
was immediately re-contracted by Laurel as a creative advisor, if and when 
requested, on a non-exclusive basis, and as the director of Stephen King’s Pet 
Sematary (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1985 31). In this sense, the company’s 
agency problem was resolved. Control was transferred to Rubinstein in a more 
complete sense, empowering him to act as the company’s sole principal. In the 
end, it is unclear if Romero was ever utilised in the capacity of creative advisor 
and Pet Sematary, as we shall see, was eventually passed to another 
filmmaker. Either way, Romero’s new contract of employment essentially made 
him little more than another agent working for the company, his self-interested 
behaviour now carefully tempered and managed. Understandably, Romero’s 
departure had a dramatic impact on Laurel’s corporate identity and future 
business relations. Although Rubinstein was now free to lead the company in 
whichever direction he pleased, the massive waves of consolidation about to hit 
both Hollywood and a wider industry at large would have additional, unexpected 







An investigation into agency and agency theory from a sociopolitical and 
economic perspective considers the multifaceted interactions and institutional 
levels of control that impact, and to a large degree dictate, auteurist activities in 
the independent sector. Externally, issues of creative agency are a result of 
constant negotiations between stakeholders, where, simply put, financial 
success appears the best means of sustaining total autonomy. Industry trends 
also play a part and the demands of the marketplace typically have the final say 
in determining output. Laurel’s strategy of developing a portfolio of films-in-
development for an array of markets was shrewd, if of limited success. Finally, a 
consideration of agency theory and issues of self-interest challenges the 
uncritical valorisation of the auteur filmmaker in independent cinema analysis. 
As seen in this close evaluation of Laurel’s growth, Rubinstein’s careful 
nurturing of a multitude of internal talent strengthened the firm’s infrastructure 
and economic potential, in the process supporting a diverse array of creative 
practitioners in the independent sector. Romero on the other hand wanted 
Laurel to remain focused on his own creative agency. After all, if agency theory 


















New Dawn Fades: Mergers, Acquisitions and the Small 
Business Enterprise, 1985-1994 
 
“Mention Laurel Entertainment,” wrote journalist Ron Weiskind in October 1984, 
“and one name comes to mind—George Romero” (W23). This may have been 
so, but as we have seen Laurel’s success owed as much to Richard 
Rubinstein’s stratagem as it did his partner’s auteurist output. With the 
company’s totemic figure now absent, Laurel faced a period of change and 
reorganisation in which the firm’s corporate identity and production output would 
need to be redrawn. “Change” defined Laurel’s activities from Romero’s 
departure onward, augmented, as now seems familiar, by large-scale industrial 
goings-on as much as internal adjustments. Stephen Prince points out that in 
the 1980s a series of Hollywood mergers and buyouts “transformed the 
industry” (47), part of a larger global business trend dubbed “merger mania” by 
marketplace analysts (Lubatkin, “Mergers” 218). In the late-1980s, a first wave 
of industry-wide mergers and acquisitions (M&A) offered the solidity Laurel long 
desired. A second wave, coming in the early 1990s, resulted in dissolution. 
 An examination of M&A in relation to the media traditionally falls upon 
top-level machinations, exploring the moguls, conglomerates and major players 





A subjacent analysis of Laurel Entertainment offers instead a ground level 
perspective from which to scrutinise these developments, providing a rare case 
study of one of the many small to medium business enterprises swept up (or 
swept away) by these waves of consolidation. Divided into three sections, this 
chapter begins by examining Laurel in its pre-merger phase, asking how 
attempts to readjust after the departure of Romero contributed (directly or 
otherwise) to merger with Spelling Entertainment in 1989. The following section 
looks at the impact this merger had on Laurel’s output and corporate identity. 
This is then followed by a close analysis of the limitations subsequently 
imposed by this merger, paying attention to the 1990s M&A wave and Viacom’s 
purchase of Spelling in 1994, a transaction that rendered Laurel obsolete and 
resulted in the firm’s closure. 
 
5.1. Quantity before Quality: Pre-Merger, Syndication and Library Assets 
From the company’s first feature film in the mid-1970s, Laurel’s identity hinged 
on Romero’s auteurist output and cult image. After his exit from the company in 
1985, on the surface little appeared to change. Advertising material for 
Creepshow 2 and Tales from the Darkside: The Movie continued to foreground 
Romero’s involvement. Indeed, Creepshow 2 posters emphasised the value of 
writers King and Romero as “masters of the macabre,” presenting an image of a 
ghoulish figure pointing directly toward their above-the-title names. (fig. 5.1). 
Romero’s termination of contract agreement made clear the importance of his 
brand name, ensuring its indefinite usage in the marketing of the Tales from the 
Darkside television series. In 1987, Romero was still contracted as a creative 
consultant and had begun preparation to direct Pet Sematary, affirming his 







Fig. 5.1. UK poster for Creepshow 2. “Creepshow 2 - Original Vintage Film Poster.” Original 
Poster. http://www.originalposter.co.uk/fulldetails.asp?rid=3698. Accessed 23 Mar. 2018. 
 
 Even when accounting for Romero’s name value, attracting production 
monies remained a challenge. Warner Bros. retained first refusal rights on 
Creepshow 2 as late as 31 March 1986 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 9), 
finally placing the project into turnaround where it was picked up by Roger 
Corman’s New World Pictures on a reduced budget. At around the same time, 
development of The Stand was delayed to focus on Pet Sematary, avoiding the 
potential hazard of having two Stephen King adaptations in direct competition 
with each other on the marketplace (Laurel Entmt. AR 1985 2). 
 Pet Sematary’s more modest scale (though effects heavy, it did not go as 
far as to drop a nuclear bomb on Las Vegas) made financing for this film more 





allowed Paramount to option the project outright (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1988 
5). In this instance, Rubinstein stayed on to produce and Paramount honoured 
King’s agreement to write the screenplay and to allow production to take place 
in his hometown of Maine, New England. Otherwise, this was not formally a 
Laurel production. The company received no credit on the final print (beyond 
individual credits for Rubinstein and Mitchell Galin) and Paramount’s inhouse 
producer Ralph S. Singleton oversaw the day-to-day responsibilities of 
production. Paramount’s scheduling also clashed with Romero’s reshoots on 
Monkey Shines for Orion Pictures and he was replaced by up-and-coming 
director Mary Lambert.82 Romero felt betrayed by this decision to move ahead 
without him and vowed never to work with Rubinstein again (Jones, “George A. 
Romero Speaks” 19). 
 Released in April 1989, Pet Sematary received lukewarm reviews in the 
press (Canby 16),83 as did Harrison’s Tales from the Darkside: The Movie, the 
latter “lacking in a uniting vision” according to critic Mark Kermode (“Video” 58). 
Creepshow 2 was more universally derided, and Michael Gornick’s direction 
compared unfavourably to Romero’s work on the first film. As Richard 
Harrington wrote in his review for the Washington Post, “King and Romero—the 
horror genre’s equivalent of the daily double—are back on the storyboard for 2, 
but with director Michael Gornick in charge, 2 goes nowhere slowly” (B6). Nigel 
                                                   
82 Gornick claims the decision to go ahead with Mary Lambert at the helm was made because 
Romero “wasn’t sellable as the director of this project” (Axl and Jscott). The accuracy of this is 
not known and Romero’s rights of first-refusal on the project go some way towards disproving 
Gornick’s remarks. This said, Romero’s diminishing box office appeal probably resulted in few 
sleepless nights at Paramount when he proved unavailable. 
83 Rubinstein was not about to let such negativity go unchecked and wrote an angry retort to 
Vincent Canby’s review, published in the New York Times’ letters pages on 21 May 1989: “the 
major problem here is that [Canby] incorrectly labels the picture as a thriller. Pet Sematary is a 
horror movie, and it is a genre convention that horror movies telegraph their plot way ahead and 
the characters aren’t smart enough to stay out of trouble. This approach hasn’t seemed to 
bother the fans” (“Pet Sematary” H3). Rubinstein’s justification for the failings of the plot may be 
dubious, but it is intriguing to see him reinforce the importance of Laurel’s identity in connection 





Floyd of Monthly Film Bulletin also criticised Gornick’s direction, finding it 
wanting in narrative structure, pace and suspense (14). 
 Anthony Kaufman reminds us of the importance of “artistry” when it 
comes to canonical independent cinema, forming for him one of three key 
points of reference alongside financing and production contexts (qtd. in Nikolic 
3). With Romero absent, it can be argued that Laurel never reached the same 
level of artistry that it had under its co-founder. Such value judgements are, of 
course, entirely subjective (Romero was himself no stranger to scathing reviews 
in the press), and it is not the intent of this thesis to organise Laurel’s pre- and 
post-Romero phases into good art vs. bad art paradigms. What we can say with 
a little more certainty (and even here there is contention) is that the filmmakers 
who stepped into Romero’s shoes lacked his penchant for auteurist filmmaking, 
either from the classical Sarris model (despite showing technical competence, 
Creepshow 2, Pet Sematary and Tales from the Darkside: The Movie lack the 
“distinguishable identity” of their directors) or from a commercial perspective. 
 In the defence of these filmmakers, the firm positioned them as 
peripheral figures. Deference to King’s artistry was evident in his deal on Pet 
Sematary, while interviews with Creepshow 2 producer David Ball and Laurel’s 
creative director Mitchell Galin reveal an almost awe-like admiration for the 
novelist (Ball 2016; Galin 2018). King’s agency was picked up on by Vincent 
Canby in his review of Pet Sematary, referring to the novelist/screenwriter as 
“the film’s auteur as well as author” (16). Directors Harrison, Lambert and 
Gornick were essentially employed to translate a blueprint of a script (already 
written without their input) to the big screen. More so, Gornick and Harrison 
were inhouse collaborators, chosen as much for their reliability as their artistic 





firm’s “masters of horror,” or “auteur-as-commodity” (A. Martin 96). This was to 
the frustration of Gornick, who worried he was being “hidden in the background” 
on Creepshow 2 because his name lacked marquee value (Gross 41). Granting 
that these filmmakers were allowed a degree of creative latitude on set 
(Harrison 2018), their artistic worth was only a secondary consideration in terms 
of the company’s wider endeavours. 
 After the departure of Romero and David Vogel in the mid-1980s, 
Laurel’s creative governance was handed to former television producer Mitchell 
Galin, who joined the company as vice president of production in April 1985. On 
paper, he shared this title with Gornick, yet soon became a company leader 
second only to Rubinstein. Galin had previously served as director of 
development and production supervisor for Robert Halmi, the famed “miniseries 
king” and so-called “biggest TV movie producer in the world” (Rutenberg). 
Under Galin’s tenure, Robert Halmi, Inc. (which sold to Hallmark Cards in 1994) 
produced such lavish television movies as The Phantom of the Opera (Dir. 
Markowitz, 1983) and China Rose (Dir. Day, 1983), both for CBS. 
 By 1986, Laurel’s executive corporate officers were therefore as follows: 
Rubinstein remained president and treasurer, Virginia M. McGuire was 
controller of the company and vice president of finance and secretary and 
Gornick and Galin were vice presidents of production (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 
1986 15). On 29 July 1987, McGuire, Gornick and Galin were promoted to 
senior management level and Diane Vilagi was promoted to vice president of 
production administration (“Executives in Turnaround” 6). That same year, 
Charles Jeffrey Caiman rounded off the group of corporate officers as vice 
president of television and Laurel listed 15 members of staff employed on a 





 Galin’s immediate responsibility on joining Laurel was to oversee 
production of Tales from the Darkside, which remained the company’s most 
reliable source of revenue. Darkside was now being broadcast on a reported 
125 local stations across the US, mostly programmed in late-night timeslots. 
According to Rubinstein, this was when “horror buffs are most likely to watch 
and when there is less original programming to compete for viewer’s attention” 
(Farber, “Success” C22). The series had continued to grow in value well after 
the production of the pilot episode and in fiscal 1984 television licence fees 
accounted for 60% of Laurel’s revenue. By fiscal 1986, these license fees 
accounted for approximately 85% of the revenue (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 
1986 F-19). On 24 June 1987, George Anderson reported that Laurel’s net 
income was approximately $1.5 million, the main source of which was Tales 
from the Darkside (“The Tattler” 30). 
 As mentioned in Chapter Four, much of the revenue from the series went 
back into production, but the program did at least generate a more reliable 
source of monies than Laurel’s feature film output. Darkside further benefited 
from its economical approach to production, and William Teitler recalls an 
“inherently organised . . . automobile-style assembly line.” Production 
encompassed exactly four days (consisting of no more than 90 shots) and ran 
concurrently with pre-production on the following episode. Post-production was 
overseen by two editors and usually spanned little more than a week (Teitler 
2018). Given that the show was a “lean operation with small overheads,” a 
decision was made to produce series three and four consecutively, bypassing 
the start-up costs associated with yearly renewal (Teitler 2018). With the crew 
already in place, and studio space in New York and Los Angeles rented, Laurel 





month period. After which, the firm’s commitment to syndicators LBS and 
Tribune was finished, and the show broadcast its last episode in July 1988 
(Teitler 2018). 
 This push to generate more episodes was about more than licensing 
fees and saving on start-up costs. Todd Gitlin records that in television “the real 
money was in syndication,” where a series moves beyond its singular network 
home to run repeatedly on multiple channels for an unlimited period of time 
(57).84 Darkside was pre-syndicated, but additional episodes still equalled 
additional revenue. Famed television producer Aaron Spelling, the man behind 
hit shows Charlie’s Angels (1976-1981) and Dynasty (1981-1989), proffered 
that a minimum of 66 episodes was required for “successful domestic repeat 
syndication of network or first-run syndication programming” (Spelling Entmt. 
Form 10-K 1989 10). Former media executive Jeffrey C. Ulin says this number 
“allows a station to run a program five days per week (‘stripping’) for 13 weeks, 
corresponding to half of a network season (e.g. September-December); with 
repeats, this quantity provides adequate episodes to run a series daily 
throughout the entire broadcast year” (239). Most network shows move into 
syndication once this number is reached, often trimming the length of each 
episode to permit more commercial time (Gitlin 57-58). As a first-run syndicated 
package, Darkside was ready made for such distribution. It was “syndication 
fodder,” as Teitler put it (Teitler 2018). 
 With this so-called “magic number” (Ulin 239) for repeat syndication 
reached, it made little sense to renew Darkside after series four (bringing the 
total number of episodes to 90). Laurel then determined to produce a second 
                                                   
84 One of television’s most famous syndicated shows is perhaps NBC’s Seinfeld (1989-1998). 
After ending its original network run, by 2013 Seinfeld had earned a reported $3.1 billion in 





anthology program that could repeat the trajectory of its older sibling and, in 
1987, fashioned two pilots for first-run syndication in collaboration with LBS and 
Tribune. The first, Moment of Fear, intended to downplay the supernatural in 
favour of Hitchcockian suspense. The second, Night Rose, focused on eroticism 
and was picked-up on an exclusive basis by premium cable service HBO, who 
then lost interest when executives deemed John Harrison’s pilot “too 
pornographic” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1987 4; Harrison 2018). With neither 
show attracting much attention, Galin edited together a “scissor reel” of 
Darkside’s most iconic monsters and pitched it to Tribune as a new anthology 
horror series that placed such creatures at the forefront (Galin 2018). Monsters, 
as it was later called, displayed an identical model to Darkside and Tribune 
immediately fast tracked it into production, placing it on the air the same 
calendar year that Darkside concluded. The show spanned three series and 72 
syndicated episodes. 
 Aside from these financial incentives, Laurel “benefited from its 
involvement in television series production as a result of the opportunity to 
develop relationships with many writers and directors in both New York and Los 
Angeles” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1988 4). As a consequence of this focus on 
bicoastal television production, Laurel’s Fort Pitt Blvd. base became surplus to 
requirements.85 Rubinstein had maintained offices in New York from Laurel’s 
inception and all of the firm’s corporate officers would now join him there. The 
creative staff were also relocated to New York and, since this space was 
“suitable and adequate for its present needs,” Laurel ended the lease on their 
Pittsburgh offices in July 1987 (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1987 12). If Romero’s 
exit formally ended the company’s auteurist focus, Laurel’s status as a thriving 
                                                   





regional film base away from bicoastal centres was now also a thing of the past. 
 The demise of Laurel’s regional status was a profound change for a firm 
whose geographic location had been key to its formative identity. Yet this shift 
was unnoticed in the press and, given the gradual relocation to New York, 
made little difference in terms of the company’s productivity. Pittsburgh had 
made sense for a number of reasons, based on its knowledge of tax shelter 
schemes, distance from Hollywood unions, informal locus of eager (and 
therefore cheap) talent and the facilities accumulated by Romero and Latent 
Image. For Romero, Pittsburgh had been a separation from mainstream modes 
of production, literal and figurative. Now this was at an end. In some ways, 
relocation to New York was itself an ideological shift towards a more 
standardised corporate governance, a shift that had begun with the firm’s IPO in 
1979. As Laurel grew, the firm sought closer relations with the mainstream and 
a commitment to regional production now made little sense. Though ties to 
Pittsburgh were, for all intents and purposes, severed, the firm left behind an 
infrastructure of trained professionals that would later become intrinsic to media 
production in the region.86 
 Laurel’s focus on television production was another shift in the firm’s 
identity, yet this change in output unlocked significant additional revenue. Since 
production began, Darkside had been licenced to numerous foreign territories 
and in 1986 the video cassette rights for the first 24 episodes were licenced to 
overseas and domestic distributors, including International Video Entertainment 
and Embassy Home Entertainment (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 4). Geoff 
King notes the “astronomical” growth of the home video market in the 1980s 
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(American Independent 22), rapidly becoming a “global culture industry” (Yip 
91). Indicatively, Frederick Wasser charts 2500 video rental stores in the US in 
1980. By 1986, this had grown to 25,000 (Veni 101). That same year, the home 
video market was returning as much money to producers as the theatrical 
market (Wasser, “Vestron” 32). Blockbuster Entertainment soon became a 
marketplace leader, opening its first store in Dallas, Texas in 1985. Laurel’s 
back catalogue, of course, included feature films, and in 1986 the company 
reported that 25% of its revenue came from the licencing of domestic cassette 
rights to “a single motion picture distributor” (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 F-
19). 
 Feature films were therefore not entirely put to one side and, as the 
$450,000 in fees received for Creepshow 2 demonstrated, could still generate a 
respectable income (Laurel Entmt. AR 1987 5). On 9 May 1986, Laurel acquired 
the assets of the California-based limited partnerships Angeles Cinema 
Investors 81 and Angeles Cinema Investors 82. These assets consisted of 
cash, four feature films and the “amounts due or to become due” in respect to 
these films in the future. The four films acquired were Blue Skies Again (Dir. 
Michaels, 1983), Irreconcilable Differences (Dir. Shyer, 1984), Scandalous (Dir. 
R. Cohen, 1984) and Swing Shift, this latter film starring Goldie Hawn, Kurt 
Russell and Ed Harris. Laurel’s report to shareholders made it clear that the 
domestic theatrical release of all four had been “completed” (Laurel Entmt. 
Form 10-K 1986 10-11) and, with the exception of Irreconcilable Differences, 
had all been box office disappointments. The worst offender was the sports-
comedy Blue Skies Again, which returned a paltry $46,603 at the domestic box 
office (“Blue Skies Again (1983) - Financial”). 





Angeles Cinema Investors and why Laurel would purchase four films it knew to 
be played out theatrically. To answer the second question first, from this deal 
Laurel received approximately $4.4 million in cash, of which $1 million was 
immediately paid back to the two partnerships. Approximately $700,000 was 
used to pay the expenses of each entity and $225,000 was allocated to 
partners of Angeles Cinema, leaving Laurel with approximately $2,475,000. 
Laurel was also entitled to 25% of the next $4.6 million of future collections (if 
any) and 100% thereafter. Monies from this transaction were poured back into 
development activities, which Laurel foresaw would enhance the chance of 
future projects reaching production (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 11). 
 Distinct from the limited partnerships of Laurel’s 1970s tax shelter 
projects, Angeles Cinema Investors was one of a number of venture capital 
vehicles investing in feature films in the early-1980s, including Silver Screen 
Partners, Delphi Film Associates and FilmDallas. Unlike tax shelters, investors 
here were looking for a profit. As investment banker Jeff Barbakow warned, "if 
the films don't work, the deal doesn't work" (Harris E1). FilmDallas managing 
general partner Sam L. Grogg noted an “upswing of the booming film industry—
cable had matured, new superchannels were leading new markets for movie 
sales, videocassette rentals were growing at phenomenal rates and the 
international market was on the rebound” (151). Despite Grogg’s optimism, and 
the occasional success, individual investors did not typically receive more than 
10% to 15% annually on their invested capital (H. Vogel 132). A Los Angeles 
Times article from 1983 name-checked Angeles Cinema when reporting the 
high-risk of such enterprises (Harris E1). In industry speak, it became known as 
“dumb money,” dominated by the folly of “deep-pocketed dentists, oil tycoons 





game of film production” (Kelly).87 
 In keeping with the majority, Angeles Cinema’s $32.5 million feature film 
speculation, spread in a mutual fund model between two partnerships across 
four films (Harris E1), failed to return significant monies to investors. Sale of 
these assets to Laurel promised at least some returns on an ill-advised 
business venture. For Laurel, beyond the additional liquidity, the ancillary value 
of Angeles Cinema’s films was not totally exhausted, and Laurel now identified 
such markets as key to its industrial growth (Aaron Spelling Prod. Proxy 1989 
77). More so, acquisition of these properties, when placed alongside the feature 
films directed by Romero and the Tales from the Darkside television series, 
represented “a significant step towards Laurel’s long-term goal of building a 
‘library’ of motion pictures and TV programs with continuing residual values” 
(Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1986 4). In this transformative stage, what Laurel 
wanted was quantity. Quality, if not discounted, was, as seen with Creepshow 2 
and Darkside: The Movie, far from a leading concern. 
 Owning “substantial library assets” has long been an integral part of the 
major studios’ infrastructure (H. Vogel 91), and in the 1980s and 1990s theorists 
observed a move towards the consolidation of library ownership. In their article 
“Who Owns the Movies?” (1994), Elliot Forbes and David Pierce write that 
 
Wall Street loves libraries and weighs them heavily in valuing stock; 
banks and other lending institutions readily accept them as collateral; 
and the cash flow generated by their exploitation sometimes sustains 
companies through otherwise tough periods. And with the constant 
development of new media, film libraries have historically appreciated in 
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value over time. (43) 
 
Constructing a substantial library of content was at the root of M&A activity 
during this period. According to Stephen Prince, media mogul Ted Turner’s 
acquisition of MGM/UA in 1986 hinged on the studio’s library of classic films, 
“providing an outstanding bank of programming in perpetuity” and a steady 
stream of content for Turner’s small screen broadcasting outlets (71-72). 
Operating on a much-reduced scale, Laurel’s acquisition of Angeles Cinema 
Investors’ assets enhanced the firm’s marketplace potency across platforms. 
Given what was to come, one wonders how much of this activity was really 
about making the company itself an attractive target for acquisition. 
 The late 1980s had been a particularly turbulent time for independent 
production companies and small motion picture enterprises. In 1986, an 
investigation into the Cannon Group by the SEC accused the firm of fraudulent 
account practices, causing stock to fall and culminating in lawsuits by several 
shareholders accusing Cannon of misrepresenting its finances (Delugach C1, 
C8). Competitor De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy in August 1988 (Akst 1) and, by 1992, independent companies New 
World Pictures, Weintraub Entertainment Group, Orion Pictures, Vestron, 
Skouras and Cinecom were reported “dead” or “barely breathing” (Russell 
Smith D10). In 1987, the New York Times predicted a “tough season” ahead for 
independents,88 attributed to a dissipating enthusiasm around home video and 
pay television and the continuing rise of production and market costs. 
Investment banker Mark Manson, meanwhile, argued that “for the most part it is 
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simply impossible to predict what films will succeed and what won’t. Simply 
making a lot of movies helps” (Fabrikant, “Small Studios” L37). 
 When reviewing Laurel Entertainment for potential acquisition, auditors 
for Spelling Productions summarised that “as an independent entity, the 
prospects for Laurel’s growth are limited by the increasingly difficult time it, like 
other small independent entertainment companies, is experiencing in raising 
capital” (Aaron Spelling Prod. Proxy 1989 25-26). By 1988, the problems in 
financing feature films notwithstanding, Laurel was also facing difficulties with its 
small screen partners. At some point during the production of Tales from the 
Darkside, relations with Jaygee Productions soured, and on 31 March Jaygee 
filed a complaint against Laurel for breach of contract. Chief amongst its 
concerns was a lack of payment on net proceeds, lack of profit participation on 
the upcoming Tales from the Darkside: The Movie and a lack of profit share on 
the sister show Monsters, a program Jaygee determined to be a direct spin-off 
from Darkside. Jaygee sought general damages of no less than $800,000 and 
punitive damages of no less than $3 million (Laurel Entmt. Form 10-K 1988 13-
14). 
 The above episode reinforced Laurel’s financial vulnerability and the 
need to establish “friendly” partnerships in future enterprises. From an M&A 
perspective, business professor Robert F. Bruner labels so-called “friendly” 
companies the “white knight,” i.e. buyers who purchase a target and agree not 
to dismantle the company or lay-off employees. For Bruner, a white knight is “a 
horizontal or vertical peer of the target firm and is motivated to bid by the 
prospect of synergies in the combination and/or the desire to preserve a 
strategic relationship or deny such a relationship to a competitor” (848). 





very least, on the company’s mind during this period.89 Laurel’s growing library 
of assets certainly made it attractive to acquiring firms, while a volatile 
independent landscape, not to mention the financial threats from former 
partners, made a protective “white knight” guardian desirable. Actively courted 
or not, Laurel suddenly had an opportunity to cultivate such a relationship. 
Rubinstein and Galin were friendly with Jules Haimovitz, a so-called expert in 
“restructuring the business profile” of entertainment companies (Sharkey and 
Freeman 20). Haimovitz joined Aaron Spelling Productions in December 1987 
and by the middle of 1988 had arranged a merger between the two companies. 
A third company in this partnership, Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., offered a 
solution to Laurel’s longstanding distribution woes. 
 
5.2. “A Natural Middle Ground”: Acquisition, MFTs and Corporate Identity 
In the entertainment industry, the 1980s merger wave is said to have begun in 
earnest when, in 1985, media baron Rupert Murdoch and his News Corp. 
purchased 20th Century Fox, nothing less than “one of the most important 
mergers in industry history” according to Schatz (“The Studio System” 22). 
Bountiful M&A activity followed, culminating in 1989’s “year of mega-takeover” 
(Gold 5) when publisher Time Inc. merged with Warner Communications, and 
Japanese electronics giant Sony acquired Columbia Pictures. A managing 
consultant from McKinsey & Company reported that, from 1988 to 1989, $80 
                                                   
89 Companies are often coy about publicising their desire to become an acquisition target, 
particularly in the independent sector where ideas of autonomy and authenticity are central. 
Independent production and distribution company A24, the firm behind Oscar-winner Moonlight 
(Dir. Jenkins, 2016) and Greta Gerwig’s Lady Bird (2017), has recently undergone a protracted, 
“will they, won’t they” courtship with Apple. Despite A24’s status as a provider of “edgy, auteur-
driven projects” (Lang), IndieWire’s Jenna Marotta reports that the company was started by an 
investment firm who “considered it likely that they would flip the company within a matter of 
years after it was founded” (“Apple”). Merger with Apple was strongly denied in March 2018, 
though in November a non-exclusive partnership was announced in which A24 would provide 
content for the tech giant (Lang). Whether A24 wishes to retain its autonomy, or is simply 





billion was committed to “big takeovers” in the entertainment industry 
(Micklethwait 4). The widespread creation of “powerful communications 
complexes” (Norris 39) created a snowball effect, where M&A became 
“essential to the competitive survival of American enterprise in the emerging 
global entertainment communications marketplace” (Gold 5). As Variety editor-
in-chief Peter Bart wrote, “Sony’s acquisition of Columbia symbolized the 
globalization of Hollywood. Rupert Murdoch’s purchase of Fox formalized that 
the studios were becoming mere cogs in global media machines.” 
 Kalin Kolev et al. identify this as part of a wider trend spanning multiple 
industries and continents, influenced by permissive legal environments, 
favourable economic conditions (including recovery from an economic 
recession) and financial innovations such as junk bonds (23). In this context, 
economists observe that the stock market tends to negatively value unrelated 
diversification between joining firms (Shleifer and Vishny 53), while M&A activity 
between related firms boasts a higher success rate (Trautwein 285). The 
Reagan administration’s “hands off” approach to same industry mergers was 
also significant and, with the challenge from anti-trust authorities diminished, the 
number of such synergies grew exponentially (Shleifer and Vishny 53). For 
Michael Lubatkin, this confidence in same industry mergers fits a so-called 
merger contingency framework, where “the better the strategic fit between the 
acquiring and the acquired firm (that is, the more the respective environments of 
the two firms have unifying features) the greater the potential value created by 
the merger” (“Merger Strategies” 40). Synergy between firms has become part 
of a sound strategic plan, bringing together complementary resources that 
facilitate more effective operations (Lubatkin, “Mergers” 218). 





trend, as largescale conglomerates began “divesting unrelated market 
segments in order to concentrate on related areas of operation” (60). Prior to 
the 1980s M&A wave, the owners of the major studios typically had “no 
experience of—and little interest in—media entertainment” (Schatz, “The Studio 
System” 18). This is epitomised by Gulf and Western’s (a conglomerate that 
began by specialising in clothing, auto parts and manufacturing, etc.) purchase 
of Paramount in 1966. Prince calls the industry’s movement away from such 
unrelated couplings “deconglomeration” (60). 
 
Table 5.1 
Types of Merger 
Horizontal Mergers  Between companies producing one or more of the same, 
or closely related, products. 
Vertical Mergers Between companies having a buyer-seller relationship 
before the merger. 
Conglomerate Mergers – 
Product Extension 
When products of the acquiring/acquired companies are 
functionally related in production or distribution, but do 
not compete with one another. 
Conglomerate Mergers – 
Market Extension 
When the acquiring and acquired companies manufacture 
the same products, but sell them in different geographic 
markets. 
Pure Conglomerate Mergers Between firms that are functionally unrelated. 
Source: Yakov Amihud and Baruch Lev. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for 
Conglomerate Mergers.” The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1981, p. 610. 
 
 Looking at what makes an effective same industry synergy, economists 





do we need it?” (I. Altman). Frequently broken into distinct types (see Table 
5.1), the 1980s entertainment industry often combined vertical and horizontal 
integration. This granted firms ownership and control over “adjacent stages” of 
production, distribution and sales output, simultaneously allowing them to sell 
product across different media platforms—film, television shows, books, music, 
videogames, toys, etc. (Fan and Goyal 877; Micklethwait 6). Smaller business 
enterprises also hoped to ride this wave, fearing that failure to do so would see 
them cut adrift. In 1988, the Hollywood-based production company Heritage 
Entertainment, Inc. acquired Landmark Theatre Corp.’s chain of domestic 
theatres, admitting to shareholders that the wider trend of consolidation was 
behind this purchase. Heritage cited Aaron Spelling’s acquisition of Laurel 
Entertainment as a precedent that its shareholders would be wise to follow 
(Heritage Entmt. Proxy 1989 32). 
 In a 1989 proxy statement to shareholders,90 Aaron Spelling Productions 
recorded that Laurel’s east coast concentration “on the lower budget, first-run 
television syndication market as well as on feature films” would horizontally 
compliment the firm’s own production of prime-time network television on the 
west coast, providing “significant flexibility in producing programming in all 
budget ranges” (ix). Aside from this market extension, Laurel’s growing, if 
modest, portfolio of content matched Spelling’s objective to expand significantly 
its library of entertainment programming (Spelling Entmt. AR 1990 2). What 
these SEC reports left out was that Spelling’s future was uncertain. The 
company had recently ended a 17-year exclusive contract with ABC television 
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proposed M&A) and are intended to facilitate an informed and knowledgeable voting process 





(“Dynasty Producer” 50), prompting the Wall Street Journal to call Spelling a 
“lacklustre performer . . . no longer a major power in prime-time television” 
(Rundle 1). 
 The acquisition of Laurel was only one part of Spelling’s grander attempt 
to strengthen its position. In July 1988, while being written-off by the Wall Street 
Journal, Spelling announced merger with Great American Communications 
Company (GACC), combining Spelling Productions with GACC’s Worldvision 
Enterprises, Inc. under the organisational framework (or holding company) 
Spelling Entertainment, Inc. Worldvision was then a leading television distributor 
with an extensive library of international and domestic programming, including 
Hanna-Barbera’s range of children’s animation “rich in proven franchise cartoon 
characters,” from Fred Flintstone to Yogi Bear (“Great American” 74). As future 
Spelling president Peter Bachmann stated, Worldvision’s library “generates a 
very stable cash flow that helps underwrite its operations and new productions” 
(Littleton, “Supplier” 54). More importantly, it gave Spelling a guaranteed 
distribution outlet. The deal was worth a reported $65.4 million in cash, plus 
stock options of around $118 million for GACC owner Carl Lindner Jr., granting 
him a 49% controlling interest in the company (Drew 27). Partnership with 
Worldvision allowed Spelling to “control [its] own destiny” (Littleton, “Helpful” 
54), and Laurel would provide another source of programming to be distributed 
through this network. 
 From a media producer SME perspective, Worldvision could “generate 
revenues internally” (Cohn 13), meaning Laurel no longer had to worry about 
sourcing distribution for its small screen output. With these incentives in mind, 
and Laurel’s reported losses of $211,000 on sales of $3.5 million in fiscal 1988 





Spelling Entertainment. The deal was finalised on 1 March 1989 at a total 
purchase price of “approximately $12 million [consisting] of $7.1 million in cash 
including related expenses and approximately 734,000 shares of Class A 
Common Stock with a market value on that date of approximately $4.9 million” 
(Spelling Entmt. Form 10-Q 1989 5). For Laurel’s 2,600,847 shares of common 
stock, former shareholders received a combination of $1.70 in cash per share 
and approximately .282 of a share of Spelling stock (Spelling Entmt. Form 10-Q 
1989 6).  
 Though the benefits were clear, this merger definitively ended Laurel’s 
fifteen-year tenure as an autonomous production company. As with its exit from 
Pittsburgh, Laurel’s evolving identity made this transition relatively 
unproblematic for the firm. The self-conscious desire to cultivate an 
oppositional, anti-establishment brand left with Romero, going with him those 
notional ideas of “autonomy, authenticity, and distinction” (M. Newman, “Indie 
Culture” 34) so important to both the canonical sector and Romero’s own “cult 
auteur” image.91 In 1989, Laurel’s identity, as confirmed by Spelling’s report to 
its shareholders, was simply that of an east coast producer of low-cost 
television and film product. As far as the company’s growth was concerned, 
legitimising cultural notions of autonomy-authenticity were now irrelevant. 
Maintaining the firm’s autonomy in terms of “real-world” working practices was 
of greater urgency. 
 As a wholly-owned subsidiary of Spelling Entertainment, Laurel’s board 
of directors was disbanded and replaced by one consisting of Aaron Spelling, 
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Jules Haimovitz, Ronald Lightstone and Rubinstein (Aaron Spelling Prod. Proxy 
1989 29). Senior management remained unchanged and Rubinstein entered a 
five-year employment contract that guaranteed his services as president and 
chief officer until March 1994. This contract promised a yearly salary of 
$300,000 (to increase by $25,000 each year) and numerous benefits and stock 
options (xi). Rubinstein was happy that a large part of his corporate 
responsibilities had come to an end, now feeling freer to return to the minutia of 
day-to-day production activities (Cohn 13). Although Laurel was now irrevocably 
beholden to a parent company, the firm was otherwise independent and self-
driving. Galin claims that Spelling was entirely hands off when it came to its east 
coast unit, granting Laurel the freedom to initiate its own productions provided 
“the [financial] numbers made sense.” According to Galin, Laurel still “had the 
authority to make the deal” (Galin 2018). 
 But what deals were Laurel now attempting to make? Film production 
was still on the agenda and Spelling was impressed with the $57 million box 
office on Pet Sematary, on which Laurel retained profit participation (Spelling 
Entmt. Form 10-K 1989 12, 13). A sequel to Tales from the Darkside: The 
Movie was also in the works, alongside an adaptation of Stephen King’s 
Thinner, originally published under his pseudonym Richard Bachman in 1984. 
In November 1990, Spelling initiated Spelling Films International, a fourth 
wholly-owned subsidiary under CEO Ian Jessel.92 This unit was added “to 
acquire and distribute feature films for international theatrical, television and 
home video release” (Spelling Entmt. AR 1990 1) and in 1992 contributed to the 
financing and international release of indie films The Player (Dir. Altman), 
                                                   
92 Jessel’s tenure ended eighteen months later on 30 April 1992. He subsequently sued the 
company for wrongful dismissal and in June that same year was appointed president of 





Storyville (Dir. Frost) and Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me (Dir. Lynch). 
 Rather than a boon to the Laurel partners, Spelling Films reported that 
only one or two of the films on their roster would be made in-house, with the 
rest sourced from third party co-ventures (“Spelling Ent. Forms Intl.” 50). Once 
again, this was about library building, emphasised in September 1993 when 
Worldvision acquired 150 movies from the struggling Carolco Pictures. 
Properties in this deal included blockbusters Total Recall (Dir. Verhoeven, 
1990), Terminator 2: Judgement Day (Dir. Cameron, 1991), Basic Instinct (Dir. 
Verhoeven, 1992) and the Rambo trilogy (1982-1988) (Spelling Entmt. 10-K 
1992 1). As for Laurel, if the firm wanted to continue to make feature films, it still 
had to source third party financing independently. Even under this new 
corporate umbrella, money for features was difficult to obtain and the firm’s 
agency, in regard to an unencumbered existence of choice, remained limited to 
surrounding opportunity structures. 
 Tales from the Darkside: The Movie was initiated before the Spelling 
merger and was once again optioned by Paramount Pictures, again with 
Rubinstein and Galin producing. Thinner was not completed until well after 
Laurel’s closure, and the firm made no other theatrical features in the interim. 
Instead, Worldvision gave them a direct line of access into television. Spelling 
also encouraged activity on the small screen, readily introducing Rubinstein and 
Galin to network executives as a new “potential supplier” (Galin 2018). Early 
1990s television seemed like fertile ground and Amanda Lotz reports that new 
technologies (remote control, video recorders and analogue cable systems) and 
a growth in the number of channels “expanded viewers’ choice and control,” 
combining to facilitate an “explosion of content providers” (Television 12, 14). 





producers, another fortuitous development was about to make Laurel’s 
transition into small screen production even more attractive. 
 In November 1990, ABC had a sizable hit with the $12 million miniseries 
adaptation of Stephen King’s It, produced by WBTV and directed by Tommy 
Lee Wallace (after original director George A. Romero withdrew). According to 
the A.C. Nielsen Co. ratings, It: Part One received an 18.4 audience share 
(watched in an aggregate of 17.2 million homes) and Part Two enjoyed a 20.6 
share (19.2 million homes), making it the second most watched program on US 
television that week (Hastings, “TV Movies” 12; Hastings, “ABC Posts” 10). King 
remained a sizable asset to Laurel and, in turn, he found Rubinstein to be a 
sympathetic partner. Through the single purpose entity Laurel-King, Inc., the 
firm still held options on a number of King’s stories and frequently granted the 
author the right of first refusal to adapt his own material. 
 Serendipitously, King had become interested in writing for television. 
Although not directly involved in the production of It, he was impressed with 
ABC’s cult series Twin Peaks, which began airing in April of that same year. 
King became convinced that Twin Peaks had opened the door to more offbeat 
and adult modes of small screen address (Applebome H25) and began working 
on an original teleplay called Golden Years. Given Laurel’s increasing agency in 
small screen production, the company made a natural partner and Golden 
Years went ahead with monies provided by distributor Worldvision and CBS, 
giving Laurel its first ever network co-production. 
 Golden Years began with a short-order first series of seven episodes and 
fully intended to run into a second year if successful. Since a second series was 
not picked up, Golden Years’ has subsequently been mislabelled as a 





the fact that Laurel’s next two Stephen King adaptations were miniseries, 
beginning with the eight-hour/four-part The Stand (Dir. Garris) in 1994 (made in 
collaboration with ABC and WBTV) and followed by Stephen King’s The 
Langoliers (Dir. Holland) for ABC, released in two-parts the following year93. 
After Golden Years and Monsters ended their respective runs, Laurel focused 
exclusively on either miniseries or movies-for-television (MFT). As Spelling 
Entertainment told shareholders in its 1990 annual report, “Laurel believes this 
is a logical area of expansion; television movies occupy a natural middle ground 
between Laurel’s theatrical motion picture and television series businesses” (9). 
Given his significant experience in MFT production at Robert Halmi, Galin was 
well-equipped to lead the company in this direction. 
 In terms of financing, Galin says that on The Stand ABC provided a “very 
healthy license fee” (Galin 2018), going some way to covering the $28 million 
production budget (Laurel’s largest to that point, bankrolling an eight-hour 
program shot over 100 days with 125 speaking roles).94 The network intended 
to recoup monies through advertising sold at $150,000 per 30-second spot, and 
ABC’s senior Vice President Judd Parkin was confident of a hit due to King’s 
brand name appeal (Goldman B1). Laurel raised additional monies through 
Worldvision’s foreign pre-sales, or, more accurately, a projection of what foreign 
pre-sales would be. Galin claims these pre-sales far exceeded initial 
expectations (Galin 2018). The Stand appeared in the UK on Sky television in 
September 1995 and was then released on a double VHS set by Warner Home 
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May 1995, some six months after Laurel began closing down its offices.  
94 Rubinstein boasted that the company did not use deficit financing on these network projects 
(McClellan 74), although it appears that significant monies were in fact sourced in this way. In 
deficit financing, the network usually provides only a percentage of the license fee, meaning 
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Video. Indeed, Spelling Entertainment’s annual report highlighted that, in fiscal 
year 1992, Worldvision released thirteen titles to the rental market, including 
Beverly Hills 90210 (1990-2000), Golden Years and Tales from the Darkside 
(7). 
 The agreement with CBS on Golden Years stipulated that the network 
was “required to order from Laurel an MFT by a date certain or pay a penalty of 
$100,000” (Spelling Entmt. Form 10-K 1991 4). Accordingly, CBS 
commissioned Laurel’s “true-life” drama Precious Victims (Dir. Levin, 1993), 
based on a double-kidnapping of two new-born babies in Jersey County, Illinois 
in the 1980s. On the small screen, production begot production and, with 
Spelling and Worldvision’s patronage, from 1991 to 1994 Laurel entered into an 
unprecedented period of activity, producing Golden Years, Precious Victims, 
The Stand and The Vernon Johns Story (Dir. Fink, 1994). More so, in Precious 
Victims and Vernon Johns, Laurel finally moved beyond “things that go bump in 
the night” (McClellan 74), able actively to “broaden its focus” to produce a 
diversified production slate (Spelling Entmt. AR 1990 8). Despite the aspirations 
of its co-founders, this was something the firm had struggled to achieve under 
Romero’s creative leadership. 
 MFTs such as Precious Victims and Vernon Johns were hardly ground-
breaking fare and topical telefilms, in their “recreation of ‘real’ events, people, 
and places” had long been an MFT staple (Edgerton 221). Contemporary 
reviews of Victims dismissed it as by-numbers (Willman B9) and Variety 
mischievously placed it in the “baby suspense genre,” ridiculing “all the 
kidnapping and child custody battles collecting on primetime’s doorstep” 
(Loynd). Rote though they may have been, Galin says that of all his work for the 





minister (played by James Earl Jones) preaching equality in 1950s 
segregationist Alabama was close to his heart (Galin 2018). Aside from 
expanding Laurel’s brand, Vernon Johns revealed Galin’s own creative agency, 
acquiring projects for which he had an affinity and producing them in a medium 
in which he had considerable human capital. Laurel’s senior vice president of 
production had not only successfully taken over the reins from Romero, but 
was, in many ways, the perfect partner for this period of change and 
consolidation. 
 In Laurel’s focused production of network television, the firm’s identity, 
already seen to be transitional, was increasingly becoming a mirror of its parent. 
Above, we have seen how corporate leaders and economists favour M&A 
synergies between related companies, stressing the importance of sameness 
and a merger contingency framework. But such partnerships still hinged on 
difference. In Laurel, Spelling had identified three areas of divergence that 
could expand its marketplace reach, based on: 1) geographical separateness; 
2) specialisation in “high quality yet cost-effective production of fantasy and 
horror projects”; and 3) the production of first-run syndicated television that 
could be rapidly mass produced (Spelling Entmt. AR 1990 8). De Bernardis and 
Giustiniano’s work on organisational identities95 after an M&A event argues that, 
accepting that corporate ambiguity in the marketplace is detrimental, holding 
firms can manage “multiple identities under a shared group identity” to achieve 
success in multiple markets (351). Nonetheless, Laurel’s identity quickly began 
to collate with that of its parent. 
 Laurel’s business offices remained on the east coast, yet other “areas of 
divergence” began to dissipate. Fantasy and horror product was no longer 
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centralised, while the production of first-run syndicated programming became a 
thing of the past. Sameness between corporations may be a leading instigator 
in pursuing a merger, but in Laurel’s case this facsimile continued to develop 
after the event, demonstrating a moving together of identities as the firm’s 
began operating in tandem. In fact, the term “moving together” is inexact. For 
Spelling, merger was about consolidation and library building, its programming 
continuing much as it had before post-merger. Change was therefore primarily 
identifiable in the subsidiary and not the parent. 
 To a large extent, Laurel’s transformation was organic, and Galin’s 
agency as creative leader made a movement into network television a natural 
progression. Laurel benefited from television production long before it merged 
with Spelling and a sustained engagement with this medium revealed a savvy 
recognition of “strategic momentum,” i.e. “the tendency to maintain or expand 
the emphasis and direction of prior strategic action in current strategic 
behaviour” (Amburgey and Miner 335). Yet by the early 1990s, Laurel was not 
the same firm Spelling had acquired. The use of shared resources played a part 
in this transformation. Singh and Montgomery discern the value creation behind 
the “combination of human capital (specialized) and physical assets” post-
merger (378). Worldvision and Spelling’s resources made Laurel’s appropriation 
of network programming the path of least resistance, augmenting the parallels 
between the parent and its subsidiary. 
 Laurel is, of course, just one case study and further empirical work needs 
to be done to see how common this pattern is of subsidiaries taking on the 
characteristics of a parent post-merger. With this in mind, analysis of 
independent cinema does volunteer further examples of this behaviour. In the 





distribution companies, notably Disney’s procurement of Miramax in December 
1993 and Ted Turner’s purchase of New Line Cinema the following January. 
For these acquiring media conglomerates, this was about reaching new market 
segments (Tzioumakis, “American Independent” 64) or, in the case of Turner, of 
continuing to expand the library of programming for his television networks 
(Wyatt, “The Formation” 84). Like Laurel, New Line and Miramax’s internal 
governance remained autonomous. Justin Wyatt observes that “the most 
impressive difference [post-merger] given their new affiliation was a greater 
access to funds and more latitude in production decisions” (“The Formation” 
84). 
 Change was actually more dramatic than this. In Indie, Inc., Perren looks 
closely at Miramax in its pre- and post-Disney phases, finding that this latter era 
facilitated greater control over development, access to the parent’s 
marketing/distribution resources and an ability to control and nurture talent 
(stars, producers and directors)—behaviour not dissimilar to that of a major (91-
92). At both companies, mass appeal, star-driven properties such as The 
English Patient (Dir. Minghella, 1996) and the Lord of the Rings trilogy (Dir. 
Jackson, 2001-2003) now sat alongside so-called “edgy” fare with greater 
frequency. Perren writes that after the Disney takeover, Miramax became 
“‘hybrid’ in nature” (92). Wyatt, meanwhile, dubs these amalgamations “major 
independents” (“The Formation” 86-87). “Hybrid” Miramax projects like Pulp 
Fiction were thus celebrated at Hollywood ceremonies such as the Academy 
Awards, while concurrently appearing at supposed counterpoint events such as 
the Independent Spirit Awards, demonstrating an expansive marketplace reach 
(Perren, Indie, Inc. 92). Post-merger, the portmanteau term “indiewood” was 





 The extent of Miramax’s emulation of Disney went even further and on 
16 September 1993 the Weinstein brothers launched the subdivision Miramax 
Family Films. Miramax planned to produce low-cost (around $6 million per film) 
fantasy films with an eye towards the family market. As Bob Weinstein told the 
New York Times, “we have the best parent company in the world when it comes 
to marketing family films, so we’d be crazy not to take advantage of that” (Eller 
B9). Films released under this corporate banner included Into the West (Dir. 
Newell, 1992), The Neverending Story III: Escape from Fantasia (Dir. 
MacDonald, 1994) and the talking-pig movie Gordy (Dir. Lewis, 1995). 
According to Perren, Miramax Family Films was closed when it provided “too 
much overlap with Disney product” (Indie, Inc. 104). 
 In Laurel’s case, the merger was not with a large entertainment 
conglomerate. Yet like Miramax, Laurel was driven by a pragmatic utilisation of 
wider available resources, logical decision-making, human capital and strategic 
movement to mirror the behaviour of its parent. De Bernardis and Giustiniano 
suggest that a firm’s identity is most salient during periods of change, growth or 
retrenchment, citing the loss of a sustaining element or the effects of M&A (336-
37). In 1985, Laurel had change forced upon it, instigated by the departure of its 
co-founder/creative leader. The firm consequently allowed its identity to move in 
line with the capabilities of its new parent, facilitating a more diverse range of 
output than ever before. From this point forward, Rubinstein told journalists that 
Laurel’s “primary business is TV” (Cohn 13). However, as the 1990s 
progressed, this corporate conversion did not protect the firm from wider 
industrial changes amassing on the horizon. Laurel may have ridden the storm, 






5.3. “Have a Good Holiday, by the Way We’re Shutting You Down”: 
Closure 
Merger with Aaron Spelling Productions and Worldvision was mutually 
beneficial for all parties. Under the Spelling Entertainment umbrella, Laurel 
increased its output, producing a diversified range of small screen material that 
expanded upon (if, due to a relationship with Stephen King, never entirely 
abandoned) the firm’s reputation for genre product. Worldvision’s access to 
national and international markets, not to mention ancillaries such as home 
video, shored up distribution and unlocked a consistent and repeatable source 
of income. Having been introduced to network executives, Laurel became a 
steady supplier of content, much to the satisfaction of its partners. Taken 
collectively, in fiscal 1989 Spelling Entertainment reported revenues of 
approximately $48.2 million (Form 10-K 1989 33). In fiscal 1990, the first full 
year of joint operations, this combined revenue totalled $134.8 million (Spelling 
Entmt. AR 1990 12). 
 Behind the scenes, things were less stable. Almost immediately after it 
was established, Spelling Entertainment was put up for sale. Aaron Spelling’s 
ABC television shows Dynasty and Heartbeat (1988-1989) were reportedly 
“dying” (that is, haemorrhaging viewers) and, in what would later prove an 
embarrassing comment made to the Los Angeles Times, Spelling pronounced, 
“I can honestly say that I don’t know what the networks want anymore” (Finke 
3). Clare L. Drew’s 1990 article “The Selling of Spelling” was ruthless in 
appraising the firm, writing-off Spelling’s “fumbled attempts at a comeback” and 
dismissing his company as little more than an “ailing conglomerate” (26). Drew’s 
article conceded that the firm was in its infancy, and that the acquisition of 





revenue (28). Yet pressure to sell was being applied by major shareholder Carl 
Linder Jr., owner of Great American Broadcasting and 49% of Spelling 
Entertainment’s stock. Linder Jr. was personally mired in a reported $1.2 billion 
debt (27) and selling holdings in Spelling intimated some relief. For Linder Jr., 
the Spelling shares “were great assets, but not core assets” (P. Thomas B1). 
 Subsequent activity was rapid. On 6 May 1991, Great American sold 14 
million shares of Spelling Entertainment Class A common stock (and 250,000 
shares of cumulative preferred stock) to the Charter Company, a Florida-based 
conglomerate with interests in oil operations, banking and land development. 
Charter changed its name to Spelling Entertainment Group, Inc. in October of 
the following year, reflecting “the fact that the company has become an 
integrated entertainment company following the acquisition of Spelling 
Entertainment” (Lightstone 1). Charter/Spelling instantly began selling off its 
non-entertainment-driven assets in an attempt to increase synergy. A reported 
$25 million in cash was obtained from its oil operations, which was in turn 
pumped back into television program development (Heimann 1). In this case, 
the parent self-consciously merged its identity with that of the subsidiary. 
 Charter’s parentage was short-lived and on 31 March 1993 Blockbuster 
Entertainment attained 48% of Spelling common stock. Blockbuster then 
acquired additional common stock from third parties and as of 25 March 1994 
owned 70.5% of the company's outstanding stock (Spelling Entmt. Form 10-K 
1993 2). Blockbuster’s ascent since opening its first video rental superstore in 
Dallas had been dramatic, taking advantage of the home video boom to 
become a formidable entertainment industry player.96 From 1989 to 1992, 
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Blockbuster’s revenue tripled, reaching $1.2 billion. This included $142 million 
in earnings in 1992 alone (Ramirez 51). Now an “international powerhouse” with 
more than 3500 stores globally, under entrepreneur Wayne Huizenga’s 
leadership Blockbuster instigated plans for expansion. Purchase of Spelling 
Entertainment was high on Huizenga’s list of priorities, viewing this acquisition 
as a major step towards fulfilling his “goal of becoming a content provider as 
well as a distributor” (Arnold 46). 
 A month prior to this acquisition, Blockbuster purchased a stake in 
production-distribution company Republic Pictures Corporation for $25 million, 
obtaining its library of 1400 feature films and 3000 television episodes. In 
September 1993, Blockbuster instigated a merger between Spelling and 
Republic in a “stock swap” valued at around $140 million (Grossman and Stern 
B10; Turner B12). Through Spelling, Blockbuster harboured plans to produce 
straight-to-video content that would bypass the cinemas and go directly into its 
stores, a move that led Robert Alexander of Alexander and Associates, Inc. to 
call Blockbuster “the first modern studio . . . instead of making productions for 
the big screen, they’ll be concentrating on production for the electronic screen 
at home” (Grossman and Stern B10). This platform would have been ideally 
suited to Laurel’s middle-ground between film and television, but the company 
was becoming an increasingly small cog in a growing multiplatform machine. 
What had started as a triptych of companies made of east and west coast 
production centres (with a distributor in between), now included a film 
production unit, another production-distribution unit97 and its home 
entertainment-focused parent. 
 In January 1994, Blockbuster merged with Sumner Redstone’s 
                                                   





transnational media corporation Viacom Inc., a “corporate empire based on the 
value of owning well-established broadcast and cable properties” (Gershon and 
Suri 49). This merger was part of another global propagation of M&A activity in 
the 1990s, which included Disney’s purchase of Miramax and Ted Turner’s 
acquisition of New Line. This 1990s M&A wave is often conflated with activities 
from the previous decade. In terms of the entertainment industry, this placed 
News Corp.’s acquisition of Fox in 1985 as the start of a wave of industry-wide 
consolidation that went well into the 1990s (Schatz, “The Studio System” 26-
27), culminating with the Paramount-Viacom merger in 1994. 
 Business scholarship, however, allows us to consider the M&A activity of 
the 1990s as an entirely separate global cycle from the one preceding it. Kolev 
et al. define the 1990s M&A wave98 through a number of contextual factors, 
including increased economic globalisation, cross-border acquisitions, a 
disappearance of hostility and, crucially here, and in stark contrast to the 1980s, 
an emphasis on stock and stock swapping to complete acquisitions (25). 
Rappaport and Sirower posit that “in 1988, nearly 60% of the value of large 
deals—those over $100 million—was paid for entirely in cash. Less than 2% 
was paid for in stock.” Little over a decade later, the number of large deals 
completed using stock swaps had risen to 50%, with only 17% now done with 
cash (147-48). Although there is a clear through line between M&A waves in the 
1980s and 1990s (they both focus on synergy and on couplings between 
comparable partners), the difference had a pronounced impact on the future of 
the industry, not least of all in terms of Laurel Entertainment’s longevity. 
 The Blockbuster-Viacom merger was financed by an exchange of stock 
                                                   
98 Kolev at al. point us towards five waves of M&A activity, occurring intermittently from the late-
nineteenth century to the mid-2000s. For more information on how these five waves are 
characteristically differentiated, see “A Review of the Merger and Acquisition Wave Literature: 





worth $8.4 billion (Fabrikant, “Viacom Announces” 1) and was actually part of a 
“complex deal” to finance Viacom’s acquisition of Paramount Communications 
(Wasser, Veni 148). In September 1993, Viacom proposed a $8.1 billion merger 
agreement with Paramount that followed this “stock-swap” trend and called for 
just $1.09 billion in cash to be paid to Paramount shareholders (Quint 112). A 
stock-swap transaction, rather than an outright purchase with cash, has several 
disadvantages, leading to an over-valuation of stock while implying that the 
venture is embedded in risk. Rappaport and Sirower write, “a really confident 
acquirer would be expected to pay for the acquisition with cash so that its 
shareholders would not have to give any of the anticipated merger gains to the 
acquired company’s shareholders” (154). Acquiring firms might propose a 
stock-swap transaction as a way of “hedging their bets” or if they do not have 
adequate cash resources to make a cash offer (154). This latter consideration 
was indeed the case with Viacom. Sensing an opportunity, QVC chairman Barry 
Diller entered a counter offer of $9.5 billion for Paramount, now placing 
Viacom’s plan in jeopardy. 
 As QVC and Viacom entered into a bidding war (Noglows, “Viacom-Par” 
46; Fabrikant, “Paramount’s” D1, D3), Viacom recognised that they needed 
cash. In September, Blockbuster agreed to invest $600 million (in exchange for 
convertible preferred stock) to bolster Viacom’s Paramount bid (Fabrikant, 
“Viacom Gets Help” D1). Bidding against QVC pushed the price to over $10 
billion and Viacom, as a heavily leveraged firm, had trouble borrowing money. 
Blockbuster, on the other hand, had “strong cash flows and no debt,” making 
them an ideal partner (Fabrikant, “Hints” D1). In January 1994, Viacom’s 
partnership with Blockbuster became merger. 





Viacom’s latest bid, giving Redstone’s firm 50.1% of the company (Noglows, 
“Diller’s Deal” 63). Law professor Clark W. Furlow describes this as a two-step 
transaction. Since Viacom was only able to raise the cash for a tender offer for 
just over half of Paramount, this would be followed by a so-called “squeeze out 
merger” for the remaining shares, exchanged for a mix of Viacom’s equity and 
debt securities. “At the end of the process” writes Furlow, “Paramount’s 
stockholders would have received a mix of cash, debt securities and shares of 
the combined enterprise” (534). 
  Journalist Paul Noglows summarised the Viacom-Paramount deal as 
“one of the longest (10 months), costliest (Paramount cost Viacom about $10 
billion plus $62 million in advisement fees) and ugliest (the rival suitors bounced 
in and out of court) takeover battles in U.S. corporate history” (“It’s Official” 11). 
For Viacom, it was worth it. Anthony Ramirez of the New York Times listed the 
combination of Viacom-Blockbuster-Paramount as “the nation’s fourth-largest 
media and entertainment company, behind Capital Cities/ABC, Walt Disney and 
the biggest media company, Time-Warner” (51). Acquisition of Paramount 
allowed Viacom, in the words of Peter Bart, to not only “control the destiny of 
[its] own product in the marketplace, but [its] competitors’ as well.” As the dust 
settled, Viacom emerged with a majority interest in a dizzying array of media 
subsidiaries, including MTV, Nickelodeon, VH-1, Showtime, Paramount Pictures 
and Paramount Television (fig. 5.2). It was only logical that some of these 
subsidiaries would now be surplus to requirements. 
 Viacom, via Blockbuster, now owned a majority of Spelling's Common 
Stock (Spelling Entmt. Form 10-K 1993 2) and post-merger with Paramount, the 
parent began to look over its subsidiary with a critical eye. By this juncture, 





Beverly Hills 90210, but in 1998 Viacom began “paring the company down,” 
beginning by closing Spelling Films International. According to Sallie Hofmeister 
of the Los Angeles Times, Viacom considered the Spelling “unit redundant with 
its Paramount Television operation” and began looking to sell. 
 
 






 This “paring down” had in fact begun much earlier, when Viacom asked 
why, in the wake of a “mega-merger” with Paramount, they needed Laurel 
Entertainment. From Viacom’s perspective, Laurel was nothing more than a 
minor east coast subsidiary then specialising in unfashionable MFT product 
(Goldman B1). More than that, Laurel’s sacrosanct autonomy, which extended 
beyond production to include internal organisational structures (staffing, 
benefits, work place bonuses, etc.) was deemed ill-suited to a holistic, top-to-
bottom business organisation.  
 Galin remembers Viacom bringing “specific rules about how things were 
done” and Laurel’s bonus structure proved a particular point of contention 
(Galin 2018). Viacom wanted restrictions on the type of bonuses Laurel 
awarded to its employees (something they applied universally across all 
subsidiaries), while Rubinstein and Galin felt that any economic cap on 
rewarding success would limit Laurel’s competitiveness in the marketplace. This 
applied especially to attracting and maintaining high-quality staffing. Laurel’s 
resistance to its new parent’s management techniques resulted in the company 
becoming “a square peg in a round hole” according to Galin (2018) or, as 
Rubinstein apparently once joked, little more than a “rounding error” (Dubensky 
2016). 
 On 23 November 1994, the day before Thanksgiving, the Laurel offices 
received a fax from Viacom informing them that the company would be closed. 
As Galin glibly summarised, the fax basically said, “have a good holiday, by the 
way we’re shutting you down” (Galin 2018). Rubinstein and Galin’s contracts 
guaranteed a fair settlement, but lengthy legal negotiations were fought to get 
more than the rudimentary two-weeks redundancy payment offered to its staff 





staff would be hired back by Viacom on later projects on a freelance basis 
(Galin 2018). As part of the exit plan, the divorcing companies had to determine 
what to do with those Laurel projects in various stages of development and 
production. Though the exact details are unclear, it seems that projects already 
in active production remained at Spelling, such as Stephen King’s Thinner.99 
Projects in earlier stages of development left with the Laurel partners (Galin 
2018). Syndicated television shows Monsters and Tales from the Darkside also 
stayed with Viacom in an agreement that allowed Rubinstein and Galin to keep 
hold of their projects with Stephen King. 
 As Laurel began to shut down, Rubinstein and Galin entered into a 
production deal with ABC to once again produce MFTs and miniseries 
programming. ABC gave the partners overhead money to establish new offices, 
though permanent staffing was scaled back to a few assistants. Rubinstein and 
Galin had to contribute their own money to this reorganisation. Under the terms 
of the agreement, production was more prescribed and some decision-making 
needed approval from their patron (Galin 2018). On 20 March 1995, the 
partnership formalised as New Amsterdam Entertainment, Inc., named after 
New York’s original moniker. Production began on the MFT Kiss and Tell (Dir. 
Wolk) soon after, airing on ABC on 15 January 1996. This was followed with a 
feature film adaptation of Stephen King’s The Night Flier (Dir. Pavia 1997), 
distributed by New Line. As before, feature films remained an aside and 
Rubinstein told Variety that event television would “continue to be a cornerstone 
of New Amsterdam” (“New Amsterdam” 4). Such was the consistency between 
Laurel and New Amsterdam’s output that writer Frederick C. Szebin thought 
that Laurel had simply changed its name (31). 
                                                   






 From a macro-industrial viewpoint, closure of Laurel’s offices was little 
more than a by-product of the widespread M&A consolidations of the 1980s and 
1990s. The 1990s wave of stock-swap transactions had made Paramount an 
obtainable goal for Viacom, yet competition with rival corporations increased the 
price and resulted in “surprise” partnerships (Lippman and Bates) that Redstone 
and Viacom’s board of directors might otherwise have not considered. In 
Viacom’s acquisition of Blockbuster, the latter firm’s subsidiaries were barely, if 
at all, acknowledged and as the Viacom-Paramount media empire emerged, 
numerous internal SMEs were rendered inconsequential. At a micro-industrial 
level, Laurel’s merger with Spelling initially provided security in a hostile 
independent landscape, only to later negate the firm’s agency in determining its 
own system of internal governance. After Romero’s exit, Rubinstein had to 
navigate a series of potentially fatal corporate changes, his skill evident in 
Laurel’s consequent growth and the speed (and consistency) in which a second 
production company emerged when Laurel’s survival proved untenable. Indeed, 
New Amsterdam has continued to operate, in some capacity, to date, and 
Rubinstein’s independence, not to mention his status as the leader of a small 
media production company, remains intact. 
 As an interesting endnote, though offices closed in the mid-1990s and 
production has long ceased, Laurel Entertainment has not quite been buried. 
After Viacom acquired the CBS Corporation in 1999, and then split with it in 
2006, the divorce package passed a large portion of Viacom’s television library 
assets to CBS. Since Laurel was now identified as a TV company (Galin 2018), 
the firm ended up at CBS as part of this deal. CBS have since released the 
entire Tales from the Darkside series on DVD and in 2015 went as far as to 





continuation of Laurel’s residual ancillary value. In December 2016, Laurel 
Entertainment (now an LLC without a registered staff) was itemised as one of 
CBS’s 441 domestic subsidiaries in a list that includes companies both active 
and dormant. Spelling Entertainment is also accounted for here (CBS Corp. 
Form 10-K 2016 155-173). If the analogy were not so pointed, it would be 
tempting to say that Laurel, after leading a long and varied life, now counts its 
self as one of the undead—long deceased, but somehow still living. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a rare glimpse into M&A from the perspective of a 
small or medium enterprise, nuancing an understanding of such activities in the 
entertainment industry. Economists and media industry theorists have long 
been attentive to the importance of sameness between firms when it comes to 
industry synergy. This ground-level exploration expands this reading to argue 
that successful mergers can also instigate an additional mirroring between 
firms, where collated resources and knowhow result in the acquired firm taking 
on key characteristics of its parent—in the process, narrowing differentiation 
and altering its corporate identity. Additionally, we have seen how analysis can 
benefit from the key distinctions between M&A waves already identified by 
business scholars, in this case those that altered the global business landscape 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Accepting that there are important overlaps, this was 
far from one continuous wave and the switch from cash to stock payments 
resulted in “surprise” mergers that had a lasting impact on the industry at large. 
Ironically for Laurel, after over twenty years as an independent SME, it was 











In order to “make sense” of current media industry practices and future 
directions, Paul McDonald argues that researchers must “contextualise these 
contemporary phenomena, recognizing how the signs of continuity and change 
witnessed in the media industries of today arise from complex and contested 
histories” (2). By strongly engaging with a media industry studies framework 
that scrutinises past developments and contexts, this thesis has contributed to a 
historical understanding of American film production away from the established 
bicoastal centres. Laurel Entertainment, Inc. may have been neglected from 
previous critical accounts, but this close analysis of the firm across four 
decades has revealed the complex interplay of creative and economic concerns 
that exist for independent practitioners. Though independent cinema is 
frequently distilled as “the province of the auteur" (Schatz, "Film Industry" 50), I 
have shown the numerous mitigating factors that dictate the production of 
media goods in this sector, from the marketplace to the relationships between 
individual stakeholders. Placing Laurel and its methods within the broader 
history of the American film industry offers a fuller comprehension of decision-
making, artistic incentives and business planning away from Hollywood. 
 Through a media industry lens, I have surveyed the real-world business 
activities of a motion picture production company, considering media producers 
not simply in relation to the products they make, but also exploring the 





products. In this interdisciplinary investigation, I employed a range of business 
and economic theory to interpret the firm’s behaviour. Accordingly, Chapter One 
applied a theory of business orientation to independent cinema activities for the 
first time, shedding light on parent company Latent Image’s early attempts to 
“walk the line” between creative and economic concerns, while highlighting 
consistencies and deviations between practitioners usually segregated by 
avant-garde, “speciality” or exploitation paradigms. Chapter Two offered a rare 
examination of film and risk, applying Sedgwick and Pokorny’s analysis of risk 
management to the independent sector. Here, firms such as Laurel utilised a 
“portfolio” strategic approach to development rather than production, placing 
“speciality” or quality films next to cult horror, exploitation and sci-fi fantasy films 
on an expansive development roster. The films that moved into production was 
largely dependent on opportunity structures and changing marketplace trends. 
 Chapter Three called attention to issues of professionalisation, revealing 
in intricate detail the changes that occurred during Laurel’s IPO. Exploring this 
process of formalisation brought to the fore the firm’s skilful management of its 
corporate identity, demonstrating the self-conscious organisation of Romero’s 
cult auteur persona. Chapter Four moved to analyse issues of agency by 
placing sociopolitical theories of agency against an economic “theory of 
agency.” This review emphasised the corporate relationships that drove the firm 
forward, while highlighting the internal and external systems of power (from 
corporate officers to the marketplace itself) that determined output. Chapter 
Five examined the impact of M&A activity on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), where shared resources and knowledge, etc. can see the 
acquired firm take on the characteristics of its parent. As these chapters 





contextualised the activities of a single media producer against measurable 
patterns of business and economic behaviour. Situating independent media 
practitioners such as Laurel as SMEs, rather than as “maverick” producers of 
transgressive art, gets us closer to understanding the everyday opportunities 
and limitations that exist beyond the mainstream industry. 
 In this look at the firm’s organisational behaviour, I have also provided a 
revisionist account of auteur filmmaking, cult film and independent cinema from 
a unique SME vantage point. Although Romero’s geographical “independence 
from Hollywood” has been valued as a space free of artistic compromise (K. 
Newman, “Monkey Shines” 46), the firm’s regionality meant different things at 
different periods in its life cycle. At Latent Image, Romero took advantage of a 
burgeoning local television and advertising industry to pursue alternative modes 
of production, using the distance from Hollywood production processes to 
instigate a post-Fordist, egalitarian work culture. As Latent became Laurel, 
Richard Rubinstein embraced the commercial opportunities of the region, 
recognising tax shelter incentives as an integral part of Pittsburgh’s business 
strategies. Professionalisation through an IPO led to a more conventional 
infrastructure and, although Laurel encouraged an identity as a “seat-of-your 
pants” independent (Bernardini 177), the firm developed a robust system of 
governance that incorporated economic transparency, skilled corporate staffing, 
product diversification and external partnerships, etc. In the process, Laurel’s 
Pittsburgh base became an irrelevance, culminating with relocation to New York 
in the late 1980s. This regional space, though creatively advantageous, was 
ultimately dependent on its economic efficacy. 
 Laurel’s use of cult film paradigms was also bound to strategic 





as fields of study, with cult, and horror in particular, previously positioned as 
either “abject entity” for “indie film” consumers (Sexton 81) or segregated from a 
critical organisation of independent film because of its apparent commercial 
priorities (Insdorf 58). Within the firm, however, these strands met in a carefully 
managed business plan, non-hierarchically arranged to maximise the profit-
potential of Romero’s persona (see Chapter Two’s Business Wheel). The 
filmmaker’s association with transgressive horror cinema and regional 
autonomy was cultivated into a distinct (anti)brand, helping Laurel overcome 
low-budget, SME limitations and achieve marketplace recognition. Product 
differentiation contributed to the massive commercial success of Dawn of the 
Dead, establishing industrial legitimacy and facilitating growth. 
 Restrictive in some ways (Romero lamented that he was trapped in a 
genre that he loved), horror contributed to a long-standing creative autonomy. 
Filmmakers such as Wes Craven and Tobe Hooper also expressed 
ambivalence in regard to their association with horror (Scream: The Inside 
Story; Caulfield, “Hooper” 7), yet like Romero used their attachment to genre to 
achieve industrial longevity. Mathijs and Mendik foreground the “unplanned” 
nature of cult, insisting that a self-conscious production of cult is the exception 
rather than the rule (“Editorial Introduction” 7). Yet the list of self-styled “masters 
of horror” is expansive, including figures such as David Cronenberg, John 
Carpenter, Stuart Gordon and Don Coscarelli, and I have shown the usefulness 
of cult (and particularly a “cult auteur” personae) to corporate strategy and 
marketplace positioning away from the majors.100 Cult can therefore be placed 
more fully within an economic history of independent cinema, an economic 
history built on product diversity and identified structures of opportunity. 
                                                   
100 Ben Kooyman’s “How the Masters of Horror Master Their Personae” (2010) also discusses 





 This media industry analysis has included the first academic investigation 
into the working practices of major American filmmaker George A. Romero, 
providing a ground-level, practitioner point of view of authorship—not in terms of 
what “‘we collectively believe it to be’ . . . but rather what they collectively 
believed it to be” (Nowell 2). I have explored authorship as “a commercial 
strategy . . . bound to distribution and marketing aims” (Corrigan, “Commerce” 
46), but as with issues of regionality and cult, the company’s attitude to 
authorship was multifaceted. For Romero, it meant more than simply thematic 
and stylistic expression, it was a creative process in and of itself. Robin Wood 
and Tony Williams et al. accentuate the textual consistencies of Romero’s work, 
yet these identified paradigms were symptomatic of that demand for a working, 
on-set autonomy, not the cause. As discussed in Chapter Two, this was most 
evident in the arrangement with the Italian investors on Dawn of the Dead, a 
deal that respected Romero’s on-set sovereignty while, in the release of two 
distinct versions of the film, contradicted classical notions of authorship and the 
idea of a single authorial vision. 
 The extent to which the independent sector can be described as “the 
province of the auteur" is therefore contestable. Even here, issues of creative 
freedom are far from absolute, subject to constant negotiation and renegotiation 
between a broad range of stakeholders over time. Drawing upon new interviews 
with Laurel collaborators (all of whom were speaking about the firm’s 
infrastructure for the first time) and rare legal agreements, I have unveiled the 
mediators and creative partners who problematised Romero’s agency. 
Romero’s Pet Sematary contract, as seen in Chapter Four, granted authority to 
Stephen King and a completion guarantor, thus limiting Romero’s overall control 





presence on an independent film set, albeit an overlooked one when it comes to 
analysis of this sector. For Romero, this figure dramatically impinged upon his 
on-set autonomy, ending his laissez faire approach to filmmaking and restricting 
him to a more formal work culture. Despite claims that Laurel operated in a 
“European style” at the service of the director, arrangements such as these 
situated authorship within the firm’s strategic operations, rather than as the 
ultimate function for these operations. 
 Romero’s authority was also subject to the demands of his partner 
Richard Rubinstein, and I have shown with rare detail the entrepreneurial 
activities of an independent film producer. As Spicer et al. observe, perceptions 
of the “cruel producer” have become “a stalwart of many of the portrayals that 
inform popular understanding of the producer” (3). This thesis strongly 
contradicts such portrayals. Rubinstein was indeed a savvy businessperson, 
determining that his firm’s sustained independence required a flexible system of 
corporate governance and an ability to react to changing opportunity structures. 
Gamble et al. suggest that the central question of corporate governance is “to 
whom should the directors of a company be accountable? Whose interests do 
they serve? And whose should they serve?” (4). This industrial look at the firm 
therefore reconsiders traditional art-business ideological valuations. Romero’s 
auteurist drive may have produced artistically laudable work, but Rubinstein’s 
tactical approach to production was more encompassing, serving the interests 
of his company as a collective (which, in turn, through series such as Tales from 
the Darkside, provided a creative outlet for a wider array of personnel), rather 
than the single-minded goals of an individual. 
 Though Rubinstein may have seen opportunity in Romero’s artistry (and 





and post-production facilities), he was far from simply an opportunist. 
Rubinstein was just 26-years-old when the two met and showcased an interest 
in independent media production that spanned from his Ultimate Mirror to the 
formation of New Amsterdam Entertainment in 1995. Collaborator David Ball 
stressed that Rubinstein is not a “creative producer” (Ball 2016), seemingly 
more interested in business management than the composition of the text. 
While this may be less romantic than ideas surrounding the “maverick indie 
auteur” (a romanticism of which Rubinstein himself saw the economic benefit), 
Rubinstein’s desire for autonomy created workable alternatives to a hegemonic 
film industry. Chuck Kleinhans states that “legendary stories of filmmaking make 
for interesting reading and daydreaming. But in the long run, an informed 
audience is a better one for ensuring the lasting position of the independent 
sector” (“Independent Features” 326). This historical review of Laurel 
contributes to an understanding of independent cinema and its real-world 
potentials, determining to show independent cinema as it was, rather than as 




WALTER: What have you been doing all this time? 
THOMPSON: Playing with a jigsaw puzzle. 
Citizen Kane (Dir. Welles, 1941) 
 
Following the multimethod, media industry studies approach of scholars 
Freeman, Gough-Yates, Lotz and Newcomb, I have employed a “mixture of 





picture production company. This said, disclosing such “real-world” activities is 
far from straightforward. The extent to which one can ever really know the “real-
world” behaviours of a firm or a media practitioner is debatable, especially since 
industry researchers are, in most cases, restricted by an outsider vantage point. 
In a historical analysis, when the investigation is both temporally and spatially 
far removed from its subject (in this instance, a regional American firm that 
ceased operations over two decades ago), direct “participant observation” is 
further denied.101 Critical objectivity is a clear advantage to this distance, but the 
lack of direct access casts something of a veil over the firm’s every day, real-
world (and real-time) activities. 
 Additionally, in my early collation of research, I became aware that a 
sizable percentage of this data could be traced back to the self-representations 
of the firm itself. Articles on Laurel’s corporate behaviour in the trade papers 
and regional newspapers (relating to partnerships, new employment 
agreements and up-coming projects, etc.) were repeatedly taken from the firm’s 
own statements or press releases. Interviews in film journals and fan 
magazines, meanwhile, gave Romero and Rubinstein further control over their 
public image. Even the SEC documents—based on a legally binding principal of 
transparency—included annual reports in which Rubinstein would spin fiscal 
losses and unfulfilled projects for the benefit of Laurel’s shareholders. 
 The control Laurel had over its own story is, as becomes evident, 
another part of that story, another facet in demonstrating the firm’s strategic 
organisation of its facing image. This identity management is crucial to our 
understanding of Laurel, the intersection where authorship, cult and 
                                                   
101 As Jessica Iacono et al. write, “participant observation has its roots in anthropological 
studies, where researchers would travel to faraway places to study the customs and practices of 
less known societies. It involves participating in a situation, while, at the same time, recording 





independence meet. Yet to reveal a more nuanced picture of the firm, and to 
compensate for the lack of my own first-hand participant observations, this 
review has drawn upon a synthesis of ethnographic research, hard empirical 
data and textual analysis (Gough-Yates 16). As stated, business studies theory 
has situated Laurel’s activities inside measurable organisational behaviours 
across industries. Legal documents such as the SEC 10-K reports or court 
documents such as Fox v. Commissioner have also taken narrative control out 
of the hands of the firm. As was the case with Laurel’s move into tax shelter 
production, this “offstage” image sat in contradiction to public boasts of 
expansion and creative diversity. 
 Primary amongst this variety of sources has been the ethnographic 
interviews conducted with Laurel collaborators and employees. Accepting that 
this data must be carefully interpreted (that contributors may suffer from lapses 
of memory, or have their own loyalties or scores to settle, etc.), these interviews 
have nevertheless expanded the view of the company beyond the perspective 
of its co-founders. In accord with Anna Potter, such “research methods and 
activities constitute crucial processes of contextualisation, of attempts to 
understand media industries as both creative and economic endeavours” (163). 
Ideas of contextualisation, or corroboration, have been key, presenting an 
opportunity to test data drawn from elsewhere against the experiences of those 
who worked for the company. This qualitative research method has served to 
“connect the dots” between findings or, as was the case with Mitchell Galin’s 
description of Laurel’s closure, to provide reliable, on-site information where no 
other data existed. 





attention to the challenges inherent in ethnographic research.102 For scholars 
considering or about to undertake this type of fieldwork, I can only detail some 
of the additional difficulties that I faced. As is no doubt apparent, the first 
obstacle I had to overcome was to attract relevant contributors. So-called 
gatekeepers such as agents and personal assistants repeatedly denied access, 
often discarding my request for an interview outright or insisting on final 
approval over the content of this work (a request I was not willing to grant). In 
one instance, I came up against an assistant with a frustrating unwillingness 
either to grant or deny an interview. Speaking to them regularly over a three-
year period, they still insist that an interview is possible—they just need to 
check their client’s schedule. Again. 
 In the age of social media, a growing number of practitioners now 
maintain an online presence, offering a more direct point of contact. From my 
own experience, subjects were almost universally amenable to being 
approached in this manner. More so, I quickly found that one interview begat 
another, and subjects often spoke in support of this project to their colleagues, 
some going as far as to provide a list of contacts or a point of introduction. 
Although others were initially reluctant, afraid of speaking out of turn or 
betraying a confidence, they relaxed in the knowledge that their peers had 
already gone on record. It was therefore important to consider which interview 
subjects to approach first—whose contribution would unlock the most doors 
later on. As a practical matter, it was beneficial to start at the top of the 
company and George Romero’s early approval encouraged a number of his 
more hesitant colleagues and former employees to participate. 
                                                   
102 See Potter, “Managing Productive Academia/Industry Relations: The Interview as Research 
Method” (2018), Mayer, “Studying up and F**cking up: Ethnographic Interviewing in Production 





 While agents and personal assistants restricted my access, other 
intermediaries were more sympathetic. After discovering that Romero would be 
a guest of honour at the Lucca Film Festival in 2016, I resolved to bypass the 
usual gatekeepers and speak to festival founder Nicola Borrelli directly. In turn, 
Borrelli pointed me to Paolo Zelati, a journalist who had arranged Romero’s 
participation in the festival. These contacts made it possible to spend 
considerable time with Romero—Borrelli in an effort to reinforce the pedological 
value of the festival, and Zelati in a demonstration of peer solidarity. Even with 
this support, gaining access was arduous and Romero’s changing schedule and 
the numerous demands on his time kept me waiting in the wings for almost the 
duration of the festival. This necessitated that I be persistent to the point of 
annoyance, sending e-mails throughout each day and repeatedly making phone 
calls to assure that the interview went ahead. 
 Since I would have to be ready to go at a moment’s notice, and that it 
was highly likely that this would be my only opportunity to interview Romero 
(something that is possible in any interview scenario), this experience reinforced 
the value of good preparation. This interview was entirely opportunistic, quickly 
put together when I discovered Romero would be relatively close by (some 
1115 miles away) and that a point of contact could be arranged. Afterwards, I 
began to consider the broader timetable of my investigation, asking where such 
ethnographic fieldwork should be placed in a chronology of research. As stated, 
the Romero interview took place towards the start of my research and, though it 
was useful in opening doors to subsequent interviews, without extensive 
background research it was difficult to tease out the minutia of Laurel’s 
everyday working practices. Indeed, I became concerned that not only was I not 






 More so, as Kermode found when interviewing noted horror auteur David 
Cronenberg, it can be hard to get a veteran interview subject to “say anything 
new—not because of laziness on his part, but because there are so few 
aspects of his work that he has not already intelligently considered and 
discussed elsewhere” (“Recalcitrant” 135). This was true of Romero. Though a 
gregarious and engaging subject, as I probed towards information specific to 
Laurel, Romero frequently circled back to familiar, well-tested anecdotes. Mayer 
points out that learning from your mistakes is key to this ethnographic approach 
(145-146) and I addressed these problems in subsequent sessions by collating 
as much primary data as possible beforehand. Knowing what information I was 
looking for (or what information I lacked) gave specificity to my questions, 
increasing the overall value of these sessions. In some cases, this additional 
research was a means to jog the subject’s memory, particularly when 
discussing events that transpired decades ago. In others, subjects who handled 
sensitive data, such as Martin’s Financial Service Provider Barney Guttman, 
were reluctant to volunteer new information, more comfortable either confirming 
or denying the findings that I already had. 
 In a media industries investigation, McDonald stresses the importance of 
historical research to our understanding of current approaches and future 
directions. Laurel’s direct impact on the industry is noted, observable in the 
growth of Pittsburgh as a regional filmic centre (“Inside the Pittsburgh”; Buba 
2016) and namechecked as an important influence by independent genre 





in Darkness).103 More significantly, the interdisciplinary methodology utilised 
here suggests an expansive model of analysis when it comes to tracing media 
entities, incorporating a diversity of theories and research, from business and 
economic theory to ethnographic interviews and academic analysis. At a micro-
industrial level, this combination of materials presents a holistic overview of day-
to-day production cultures and work methods, offering a viable means through 
which to further penetrate the “closed-door facade of the media industries” 
(Freeman 2) in future studies. 
 As with the reporter Thompson in Citizen Kane, who must piece together 
the life of a man from the contradictory remembrances of those who knew him, 
the history of a firm can seem like a jigsaw puzzle, one with key pieces still 
missing.104 From this heterogenous perspective, a singular, uncontested “real-
world” truth may be unknowable. Yet as Michele Hilmes has advised, “the 
concept of ‘industry’ implies the coming together of a host of interests and 
efforts around the production of goods or services” (22). The methodological 
approach of this thesis reflects the fact that the history of a firm is a collective 
history—one of contradictions, compromises and contested approaches to 
creative and economic matters. This is something that is as true for the 
American independent film sector as a whole, as it was for this small 




                                                   
103 In keeping with Laurel’s overlooked status (and, indeed, a neglect of business parameters as 
a whole), these practitioners attribute the activities of the firm solely to Romero and his creative 
demands. 
104 So as not to overwork this analogy any more than necessary, I will avoid comparing 










Laurel Theatrical Feature Films 
Creepshow. Directed by George A. Romero, UFDC, 1982. 
Creepshow 2. Directed by Michael Gornick, New World Pictures, 1987. 
Dawn of the Dead. Directed by George A. Romero, UFDC, 1978. 
Day of the Dead. Directed by George A. Romero, UFDC, 1985. 
Knightriders. Directed by George A. Romero, UFDC, 1981. 
Martin. Directed by George A. Romero, Libra Films, 1978. 
Pet Sematary. Directed by Mary Lambert, Paramount Pictures, 1989. 
Tales from the Darkside: The Movie. Directed by John Harrison, Paramount 
 Pictures,1990. 
 
Laurel Television Series, Specials, Mini-Series and Movies for Television 
“Franco Harris: Good Luck on Sunday.” The Winners, directed by George A.  
 Romero, Laurel Tape & Film, 1973. 
Golden Years. Created by Stephen King, Worldvision Enterprises, Inc./CBS, 
 1991. 
“I’m Back: The Rocky Bleier Story.” The Winners, directed by Michael Gornick, 
 Laurel Tape & Film, 1975. 
Magic at the Roxy. Directed by Mark Gargiulo, Laurel Tape & Film, 1976. 
Monsters. Created by Richard P. Rubinstein and Mitchell Galin, Tribune 





“O.J. Simpson: Juice on the Loose.” The Winners, directed by George A.  
 Romero, Laurel Tape & Film, 1974. 
Precious Victims. Directed by Peter Levin, Worldvision Enterprises, Inc./CBS, 
 1995. 
Stephen King’s The Langoliers. Executive Producers Richard P. Rubinstein and 
 Mitchell Galin, Worldvision Enterprises, Inc./ABC, 1995. 
Stephen King’s The Stand. Directed by Mick Garris, Worldvision Enterprises,  
 Inc./ABC, 1994. 
Tales from the Darkside. Executive Producers Richard Rubinstein, George A. 
 Romero and Jerry Golod, Tribune Entertainment, 1983-1988. 
“Thank God I’m a Country Boy: Terry Bradshaw.” The Winners, directed by 
 Michael Gornick, Laurel Tape & Film, 1975. 
“Trick or Treat.” Tales from the Darkside, written by Franco Amurri and George 
 A. Romero, directed by Bob Babalan, Tribune Entertainment, 1983. 
The Vernon Johns Story. Directed by Kenneth Fink, Worldvision Enterprises, 
 Inc., 1994. 
The Winners. Created by Richard P. Rubinstein and George A. Romero, Laurel 
 Tape & Film, 1973-1975. 
"The Word Processor of the Gods." Tales from the Darkside, directed by 
 Michael Gornick, Tribune Entertainment, 1984. 
 
Additional Feature Films 
À bout de soufflé. Directed by Jean-Luc Godard, Films Georges de 
 Beauregard/Les Films Impéria/Films Around the World, 1960. 
Alambrista! Directed by Robert M. Young, PBS/First Run Features, 1977. 





Anticipation of the Night. Directed by Stan Brakhage, The Film-Maker’s 
 Cooperative, 1958. 
Arabian Nights. Directed by Pier Paolo Pasolini, United Artists, 1974. 
Bad Lieutenant. Directed by Abel Ferrara, Aries Films, 1992. 
Basic Instinct. Directed by Paul Verhoeven, Carolco Pictures, 1992. 
Battle Beyond the Stars. Directed by Jimmy T. Murakami, New World Pictures, 
 1980. 
Battleship Potemkin. Directed by Sergei M. Eisenstein, Goskino /Films Around 
 the World, 1925. 
The Beastmaster. Directed by Don Coscarelli, MGM, 1982. 
Benji. Directed by Joe Camp, Mulberry Square Releasing, 1974. 
Benji the Hunted. Directed by Joe Camp, Beuna Vista Pictures, 1987. 
The Bird with the Crystal Plumage. Directed by Dario Argento, Titanus, 1970.  
Blackboard Jungle. Directed by Richard Brooks, MGM, 1955. 
Blow Job. Directed by Andy Warhol, The Factory, 1963. 
Blue Skies Again. Directed by Richard Michaels, Warner Bros.,1983. 
The Boob Tube. Directed by Christopher Odin, Constellation Films, 1975. 
A Boy and His Dog. Directed by L.Q. Jones, LQ/JAF, 1975. 
Buffalo ‘66. Directed by Vincent Gallo, Lions Gate Films, 1998. 
The Canterbury Tales. Directed by Pier Paolo Pasolini, United Artists, 1972. 
Carrie. Directed by Brian De Palma, United Artists, 1976. 
Cattle Anne and Little Britches. Directed by Lamont Johnson, Universal 
 Pictures, 1981. 
Chan is Missing. Directed by Wayne Wang, New Yorker Films, 1982. 
Chelsea Girls. Directed by Paul Morrissey and Andy Warhol, The Film-Maker’s  





Citizen Kane. Directed by Orson Welles, RKO Radio Pictures, 1941. 
The Color of Money. Directed by Martin Scorsese, Touchstone Pictures, 1986. 
The Connection. Directed by Shirley Clarke, Films Around the World, 1962. 
The Conversation. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola, Paramount Pictures, 
 1974. 
The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover. Directed by Peter Greenaway,
 Miramax, 1989. 
The Crazies. Directed by George A. Romero, Cambist Films, 1973. 
David and Lisa. Directed by Frank Perry, Continental Distributing, 1962. 
David Holzman’s Diary. Directed by Jim McBride, New Yorker Films, 1967.  
Day for Night. Directed by François Truffaut, Warner Bros., 1973. 
Dirty Dancing. Directed by Emile Ardolino, Vestron Pictures, 1987. 
Dolls. Directed by Stuart Gordon, Empire Pictures, 1987. 
Don’t Answer the Phone! Directed by Robert Hammer, Crown International 
 Pictures, 1980. 
Dreamgirls. Directed by Bill Condon, Paramount Pictures, 2006. 
Easy Rider. Directed by Dennis Hopper, Columbia Pictures, 1969. 
Eat. Directed by Andy Warhol, The Factory, 1963. 
El Topo. Directed by Alejandro Jodorowsky, Douglas Music Films, 1970. 
The English Patient. Directed by Anthony Minghella, Miramax, 1996. 
Exterminator 2. Directed by Mark Buntzman, The Cannon Group, 1984. 
The Fantastic Voyage. Directed by Richard Fleischer, 20th Century Fox, 1966. 
Faster Pussycat! Kill! Kill! Directed by Russ Meyer, Eve Productions, 1965. 
Free Voice of Labor: The Jewish Anarchists. Directed by Steven Fischler and 
 Joel Sucher, The Cinema Guild, 1980. 





Gal Young ’Un. Directed by Victor Nuñez, First Run Features, 1979. 
Game Show Models. Directed by David Neil Gottlieb, Constellation Films, 1977. 
The Godfather. Directed by Francis Ford Coppola, Paramount Pictures, 1972. 
Gods and Monsters. Directed by Bill Condon, Lions Gate Films, 1998. 
Goodbye, Columbus. Directed by Larry Peerce, Paramount Pictures, 1969. 
Gordy. Directed by Mark Lewis, Miramax Family Films, 1995.  
The Graduate. Directed by Mike Nichols, Embassy Pictures, 1967. 
Grease. Directed by Randal Kleiser, Paramount Pictures, 1978. 
Greetings. Directed by Brian De Palma, Sigma III, 1969. 
Halloween. Directed by John Carpenter, Compass International Pictures, 1978. 
Harlan County U.S.A. Directed by Barbara Kopple, PBS, 1976.  
Heartland. Directed by Richard Pearce, Levitt-Pickman Film Corporation, 1979. 
Heaven’s Gate. Dir. Michael Cimino, United Artists, 1980. 
Hercules. Directed by Luigi Cozzi, The Cannon Group, 1983. 
House of Long Shadows. Directed by Pete Walker, The Cannon Group,1983. 
The Immoral Mr. Teas. Directed by Russ Meyer, Pad-Ram Enterprises, 1959. 
Into the West. Directed by Mike Newell, Miramax Family Films, 1992. 
The Intruder. Directed by Roger Corman, Astor Pictures Corporation, 1962. 
Investigation of a Citizen Above Suspicion. Directed by Elio Petri, Columbia 
 Pictures, 1970. 
Irreconcilable Differences. Directed by Charles Shyer, Warner Bros., 1984. 
It Happened to Jane. Directed by Richard Quine, Columbia Pictures, 1959. 
Jack’s Wife. Directed by George A. Romero, Jack H. Harris Enterprises, 1972. 
Jaws. Directed by Steven Spielberg, Universal Pictures, 1975.  
The Kentucky Fried Movie. Directed by John Landis, UFDC, 1977. 





Lady Bird. Directed by Greta Gerwig, A24, 2017. 
The Last Starfighter. Directed by Nick Castle, Universal Pictures/Lorimar, 1984. 
The Last Temptation of Christ. Directed by Martin Scorsese, Universal Pictures, 
 1988.  
The Liberation of Cherry Jankowski. Directed by John Russo, Constellation 
 Films, 1976. 
Lion of the Desert. Dir. Moustapha Akkad, UFDC, 1980. 
The Living Dead at the Manchester Morgue. Directed by Jorge Grau, 
 Ambassador Film Distributors/Hallmark Releasing, 1974. 
The Lord of the Rings Trilogy. Directed by Peter Jackson, New Line Cinema, 
 2001-2003. 
Love Streams. Directed by John Cassavetes, The Cannon Group, 1984. 
Macabre. Directed by William Castle, Allied Artists Pictures, 1958. 
Maîtresse. Directed by Barbet Schroeder, Gaumont/Libra Films, 1975. 
The Man with the Golden Arm. Directed by Otto Preminger, United Artists, 
 1955. 
Mean Streets. Directed by Martin Scorsese, Warner Bros., 1973. 
Monkey Shines. Directed by George A. Romero, Orion Pictures, 1988. 
The Moon is Blue. Directed by Otto Preminger, United Artists, 1953. 
Moonlight. Directed by Barry Jenkins, A24, 2016. 
My Dinner with Andre. Directed by Louis Malle, New Yorker Films, 1981. 
The Naughty Stewardess. Directed by Al Adamson, Constellation Films, 1974.  
The Neverending Story III: Escape from Fantasia. Directed by Peter 
 MacDonald, Miramax Family Films, 1994. 
Night Call Nurses. Directed by Jonathan Kaplan, New World Pictures, 1972. 





A Nightmare on Elm Street. Directed by Wes Craven, New Line Cinema, 1984.  
Night of the Living Dead. Directed by George A. Romero, Image 
 Ten/Continental Distributing, 1968. 
No Country for Old Men. Directed by Joel and Ethan Coen, Miramax/Paramount  
 Vantage, 2007. 
North by Northwest. Directed by Alfred Hitchcock, MGM, 1959. 
Northern Lights. Directed by John Hanson and Rob Nilsson, Cine Manifest 
 Productions, 1978. 
Pink Flamingos. Directed by John Waters, New Line Cinema, 1972.  
The Player. Directed by Robert Altman, Fine Line Features, 1992. 
Profondo Rosso. Directed by Dario Argento, Cineriz/Howard Mahler Films, 
 1975. 
Psycho. Directed by Alfred Hitchcock, Paramount Pictures, 1960.  
Pulp Fiction. Directed by Quentin Tarantino, Miramax, 1994. 
Putney Swope. Directed by Robert Downey, Cinema V, 1969. 
Putty Hill. Directed by Matthew Porterfield, The Cinema Guild, 2010. 
Return of the Secaucus Seven. Directed by John Sayles, Libra Films, 1979. 
The Rocky Horror Picture Show. Directed by Jim Sharman, 20th Century Fox, 
 1975. 
Rosemary’s Baby. Directed by Roman Polanski, Paramount Pictures, 1968. 
Saturday Night and Sunday Morning. Directed by Karel Reisz, British Lion 
 Films,  1961. 
Saw. Directed by James Wan, Lions Gate Films, 2004. 
Scandalous. Directed by Rob Cohen, Orion Pictures, 1984. 
Sebastiane. Directed by Paul Humfress and Derek Jarman, Libra Films, 1976. 





sex, lies, and videotape. Directed by Stephen Soderbergh, Miramax, 1989. 
Shadows. Directed by John Cassavetes, Lion International Films, 1958. 
She’s Gotta Have It. Directed by Spike Lee, Island Pictures, 1986. 
The Sinful Bed. Directed by Ralf Gregan, UFDC, 1973. 
Spasmo. Directed by Umberto Lenzi, Produzioni Atlas Consorziate/Libra Films  
 International, 1974. 
Star Trek III: The Search for Spock. Directed by Leonard Nimoy, Paramount 
 Pictures, 1984. 
Star Wars. Directed by George Lucas, 20th Century Fox, 1977. 
Storyville. Directed by Mark Frost, 20th Century Fox, 1992. 
Strange Behavior. Directed by Michael Laughlin, Hemdale Film Corporation/ 
 World- Northal Corporation, 1981. 
Strange Invaders. Directed by Michael Laughlin, Orion Pictures, 1983. 
Superman: The Movie. Directed by Richard Donner, Warner Bros., 1978. 
Superman II. Directed by Richard Lester, Warner Bros., 1981. 
Superman IV: The Quest for Peace, Dir. Sidney J. Furie, The Cannon 
 Group/Warner Bros., 1987. 
Survival of the Dead. Directed by George A. Romero, Magnet Releasing, 2009. 
Suspiria. Directed by Dario Argento, Produzioni Atlas Consorziate (P.A.C.)/20th 
 Century Fox International Classics, 1977. 
Swing Shift. Directed by Jonathan Demme, Warner Bros., 1984. 
Ten Little Indians. Directed by Peter Collinson, AVCO Embassy Pictures, 1974. 
Terminator 2: Judgement Day. Directed by James Cameron, Carolco Pictures, 
 1991.  
The Texas Chain Saw Massacre. Directed by Tobe Hooper, Bryanston 





There’s Always Vanilla. Directed by George A. Romero, Cambist Films, 1971. 
THX 1138. Directed by George Lucas, Warner Bros., 1970. 
Tintorera: Killer Shark. Directed by René Cardona Jr., UFDC, 1977. 
Tombs of the Blind Dead. Directed by Amando de Ossorio, Hispamex 
 Films/Hallmark Releasing, 1972. 
Too Late Blues. Directed by John Cassavetes, Paramount Pictures, 1961. 
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